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Abstract 
High security level must be guaranteed in applications in order to mitigate risks during 
the deployment of information systems in open network environments. However, a 
significant number of legacy systems remain in use which poses security risks to the 
enterprise’ assets due to the poor technologies used and lack of security concerns when 
they were in design. Software reengineering is a way out to improve their security levels 
in a systematic way. Model driven is an approach in which model as defined by its type 
directs the execution of the process. The aim of this research is to explore how model 
driven approach can facilitate the software reengineering driven by security demand. 
The research in this thesis involves the following three phases. 
Firstly, legacy system understanding is performed using reverse engineering techniques. 
Task of this phase is to reverse engineer legacy system into UML models, partition the 
legacy system into subsystems with the help of model slicing technique and detect 
existing security mechanisms to determine whether or not the provided security in the 
legacy system satisfies the user’s security objectives. 
Secondly, security requirements are elicited using risk analysis method. It is the process 
of analysing key aspects of the legacy systems in terms of security. A new risk 
assessment method, taking consideration of asset, threat and vulnerability, is proposed 
and used to elicit the security requirements which will generate the detailed security 
requirements in the specific format to direct the subsequent security enhancement.  
Finally, security enhancement for the system is performed using the proposed ontology 
based security pattern approach. It is the stage that security patterns derived from 
security expertise and fulfilling the elicited security requirements are selected and 
integrated in the legacy system models with the help of the proposed security ontology. 
The proposed approach is evaluated by the selected case study. Based on the analysis, 
conclusions are drawn and future research is discussed at the end of this thesis. The 
results show this thesis contributes an effective, reusable and suitable evolution 
approach for software security. 
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Chapter 1                      
Introduction 
Objectives 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 To motivate the need for security driven software evolution 
 To describe the research objectives and research methods 
 To highlight original contribution and define the success criteria 
 To outline the structure of the thesis 
__________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Motivation 
With the rapid development of IT technology, more and more enterprises are likely to 
connect their software systems to the internet where the enterprises’ assets are exposed 
to lots of various potential damages, which is usually referred to as electronic risks [8, 
51]. High security levels must be guaranteed in applications so as to reduce the risks and 
facilitate the deployment of information systems in open network environments. 
However, because of the critical value to the business process, there are a significant 
number of legacy systems are kept in operation. Most of them cannot be connected to 
the open network directly because they were originally designed to be used in protected 
environment and thereby the security features provided in their designs are not enough 
to protect them against the security attacks in the open network environment. Obviously, 
these applications cannot operate properly in modern internet environment. 
Nevertheless, these legacy systems are vital to the enterprise in that they are tightly 
coupled with the enterprise’s information and production infrastructure and have been 
thoroughly tested during many years operation. 
Statistics derived from the Software Engineering Institute’s CERT (Computer 
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Emergency Readiness Team) Coordination Centre, a centre of Internet security 
expertise, show that vulnerabilities in software are currently at a rate of over 4,000 per 
year [23]. A number of surveys report significant financial losses due to attacks 
exploiting [24]. With the advent of the Internet, many of these existing systems are now 
in the open vulnerable environments. Hence the risks from malicious attacks are 
increasing. Some of the main causes presented in [112] and [168] can be used to explain 
the development, such as increased network connectivity, easily extensible, the 
complexity and huge size of code, easier to attack tools and attack sophistication. Many 
security methodologies and countermeasures have been developed to improve software 
security during various stages of the software development lifecycle. However, most of 
the existing approaches are limited to the integration security from the scratch of 
software development in the new designed software systems. Several approaches [110, 
168] have been proposed to address the security problems. However, theses approaches 
mainly focus either on the handling of security in a specific stage during the software 
development such as requirement, design phase or on specific security properties such 
as authentication, access control. Moreover, most of them are implemented at the late 
stage of software development life cylce so that it will cost more to find and remove the 
security problems. 
Information technology tends to focus on new systems - the processes for designing, 
developing, testing, and employing. Making them secure has been the subject of 
thousands of books and the focus of hundreds of processes. Building new systems is 
high-profile, difficult work that receives appropriate attention, but IT operations of an 
organisation rely most heavily on systems that are already in place - the legacy systems. 
Legacy systems make up the vast bulk of the code base, and all new systems become 
legacy when they come on line [122].  
The security of legacy systems, then, are as important as that of new systems because 
they [122]: 
• are central the organisation’s operation  
• make up the bulk of the code base  
• provide a point of entry to the enterprise  
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• have changed more than most of the organisation realises  
• often are changed without the scrutiny as those given to new systems  
• are impacted by changes in external systems, services, and infrastructure  
• involve old components and technology that may never have been tested  
Undoubtedly, more and more existing software will become to legacy ones due to the 
rapid development of information technology and constantly changing requirements. It 
is foreseeable that in the years to come there will be an increasing demand for perfective 
maintenance actions aiming at improving the security level of existing applications [29]. 
Therefore, it is necessary for a systmatic approach to evolve the software system with 
more security features. 
Software evolution [14, 183] is a way out. Being a broader name to software 
maintenance, software evolution refers to the study and management of the process of 
making changes to software over time which comprises development activities, 
maintenance activities and a sequence of software reengineering activities. Software 
reengineering [14] is the core technique for successful software evolution which can be 
seen as a combination of reverse engineering, functional restructuring and forward 
engineering. The purpose of software reengineering is to utilise the advantages of 
existing systems and new technologies. On one hand, existing systems can be 
reengineered by taking advantages of new technologies, while on the other hand; new 
development efforts derive benefit from reusing existing system. Software productivity 
and quality can be improved by using software reengineering across the whole life cycle 
[25]. 
The typical software reengineering techniques focus on the process starting from 
program source code which is thought as the only reliable information in a legacy 
system. During the reengineering, the program specifications can be recovered from the 
legacy source code and will then facilitate legacy system’s migration in the following 
forward engineering phase. There is a trend in recent researches in reengineering 
domain that ideas in the context of Model Driven Architecture (MDA) [137] may give 
light to the reengineering research. MDA aims at a unified model based architecture for 
software development. All software artefacts, including requirement specifications, 
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architecture and design descriptions, and even code, are regarded as models and 
represented by modelling languages. A series of models form a hierarchical abstraction 
levels and models of MDA at various abstraction levels can be transformed 
automatically to each other. 
Up to now, there is not enough attention for combining traditional software 
reengineering techniques and the software security researches, which is actually of 
significant importance for security improvement for legacy system. This situation leads 
to an increasing requirement to carry out security evolution more efficiently, which 
triggers the research described in this thesis. The thesis therefore aims to present an 
approach to reengineering the legacy software systems for security concerns in line with 
MDA philosophy.  
1.2 Research Objectives  
The proposed research aims to implement a software reengineering focusing on the 
security concerns during software evolution which will bridge the gap between software 
security and software evolution with the following objectives: 
• To provide a systematic approach to performing security - driven software 
evolution 
• To create a guideline for reverse engineering security based on models  
• To develop a risk assessment method to elicit security requirements for web 
applications 
• To present a security enhancement method to fulfil the identified security 
requirements 
• To deploy and validate the proposed approach in a legacy system 
The proposed research is comprehensive, which covers redevelopment in the software 
reengineering process; it is constructive, which develops a new theory, algorithms, 
models, strategies or methods. However, complicated interaction between human 
activities and the software system cannot be avoided in the research.  
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1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
Research questions are the core part in the structure of the proposed research. They 
should state what the study would explore. The overall research question this thesis tries 
to answer is: 
How can security patterns be used to meet the security 
requirements elicited by risk analysis through model driven 
approach to evolve the security for web software 
applications? 
To answer the principal question, a series of detailed research questions are defined to 
address the problem as follows. 
RQ1: Why is there a need for a software evolution approach for security?  
RQ2: How may the models be used to direct the whole process? 
• How may the models be extracted from source code in the legacy systems? 
• What kinds of models are required to reengineer the legacy systems?  
• How may the models be used to reengineer the legacy systems?  
RQ3: How may security requirements be elicited from the legacy systems? 
• How may the risk be assessed for legacy systems? 
• What kind of information is needed to represent security requirements? 
RQ4: How may the elicited security requirements be satisfied by security patterns? 
• How may the right security patterns be found to satisfy the elicited security 
requirement? 
• How may the security patterns be integrated into legacy system models? 
RQ5: How may the proposed approach be validated? 
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1.3.2 Research Hypothesis 
Based on the built research questions, a set of research hypotheses are presented. The 
underlying hypothesis of this thesis is:  
Software security engineering can be integrated during the 
software reengineering by using model driven approach, as a 
result, improves the security of legacy system. 
The principle proposition above is tested by program and model transformation and 
services implementation in the overall software evolution process. A subset of more 
detailed propositions can be derived as follows. 
RH1: Software design artefacts can be recovered as models from legacy systems. 
Models can represent the system artefacts thoroughly both at structure level and 
behaviour level. 
RH2: Security artefacts can be detected from legacy system.  
RH3: Security requirements can be elicited from the legacy systems. 
RH4: Security requirements can be satisfied by adopting security patterns. 
RH5: Security patterns are validated and can work properly to improve the software 
security.  
1.4 Original Contributions 
In this thesis, a novel evolution approach is proposed with a set of frameworks, methods 
and models including a security evolution framework, a model slicing based reverse 
engineering method, a security requirement elicitation method, an ontology based 
security enhancement method as well as security domain models and design models. 
The original contributions of this thesis are summarised as follows: 
C1: A novel software reengineering approach is created to integrate software security 
and software evolution for web application.  
C2: A systematic comprehension method for legacy systems is proposed on the basis of 
model slicing and system partition. Different kinds of dependency relationships 
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among classes and objects in system diagrams are analysed based on which a 
dependency graph is constructed and sliced to facilitate the system understanding. 
The improved partition algorithm makes it possible to handle the analysis and 
decomposition for legacy system more effectively.   
C3: An environment driven security requirement elicitation method for web application 
is proposed based on the proposed web applications classification method. Asset, 
threat and vulnerability are identified, quantified, treated as security vectors based 
on which security risks to the legacy systems can be calculated. Security 
requirements are elicited via the risk analysis and prioritised from the perspective of 
how urgency and importance of each one to the system security. 
C4: A security enhancement approach is presented through integrating security patterns 
into the system design models. Security patterns are organised by the proposed 
multiple aspects metric. A security ontology for inter-relating elicited security 
requirements and security patterns is defined and realised in OWL. A security 
pattern search engine is designed to implement the selection of appropriate pattern 
for given security requirement by inferring the proposed security ontology. 
1.5 Criteria for Success 
A whole criterion for the success of the proposed method is how well they support 
successful software evolution for security demand. The following criteria are given to 
determine the success of the proposed research in this study: 
• The proposed approach should be applicable in as many types of applications as 
possible as long as their source codes are available.  
• The extracted models should be consistent to the original design and easy to 
understand.  
• The security requirement elicitation framework should be able to reflect the 
system’s detailed level security requirement under the current environment. 
• The proposed approach should be able to address the elicited security problems 
and provide implementation issues supporting for development. 
Chapter 1. Introduction                                                    
8 
• The generated models with enhanced security features should be reliable which 
makes it possible to perform forward engineering. 
• The proposed approach should be feasible to realise. For example, it is possible to 
design and implement a real tool to demonstrate the approach. 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of research background and basic concepts 
related to security driven software evolution. Related works are discussed from three 
main aspects, software evolution techniques, software security techniques and model 
driven security. 
Chapter 3 introduces a unified approach, SEMDA, for security driven software 
evolution using model driven approach. The architecture and processes of SEMDA are 
proposed.  
Chapter 4 describes the approach to legacy system understanding and extraction. A 
model slicing method is proposed on the basis of analysing different dependence 
relationship among classes and objects in UML models, which serve as the foundation 
of further system decomposition. During the understanding, the existing security 
mechanisms are detected using the proposed two phase method to help the decision 
making whether or not the legacy system is security enough to protect the user’s 
security objectives. 
Chapter 5 describes an environment driven risk assessment method using security 
vector to elicit the security requirements. A web application classification method is 
proposed to help the threat analysis. 
Chapter 6 describes the advantage to use security pattern as security improvement 
method to satisfy the elicited security requirement stated in Chapter 5, as well as a 
security ontology is developed to associate the security requirements with the 
corresponding security patterns.  
Chapter 7 describes how the experiments are performed on a case study, which 
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demonstrates that the proposed approach works in practice.  
Chapter 8 draws a conclusion about the proposed approach as well as outlines the 
limitation. The research questions are revisited and answered. The future work is 
discussed as well. 
Appendix A lists security patterns repository classified by the proposed classification 
approach. 
Appendix B lists source code written in OWL to develop security ontology. 
Appendix C lists all the related publications by the author during the PhD study. 
 
 
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work 
10 
Chapter 2                 
Background and Related Work 
Objectives 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 To introduce software security and its related concepts. 
 To present an overview of software evolution. 
 To present an overview of Model Driven Engineering 
 To clarifies basic concepts related to security driven software evolution 
__________________________________________________________________ 
2.1 Overview 
Unlike the following related studies, this research will integrate security engineering 
with software evolution. A systematic approach is proposed to support the software 
evolution focusing on security concerns. The techniques, such as model extraction, 
model slicing and system decomposition for legacy system understanding, risk analysis 
based security requirement elicitation, security pattern used to apply expert security 
knowledge in the extracted models to improve the security level of legacy system, are 
used in this research to complete the functions of the proposed general framework.  
For a better understanding of the proposed framework, background and related 
techniques used in this research are reviewed in the following section. 
2.2 Software Security Engineering 
Software almost controls everything in your life. This is aggravated with the rapid 
development of Internet. More and more network-based software have been developed 
which greatly simplify data accessibility. However, software provides the diverse 
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functionalities as well as introduces the security issues [111]. More and more security 
vulnerabilities are emerging and exploited by insider or outsider of the organisation 
which leads to financial losses and bad impact of organisation’s credibility as well.   
Security as an important non-functional characteristic of software system has been 
increasingly thought as an essential part of the software development lifecycle. 
Mouratidis et al. [128] takes the first step towards this idea and proposes that security 
should be integrated into the software engineering.   
In the paper [110], Gary McGraw breaks down software security problem into two 
sub-problems: software security problem and application security problem. Software 
security, on one hand, is the process of designing, implementing, and testing software 
for security, identifies and solves security problems in the software itself. Application 
security, on the other hand, is about protecting software to operate in a specific way 
after completing the development, finding and fixing known security problems. 
In this section, an introduction to the field of software security is presented. This 
introduction includes a general overview, followed by taxonomy of software security 
areas.     
2.2.1 Software Security Concept 
The concept of software security has been considered as relevance to threats, attacks 
and vulnerabilities. Several key terms associated with software security are given as 
follows. According to the Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber Security 
Division [59, 168]: 
Secure software is software that is resistant to intentional attack as well as 
unintentional failures, defects, and accidents.  
Software security is the ability of software to resist, tolerate, and recover from events 
that intentionally threaten its dependability with the preservation of availability, 
integrity, and confidentiality of information. 
Security engineering is about building systems to remain dependable in the face of 
malice, error, or mischance. As a discipline, it focuses on the tools, processes, and 
methods needed to design, implement, and test complete systems, and to adapt existing 
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systems as their environments evolve [6]. 
In order to make a precise description of the proposed model, the involved concepts 
from [111] are listed as follows:  
Asset is “anything that has value to the organisation” and which therefore requires 
protection. 
Stakeholder is an organisation or person who places a particular value on assets. 
Security objective is a statement of intent to counter threats and satisfy identified 
security needs. 
Threat is the potential cause of an unwanted event (i.e., an attack), which may result in 
harm of a system or organisation. 
Attack is an attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorised 
access to or make unauthorised use of an asset. 
Attacker is an entity that carries out attacks. 
Vulnerability is a weakness of an asset or control (i.e., in ISO 27000-series a control is 
a synonym of a countermeasure), which may be exploited by a threat. This general 
definition covers all threats categories. 
Countermeasure is an action taken to protect an asset against threats and attacks. 
Risk is the combination of the probability of an event and its consequence. 
2.2.2 Security Properties 
Information is a very important ingredient in software and its security can be achieved 
by three globally accepted properties CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) 
[10].  
Confidentiality is prevention of unauthorised disclosure of information. 
The main objective of confidentiality is to guarantee that information can only be 
accessed by authorised user, no matter how it is accessed and where it is kept. 
Mechanisms like encryption, password, access control, biometrics, privacy and ethics 
can be used to maintain confidentiality.   
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work 
13 
Integrity is prevention of unauthorised modification of information. 
The main objective of integrity is to ensure the accuracy and consistency of information 
from being tampered intentionally, unintentionally, or accidentally. Mechanisms like 
auditing and configuration management can maintain the integrity and guarantee 
reliability and privacy of information. 
Availability is prevention of unauthorised withholding of information. 
The main objective of availability is to guarantee the authorised users can access the 
information and service whenever needed. Mechanisms like disaster recovery plan, 
resumption plan and data backup plan can be used to ensure the availability. 
Confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) are commonly used as security features 
of information system. Other security features are accountability, authentication, 
authorisation and non-repudiation. 
2.3 Legacy System and Software Evolution   
Software systems need continuous evolvement, in order to deal with constantly 
changing software requirements. As a process of conducting continuous software 
reengineering, software evolution is repeated software reengineering [183]. Software 
reengineering technology involves reverse engineering and forward engineering, and 
has becoming a practical solution to the problem in legacy system evolution. 
Legacy systems pose many conventional challenges to software maintainers. 
Nevertheless, in order to reduce cost of software development, organisations have to 
maximise the benefits from legacy assets (software system). The increasing cost of 
managing legacy systems together with the need to preserve business knowledge has 
meant that renovating legacy systems has become an important research topic over the 
years. Thus, maintaining functionalities and keeping up with changing business or 
technical conditions are considered as two important and urgent tasks. 
2.3.1 Legacy System 
As legacy software systems no longer meet the needs from customer’s requirements, 
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emerging operating software and hardware environments, they are subject to evolve. 
The maintenance scope has to cover not only maintenance of the existing functions, but 
also modifications to the current architecture and functions so that adding requirements 
will be fulfilled. In addition to such changes, non-functional changes especially when 
security as a requirement is concerned in this thesis may also be a consideration 
typically when software system entails adaption of a new computing environment.  
Bennet defines legacy systems informally as “large software systems that we don’t 
know how to cope with but that are vital to our organisation [14]”, while Brodie defined 
it as “any information system that significantly resists modification and evolution [18]”. 
Whichever, a legacy system is the one that is still valuable, but is difficult to maintain. 
A significant number of legacy systems remain in operation because they are critical to 
the business processes which they support. As Warren stated “the combination of 
extended lifetimes and poor maintainability means that legacy systems are expensive to 
change and in many cases, they cannot accommodate emerging requirements. This is 
clearly an undesirable situation which, until recently, has been tackled by replacing the 
system or attempting to maintain it [173].”  
On one hand, it is dangerous to replace a legacy system since there may exist a risk that 
vital business knowledge may be lost since it is embedded in the old systems very well. 
On the other hand, legacy system is difficult to maintain and expensive to change.  
Reengineering as the process of software evolution is a relative new approach to solve 
the two extremes of system replacement and continued maintenance by improving the 
system in some way and results in a system which is more responsive to change.  
Compared with replacement, the costs of reengineering a system are typically lower. 
Reengineering can also reduce the major risks resulted from replacement and continued 
maintenance. Reengineering starts from the current legacy system so as to the risk of 
losing vital business knowledge built in it can be reduced. Different from maintenance, 
the result of reengineering is an evolved system which can meet the new requirements 
in a cost effective manner [173]. 
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2.3.2 Software Evolution and Reengineering 
Software evolution is the process of modifying an existing software system to satisfy an 
enhanced set of requirements. Software reengineering is a systematic way to perform 
software evolution. In particular, Chikofsky and Cross define reengineering to be “the 
examination and alteration of a subject system to reconstitute it in a new form and the 
subsequent implementation of the new form [27]”. Altering existing systems involves 
the majority of all software development time and expense, and evolution comprises the 
majority of system alteration (maintenance) activities. 
When evolving a legacy system, the artefacts of the system have to be taken into 
consideration which is different from developing a new system. The major challenges 
involve ensuring the new requirements are consistent with those of the existing system, 
maintaining system’s architecture, code review and understanding of the current system, 
and maintaining the design integrity in conceptual level. The legacy systems can be 
migrated to a new platform, language, hardware, operating system, or to a new software 
development paradigm, or integrating with other systems with the help of reengineering 
technology. 
Software evolution comprises continuous reengineering process. The difference 
between them lies in that reengineering is a single change cycle, while evolution is a 
broader concept which implies the repeated reengineering activities and maintenance 
activities. Software reengineering technology is the practical solution to the problem of 
evolving legacy system to meet the ever-changing system requirements. There is a trend 
that the needs and costs of changing software are increasing with the rapid development 
of computer software and hardware. 
Software reengineering is an integration of reverse engineering and forward engineering. 
Bachman [9] introduced a chart of software reengineering cycle for better understanding 
the process of software reengineering, shown as Figure 2-1. 
Reverse engineering is the process of comprehending a target system by identifying the 
components and their inter-relationships within the system and creating representations 
of the system in another higher level of abstraction form. 
Forward engineering is the process like traditional software development that proceeds 
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from high level abstraction, design to the implementation. It aims to improve a software 
system by taking consideration of new functional and non-functional requirements for 
the migrant system. Forward engineering consists of a sequence of activities, including 
new requirements elicitation, system transformation, and finally system deployment in 
the new environment. 
Requirements
                Design
                         Implementation
Requirements
                
Design
                         
Implementation
Respecify
Redesign
Reimplement
Reverse
Engineering
（Examination）
Forward
Engineering
（Reconstitution）
Existing System Target System
Functional restructuring
（alteration）
 
Figure 2-1 Software Reengineering Process [9] 
The following research areas fall into reverse engineering domain: 
• Reengineering requirement aims to clearly identify the reengineering objectives 
in the legacy system to be migrated. 
• System analysis involves source code analysis and abstraction models to 
evaluate the legacy systems from the functional, technical and architectural 
aspects points of view. 
• Positioning involves improving the qualities of the legacy system by 
restructuring without changing the external behaviour.  
• Re-documentation is the process of changing the legacy system in a different 
view while keeping it in a semantically equivalent representation for better 
understanding.  
• Design recovery focuses on identifying the meaningful abstraction of the system 
in a higher level and associating code with specific function. 
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2.4 Software Security in Software Reengineering 
Traditionally, security is viewed as an organisational and Information Technology (IT) 
systems level function comprising of routers, firewalls, intrusion detection systems 
(IDS), system security settings and patches to the operating system (OS) and 
applications running on it. Until 2001, the first book [168] on the software security topic 
appeared, demonstrating how recently developers, architects, and computer scientists 
have started systematically studying how to build secure software. In this book, Viega 
and McGraw point out that software vulnerabilities and software exploits are the root 
cause of computer security problems. In the next year, an article “Why Is Software So 
Bad?” points out that bad habits and inadequate software life cycle processes have led to 
the developments in software engineering and the development of poor software [57]. In 
this section, a series of software reengineering efforts in the security domain are 
reviewed. 
2.4.1 Security Engineering Process 
There are several processes for secure software development in the field. Based on a 
survey on security engineering processes [32], three of the best known processes are 
presented, which are OWASP’s CLASP [138], Microsoft’s SDL [79] and McGraw’s 
Touchpoints [111]. All of them provide an extensive set of activities covering a broad 
spectrum of the development life cycle.  
2.4.1.1 CLASP  
CLASP [138] is a lightweight process for building secure software, which is contributed 
and reviewed by several leading security companies of the OWASP. Twenty-four 
top-level activities are included in the CLASP and can be tailored according to the 
development process. Key features include: 
• The main goal of CLASP is to support the secure software development. 
• CLASP involves a group of independent activities which can be integrated in the 
development process. 
• Two road maps: legacy and green-field have been defined to give some guidance 
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on how to combine the activities into the ordered set. 
• It defines some roles that may have an impact on the security and assign the 
tasks to the according roles. 
• CLASP is open to public and rich resources are provided to facilitate the 
implementation of the activities.  
2.4.1.2 SDL 
Microsoft defined the SDL [79] to address the security issues they frequently faced in 
their products in 2002 which is composed of a set of activities aiming at addressing 
security issues in their development process. SDL can be characterised as follows: 
• SDL is designed as an add-in to the software construction process.  
• The SDL process is well organised and related activities are grouped in stages, it 
is direct to map the SDL activities to the standard software development process. 
• SDL specifies the method in a concrete and practical way. 
• SDL provides rich resources in documents and supporting tools in MSDN. 
2.4.1.3 Touchpoints 
McGraw emphasised that software security can be implemented by using engineering 
methods and proposed Touchpoints [111] as a set of best practices distilled over the 
years out of his extensive industrial experience. Seven so-called touch points are 
grouped of the proposed best practices, which are: principle, guideline, rule, 
vulnerability, exploit, attack pattern and historical risk. Touchpoints can be 
characterised as follows: 
• Risk assessment is of importance in Touchpoints when it comes to software 
security.  
• Black-hat and white-hat activities are provided as Black-hat activities are about 
attacks, exploits and breaking software, while White-hat activities are more 
constructive in nature and cover design, controls and functionality. 
• Touchpoints is flexible and can be tailored to existing software development 
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process. 
• Touchpoints is rich in examples and resources. 
2.4.1.4 Process Support for Change  
The general characteristics of the three processes described above are summarised in 
Table 2-1 with the discussion how the processes dealing with evolution. 
Table 2-1 Comparison of CLASP, SDL and Touchpoints [32] 
 CLASP SDL Touchpoints 
General 
Focus Security at centre 
stage 
Security as 
supporting quality 
Risk 
management 
Structure Independent 
activities 
Well-organised set 
of activities 
Best practices 
Guidance Rich set of 
resources 
Concrete activities Rich examples 
and resources 
Evolution 
New security 
vulnerability 
Software updates 
Security advisories 
Software updates 
Security advisories 
Not Supports 
Change in security 
assumptions 
Not explicitly 
supported 
Some continuous 
activities 
Not explicitly 
supported 
All of the security engineering processes mentioned above provide a set of activities 
covered the whole software development life cycle. However, there is no explicit 
support for evolution in these processes [32]. 
2.4.2 Security in Requirement Engineering 
A security requirement is a manifestation of a high-level organisational policy into the 
detailed requirements of a specific system. Security policies are complementary to the 
functional requirements of a system, which are a kind of non-functional requirement. 
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In recent years, there is recognition in the researches of software evolution that  
changes in stakeholders’ needs (expressed as requirements) has become as one of the 
main drivers of software evolution [130]. Requirement engineering researches focus on 
addressing the abilities that the system can provide. Therefore, lots of attention in this 
area is given to the functionality specifying what the system should do. Little attention 
is given to the requirements of what the system should not do. The consequence is that 
the resulting system can’t be effectively assessed prior to implementation without the 
properly defined security requirements.  
In this section, approaches and related work of security requirements are reviewed. The 
approaches are classified according to their different concentrations, namely: secure 
requirement process, security requirement elicitation, security requirement analysis and 
from security requirement to security architecture. 
2.4.2.1 Secure Software Requirements Process 
Secure requirement process emphasises on the steps for analysing security requirements.  
The steps may comprise risk analysis for identifying security vulnerabilities and 
exploration of countermeasures for addressing identified weaknesses. In this section, 
three typical secure requirement approaches have been examined. 
SREP: Mellado proposes the SREP [117], the abbreviation of Security Requirements 
Engineering Process, which provides an approach to deal with reusing security 
requirement systematically. In order to achieve this, a security resource repository is 
proposed and Common Criteria are integrated into the software development lifecycle. 
Security Requirements and Trust Assumptions [75]: Hatebur et al. propose a 
security requirement engineering process to develop security systems based on problem 
frames, and a collection of security patterns, plus components as the way to cope with 
the solution. The components in their approach cover the roles and security goals 
statements, relationships of security requirements with other system requirements, 
threats and validation the elicited security requirements.   
SQUARE [113]: The Security Quality Requirement Engineering (SQUARE) is a 
comprehensive method to elicit, analyse, categorise, prioritise, and document security 
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requirements for software systems. The method aims to elicit security requirements as a 
part of requirement engineering process rather than an afterthought. The main activities 
in this method involve identification of security goals, risk analysis for identification of 
threat to security goals and elicitation of security requirements with which security 
goals can be accomplished by satisfying them. The method adopts “waterfall model”, 
and it doesn’t provide iterations. Therefore, elicited security requirements can’t be 
revised and evolution of a system can’t be supported. 
2.4.2.2 Security Requirement Elicitation 
Security requirement elicitation focuses on the process or the approach to identify 
security requirements. Various security requirement elicitation techniques are proposed 
in the security requirement domain. There are number of proposals for eliciting security 
requirements using techniques such as abuse case [109], misuse case [4, 111, 154], 
security use case [50], common criteria [172] or attack trees [40].  
Abuse cases [109]: Abuse case is used to specify the interaction between the users and 
the system, where harm can be caused to the resource owned by the user, stakeholders 
of the system during the iteration. An abuse case should illustrate the abuse use of 
privilege, which makes a further distinction. The strategy using to describe use case can 
be used to describe the abuse case. Obviously, abuse can be performed by modifying 
system software to gain total control of the target system. Security requirements can be 
elicited by illustrating the scenario of abuse case. 
Misuse cases: Guttorm Sindre and Andreas Opdahl [154] extend use case diagrams 
with misuse cases to represent the actions that the systems should prevent against. 
Misuse case is the use case with negative representation from the view of attacker by 
personifying the threats threaten to the system. A misuser is the user who is the inverses 
of a legitimate actor in the use case diagrams. The threat can be used to elicit security 
requirement which is then satisfied by providing additional functionality in the new use 
cases or modifying existing ones. Ian Alexander advocates using misuse cases and use 
cases together to conduct threat modelling during requirement analysis [4]. Misuse 
cases elicitation is a relatively recent approach to address and analyse security threats.  
Security use cases: Similar approach is proposed by Firesmith in [50] named security 
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use cases. Security use cases have some similarities with misuse case because both 
methods focus on depicting the idea of negative scenarios. Security use cases can be 
used to specify the security requirement related to how a system should protect itself 
against the relevant security threats. 
Common criteria with use case [172]: This approach elaborates how common criteria 
can be integrated with use case diagrams. The aim of this correlation of common criteria 
with use case is to deal with security issues in IT products during the software 
development life cycle. The profile of each actor involved in the use case diagram can 
be completed in a mandatory manner with relating common criteria with use case. There 
are seven fields in the actor profile which are name, type, location, use case association 
and whether or not private or sensitive information are involved in the use case. Actor 
profile can be used to map threats from predefined threat classifications to the actor 
after the actor profile is completed by the use case creator. 
Attack tree: Attacks trees [40] are a representation of attacks by using trees as the data 
structure. The root node of attack tree is the attack’s goal while the leaf nodes are the 
different ways to achieve the goal. The attributes associated with each node can be used 
to analyse the value of attack tree. 
Besides, based on Sindre’s misuse cases, Firesmith’s security cases and operational 
model of computer security, Kassem Saleh and Maryam Habil [147] introduce a 
comprehensive framework named Security Requirement Behaviour Model (SRBM) for 
dealing with security requirements for web services and web applications. A template 
for eliciting misuse cases is provided in SRBM. 
2.4.2.3 Security Requirement Analysis 
Security requirement analysis emphasises on how to model, specify and analyse security 
requirements. Several typical methods are reviewed as follows. 
SecTropos [126]: As a methodology of software development, Tropos is based on 
modelling framework i* [103] by using which the system and its organisational 
environment can be modelled. There are three main concepts in the Tropos models, 
which are actor, intention or goal, and dependency among them. Security concerns can 
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be modelled in the software development life cycle by extending Tropos abbreviated as 
SecTropos. Security constraints, trust among security entities and permission delegation 
are modelled explicitly in SecTropos. SecTropos provides a systematic method to elicit 
and analyse security requirements, however, it can’t make changes propagated between 
the different models [130]. 
Secure i* Framework [102]: i* is an agent oriented requirement modelling framework. 
Liu et al. [102] extends i* with the ability to analyse security and privacy requirements. 
System stakeholder, potential attackers, and agents are three actors in their approach. By 
studying the relationships between the three actors, security requirements can be elicited 
and analysed by Secure i*. The techniques implemented in the approach are dependency 
vulnerability, access control, analysing attackers and countermeasures. Some limitations 
of the approach have been described in [130] as there is no guarantee identification of 
all potential attackers and countermeasures are likely incomplete. 
KAOS [163]: Van Lamsweede [164] proposes an approach to modelling, specifying, 
and analysing security requirements by extending their earlier framework [165] to elicit 
goals and identify anti-goals to security. Anti-goals are security obstacles and are 
similar to the idea of misuse case. KAOS is a goal-oriented methodology for building 
requirements and eliciting requirements from KAOS models in the requirement 
engineering. In KOAS, a requirement is treated as a realisable goal under responsibility 
of an agent in the software-to-be. Building on KAOS, Landtsheer et al. propose an 
approach [31] to check requirements models for violation of confidentiality properties.   
UMLsec [83]: Jurjens proposes an approach to extend the UML with the ability to 
modelling security concerns. With UMLsec, application developer can model the 
security related functionality in the system design phase and analyse security on the 
system model to verify whether or not it satisfies the security requirements. UMLsec 
assumes that requirements have already been identified and there exists some system 
design to satisfy them. Several systems such as mobile communications [86], 
automotive [15], and banking [84] have been applied to validate the application of 
UMLsec.  
SecureUML [104]: Similar to UMLsec, Lodderstedt et al. propose a modelling 
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language named SecureUML in the software design phase. Based on UML, SecureUML 
focuses on modelling authorisation policies and how these policies can be integrated 
into model driven software development process. Role-based Access Control is used as 
the meta-model to specify and enforce security. Different from most of security 
requirement analysis methods, SecureUML doesn’t provide any analysis on eliciting 
security threats, but focuses on authorisation constraints. 
2.4.2.4 From Security Requirement to Security Architecture 
As two products in software development life cycle, requirements and architecture are 
closely coupled with each other.  Software architecture plays a key role in 
non-functional requirement especially security, evolvability, software reliability and so 
on. In this section, two approaches to moving security requirements to security 
architecture are reviewed. 
From System Goals to Software Architecture [163]: Based on the KAOS [165] 
framework, Van Lamsweerde proposed a goal-oriented approach to architecture design. 
Security requirements are modelled, specified and analysed by the means of KAOS and 
then transformed into architecture step by step. The proposed approach is based on 
refinement and it may be insufficient when there are propagated needs such as 
bottom-up or middleware deployment. 
Transforming Security Requirements into Architecture [186]: Yskout et al. 
introduced a semi-automated transformation for some key security requirements, 
namely authorisation, auditing and delegation. The approach starts from defining 
specific meta-model to ease the transformation from security to architecture. However, 
the result in that approach is not mature and a number of aspects need to be further 
elaborated [130]. 
In this section, related work on security requirement are reviewed and organised by 
separating different concerns. It is no doubt that security requirements play a key role in 
software security engineering. The exiting research on security requirements provide 
complex and heavyweight approaches to requirement analysis and management ranging 
from model-based to goal-oriented. However, there is little work on security 
requirements dedicated for web applications. In this research, a lightweight approach for 
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web application is proposed to facilitate the security requirement elicitation for security 
novice. 
2.4.3 Software Security in Software Design 
Security of information system consists in identifying the vulnerabilities, evaluating the 
threats, determining the risk which vulnerability allows threat given to be carried out, 
and therefore, it uses methods, techniques and tools to protect the resources of 
information system in order to ensure the availability of the services, the confidentiality 
and the integrity of information. 
• The availability of the services: the services and information must be accessible 
to the authorised entity when they need some. 
• Confidentiality of information: information does not belong to everyone and it 
can only be accessed by those who have the right of it. 
• Integrity of information: information (files, messages…) can be modified only by 
the authorised entity. 
Adding security solutions to a system that has already been functionally realised is very 
difficult, and can make the system instable. The security requirements should then be 
integrated at the design stage, so that they can be identified with the first parts of 
development process. The posteriori security of critical systems (firewall, antivirus, etc.) 
does not constitute the best security policy. The development of a security policy must 
be done at the same time in the functional design stage, and the final model must 
integrate the functional along with security specifications.  
In this section, the review of security implementation in design phase is carried out from 
the following aspects. Firstly, security architecture is introduced as the foundation for 
the following sections. After that, the security design approaches are classified 
according to what they are implemented as, in a more technical term is the “granularity” 
they are founded on, namely: components-based, aspect-oriented and service-oriented.  
2.4.3.1 Software Security Architecture  
As Barais said in [11] “a software architecture describes the structure and behaviour of a 
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software system. In a software architecture specification, a system is represented as a set 
of software components, their connections, and their behavioural interactions”. Software 
design process will benefit from the creation of software architecture as it promotes 
comprehension of the system. Moreover, it provides the basis of precisely analysing 
software design which makes early detection of design flows and errors possible and 
thereby leads to improvement of software quality and facilitates to ensure correctness. 
Architecture plays an important role in non-functional requirements research including 
security requirement. 
Security design at architectural level is critical to achieve high assurance software 
systems. A secure architecture describes how security requirements are enforced in a 
software design and it is a high-level design representing all the components, connectors 
and how they are organised to meet the security requirements. Specially, a secure 
architecture depicts how security countermeasures are deployed among the design 
artefacts to achieve the security features, such as confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. 
The question on how to create an architecture that has certain security qualities needs to 
be answered. Often, security patterns [65, 186] are used to this aim. The non-functional 
requirement (NFR) framework also uses patterns to create secure design [60, 178]. In 
[163], Van Lamsweerde proposes a patterns-based approach to creating architectures. A 
detailed security pattern review is given in Section 2.8. 
Besides patterns, security principles are also commonly used as the guidance for 
creating secure architectures. For instance, in [108] an attack surface metric is proposed, 
which can be used to measure the security of a design and improve it. Equally, the 
principle of least privilege can be used as the guidance for improving the security of 
architectures [22].  
2.4.3.2 Component-based Security Approaches 
Component-based software engineering represents the concepts of assembly and 
coupling of components-essential to most engineering disciplines [87]. 
Component-based approaches in security architecture evolution focus on improving or 
enhancing security in software architecture level by implementing security as 
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components or connectors to achieve the goal. Many approaches have been proposed 
for the security issues of component-based system. In this section, several classic 
methodologies are selected to review because the majority of them try to solve the 
security problem from the evolution point of view. 
Shin and Gomaa [153] propose an approach to modelling the process of evolving 
non-secure applications into secure applications in the light of modelling the software 
requirements and software architecture built on distributed environment. Security use 
cases have been used to achieve security requirements in their research. They evolve the 
non-secure applications into secure application by encapsulating the security services 
including integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation and access control into the 
corresponding connectors which can be invoked if the security requirement conditions 
hold. Although their research presents an overall method to integrate security into the 
application system, only architecture level evolution is illustrated in detail, and several 
security services are addressed in a general way. 
Cotroneo et al. [29] present an approach to improve the security level of an existing 
system by separating the concerns and reusing them in a multi-layer architecture. 
Security is expressed in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. The system 
relies solely on COTS technologies. The overall system architecture is composed of the 
clients, the middle-tier server, and the group of replicated legacy application instances. 
The middle-tier adds security to the legacy application, which runs in the back-end. 
Business middle-tier is used to handle security mechanisms. Confidentiality is achieved 
via cryptography while integrity and availability are obtained through replicating the 
functional modules. 
Ren et al. [143] propose a Connector-Centric approach which argues for a 
comprehensive treatment of security on architecture level based on software connectors.  
Connectors play the suitable role in modelling, capturing and enforcing security in that 
research. The approach is clarified by a classic access control model using the following 
core concepts: principal, privilege and context. Connectors play a key role in this 
approach. It contributes more comprehensive treatment of architectural security. 
Gasmi et al. [55] propose Security Meta-model of Software Architecture (SMSA), a 
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software architecture meta-model that takes consideration of the security concept 
separately from functional components by means of secure connectors, so as to 
contribute a more complete and deeper modelling of software architecture. It is 
implemented by integrating the security concept as a non-functional requirement and 
facilitating the detection of points that request the security mechanisms implementation 
during the exchange of information and the communication of the various distributed 
application elements. 
2.4.3.3 Aspect-oriented Security Approaches 
Increasing attentions have turned to addressing security concerns using Aspect-Oriented 
Software Development (AOSD) approach because of crosscutting characteristics of 
security in nature. 
Aspect-Oriented Software Development (AOSD) [88] aims at separating the concerns in 
software development and it is often used to address the complexity when new concerns 
need to be integrated into the architecture.  
As described in [33] “the central problem in modifying the security aspects of a legacy 
system is the difficulty of identifying the code that is relevant to security, changing it, 
and integrating the changes back into the system”. Hence, with the ability to separate 
concerns, Aspect-Oriented Software Development (AOSD) is a good choice to deal 
with security evolution only if security is treated as one of the system’s concerns. Here, 
some excellent works are reviewed to show how security is implemented with AOSD. 
Laney et al. [97] propose an approach to evolve the system with the support of 
employing aspects. A legacy C/S application is selected as case study with “message 
tampering” as attack. The approach shows how aspects are used to support the legacy 
system evolution for mitigating the specific security attack. As the security 
countermeasure to message tampering, digital signature is implemented as an aspect to 
improve the security.     
Georg et al. [56] present a methodology to incorporate security countermeasures into an 
application by using aspect-oriented modelling (AOM). The main idea of their approach 
is to model the security mechanisms and security attacks as aspects, which involves four 
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steps as follows. Firstly, risk analysis is used in their approach to analyse the system in 
order to identify the potential threats to the system assets and model the identified 
threats as attack aspects. Secondly, misuse models are generated by combining the 
application’s base model with the attack aspects. Thirdly, an evaluation is made to 
measure the impact of an attack by analysing the misuse models. Finally, if the 
evaluation result shows that an attack may pose severe impacts to the system, alternative 
solution is analysed to identify the security mechanisms or countermeasures to cope 
with that attack.  
Mourad et al. [125] present a method to harden security concerns by enabling the 
application with additional security requirements based on Aspect-Oriented 
Programming (AOP). Pointcuts and primitives are proposed to AOP language for 
realising security concerns. Two pointcuts are proposed to identify particular join points 
in a program’s control-flow graph (CFG) while two primitives are used to pass 
parameters between the pointcuts. The program’s call graph is analysed to determine 
how to change function signatures for passing the parameters associated with a given 
security hardening. Their approach ends with the algorithm implementation and case 
studies explanation. 
Zhu et al. [189] propose an intrusion-aware framework to build secure software based 
on Aspect-Oriented Software Development (AOSD). Security concerns are treated as 
crosscutting concerns and modularized using aspects. Security artefacts, such as attack 
scenarios, intrusion detections, are modelled as aspects by using an aspect oriented 
(UML) profile. The intrusion detection aspects are implemented and woven into the 
target system based on the UML models. An experimental evaluation by applying this 
framework for some of the most common attacks is presented in their work. 
Welch et al. [179] propose an approach to reengineering a third-party application by 
designing a reflective security architecture which aims at reducing the tangling between 
application code and security code. The application is designed using proxy pattern and 
inheritance pattern to improve the security. Security is treated as crosscutting concerns 
and the separation between them is achieved by using aspect composition and analysis 
techniques. A similar approach is described in Xu et al. [182]. 
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2.4.3.4 Service-oriented Security Approach 
To cope with the increasingly complicated requirements of software systems, 
enterprises are likely to adopt service-oriented architecture (SOA) to align their systems 
with their business processes, using web service technologies as best practice approach 
to establish an SOA. Security as the crosscutting concerns are hard to integrate into the 
overall SOA development process, while web services are best suited to implement key 
concerns. Considering the amount of overly complex web service security standards, 
security is often an afterthought which resulting in independent silos of security 
infrastructure. A solution to this problem is to provide security as a service by using 
service-oriented approach, for example offering a collection of services, providing the 
central functionality of security services such as authentication, authorisation and policy 
management. These services form a security architecture [34, 42].  
In this section, methodologies of implementing security as a service are reviewed.  As 
Buecker et al. stated [20], “a service is representative of a repeatable business task. 
Services are used to encapsulate the functional units of an application by providing an 
interface that is well defined and implementation independent”. 
Hafner et al. [68] present a reference security architecture called SeAAS which 
transforms the secure software as the security services and thereby implements security 
as a service. An illustration is given in their approach by using SeAAS to solve 
non-repudiation requirement.  
Han et al. [73] introduce a service oriented framework to compose and evolve security 
concerns. It allows the system developers to design required security concerns into 
services. Security properties are specified using a semantic model and security services 
are composed and evolved using negotiation and re-negotiation techniques. Security 
compatibilities between the realised security services and the system’s security goals are 
checked using analysis techniques.  
Emig et al. [41, 42] propose an interface to provide security services to web services 
and service-oriented applications. The same to other security service oriented methods, 
their approach treats security as crosscutting concerns and security is provided by 
services. Security services, such as authentication and access control, are provided by 
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corresponding interfaces in the security architecture described in [42] and [41]. An 
administration interface is designed to manage the access control policies, users and 
groups. 
Yamany et al. [39] propose a security framework based on SOA to provide two 
important security services: authentication and authorisation. The security services are 
said to be intelligent, automatic and reusable because mining techniques have been used 
in their design in which clustering mining algorithms are designed to represent and 
automate the access control rights, association rules are built to facilitate the prediction 
of attacks. Moreover, they explore their method in a case study to demonstrate the 
behaviour of the proposed security services in SOA environment. 
In this section, existing research approaches demonstrate how security features are 
implemented in architecture and design stage of software development lifecycle. 
Security levels are improved via implementing security features as connectors, aspects 
or services. Though several approaches focus on the security enhancement for existing 
applications such as the work in [29, 97, 153], none of them provides the 
comprehension of target application and thereby generating security requirements to 
specify which assets need to be protected against which threats to which security extent. 
In this research, a comprehensive approach to security evolving for existing applications 
is proposed from software reengineering perspective involving security analysis from 
the understanding of target system, eliciting the security requirements and reconstituting 
the system to satisfy the identified security requirements.       
2.5 Model Driven Engineering 
The term “model” is used in many contexts and often has different meanings. As 
described in [25], “a model can mean an abstraction and representation of the important 
factors of a complex reality, which is different from the thing it models, yet has the 
same main characteristics as the original”. Model is a direct representation of the answer 
to a given problem in simpler context and thereby it is easy for people to understand in a 
natural way. 
A model can help people work at higher level of abstraction by hiding the details and 
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generating big picture. With complex mechanical or electronic machines or large 
buildings, the designers and constructors have some models (e.g. blueprints and floor 
plans) which provide an accurate overview and geometric representation of the structure. 
In software development domain, a model plays the similar role by creating a model of 
the system for better understanding.  
Modelling is the process to bring out models which is an essential part of developing 
large complex software systems. It is common for an experienced software developer to 
take more time to build models than to write actual codes. Models have the advantages 
over source code because (1) they can convey information in a more efficient way; (2) 
they can enhance the understanding of the system; (3) they provide an easy manner for 
people to share knowledge; (4) well-constructed models make it easier to deliver 
complex and large systems on time and within budget. 
Model driven engineering is the systematic way to use models to guide software 
development. In this section, a browse of model driven related concepts and research 
are reviewed to lay a better understanding of the proposed framework in this thesis. 
2.5.1 Model Driven Architecture 
Model Driven Architecture (MDA) is an approach to application design and 
implementation which is produced by the Object Management Group (OMG). The core 
idea of MDA is to use models and modelling as the main artefacts and activities in 
software development, which increases the power of models. The term “model-driven” 
means that it provides a way for using models to direct the process software 
development involving understanding, design, construction, deployment, operation, 
maintenance and modification [135]. The term “architecture” means a specification of 
the components and connectors of the system and the rules for the interactions of the 
components using the connectors [135].  
Just as the name implies, models play a core role in MDA based development. There are 
different levels of models in MDA, involving Platform Specific Model (PSM), Platform 
Independent Model (PIM) and Computational Independent Model (CIM). A PSM is 
model containing all required information regarding to a specific platform which can be 
used by software developer to implement the executable code. A PIM is the model 
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describes the structure and behaviour of the application regardless of the 
implementation platform. A CIM is the most abstract one in MDA which represents the 
context and purpose of the model without any computational complexities. 
A distinction of models is suggested by Fowler in [52]. Three levels of models are 
proposed, namely Conceptual Models, Specification Models and Implementation 
Models. The same to CIM, conceptual Models are more abstract and used to describe 
concepts. Specification Models are more specific and used to describe the system to be 
built without specifying the implementation details. Different from PSMs, 
Implementation Models specify how the system has to be implemented. Fowler 
emphasises that each type of models can be illustrated using same modelling language 
[52]. 
Mellor and his colleagues in [118] classify models as sketch model, blueprint model, or 
executable model. A sketchy model is not complete or precise, being used as 
specification to describe an idea or description to ease of understanding and simplify 
communication. A blueprint model is more precise and complete which can be used as 
specification to build a system. Executable Models, such as Executable UML, can be 
directly interpreted by a processor or to generate an executable system. 
The concept of Model Driven Development (MDD) is come out as a generalisation of 
the MDA approach for software development. In [119], MDD is defined as the notion 
that we can construct a model of a system that we can then transform into the real thing. 
A common pattern of MDD is to define a PIM, and to apply transformations to this PIM 
to obtain one or more PSMs and then generate the code based on the PSMs. Figure 2-2 
shows the sequence by using MDD. 
This MDD development approach proposes not only a collection of models representing 
the system at various levels of abstraction, but also a course of software development 
[120]. The main benefit of MDD stems from the automatic transformation process that 
may reduce the costs of software development and enhance the quality of the developed 
software as well. In order to support automation, machine readable models are required 
to be automatically transformed using tools into different development artefacts, 
including schemas, code skeletons, test harnesses, integration code, and deployment 
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scripts for various platforms. 
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Figure 2-2 MDA Development Sequence [74] 
To enable automatic transformation of a model, the model written in a language must 
obey the following definitions [93]: 
A model is a description of (part of) a system written in a well-defined language. 
A well-defined language is a language with formal form (syntax), and meaning    
(semantics), which is suitable for automated interpretation by a computer. 
Modelling languages define what models are considered to be valid. They describe the 
allowed model primitives and the rules specifying how these primitives may be 
combined to form a valid model. The rich the primitives, the more different aspects of 
the problem domain are represented by using provided primitives.  
MDA provides a framework based on the Unified Modelling Language (UML) and 
other industry standards for visualising, storing, and exchanging software designs and 
models, which include the Unified Modelling Language (UML) [134], Meta-Object 
Facility (MOF) [135] and XML Meta-Data Interchange (XMI) [133], etc.  In the 
context of MDA, much effort has been invested in MOF, language definition and 
extension mechanisms (UML and UML profiles), model transformation specification 
(MOF Query/View/Transformation RFP [136]), and tool support. These developments 
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constitute enabling technologies to model-driven development. 
2.5.2 Model Driven Reengineering  
Models are useful to specify how to build a system or to describe how an existing 
system is built which lead to two different kinds of models, specification models and 
descriptive models. Specification models are generated and used to specify the new 
development systems while descriptive models are derived from existing system. 
Models are common foundations of MDE research and reverse engineering research 
which result in lots of share in both disciplines [43]. Therefore, it is significant to 
combine these two disciplines to share the knowledge of creating and using descriptive 
models. 
 
Figure 2-3 Reengineering in Context of MDA [25] 
In the context of software modelling, reverse engineering is defined as the process in 
which software artefacts from legacy systems are restructured through model 
transformation based on well-defined steps [25].  
A number of techniques related to software reengineering are proposed. All of them 
emphasise on comprehending and reusing the assets of the previous development. 
Without covering all of them, some terms derived from [183] relevant to software 
reengineering in the context of MDA (Figure 2-3) are listed as follows which may 
provide a clear understanding of this domain: 
 Reengineering is the examination and alteration of a subject system to reconstitute 
it in a new form and the subsequent implementation of the new form. The process of 
reengineering computing systems involves three main steps: reverse engineering, 
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restructuring, and forward engineering.  
Forward engineering is the traditional process of moving from high-level 
abstractions and logical, implementation-independent designs to the physical 
implementation of a system.  
Reverse engineering is the process of analysing a subject system to (1) identify the 
system's components and their interrelationships and (2) create representations of the 
system in another form or higher level of abstraction. 
Program understanding or program comprehension is a term related to reverse 
engineering. Program understanding implies always that understanding begins with 
the source code while reverse engineering can start at a binary and executable form 
of the system or at high-level descriptions of the design. Program understanding is 
comparable with design recovery because both of them start at source code level. 
Design recovery or reverse design is a subset of reverse engineering. Design 
recovery recreates design abstractions from a combination of code, existing design 
documentation (if available), personal experience, and general knowledge about 
problem and application domains. 
Program Transformation is the act of changing one program into another. The 
term program transformation is also used for a formal description of an algorithm 
that implements program transformation. The languages in which the program being 
transformed and the resulting program are written are called the source and target 
languages, respectively. 
Model Transformation is a mapping of a set of models onto another set of models 
or onto themselves, which can be broken into two broad categories: model 
translation and model rephrasing. In the former, a model is transformed into a model 
of a different language, and in the latter, a model is changed in same modelling 
language.  
2.5.3 Model Driven Security 
Manual development of security policies is difficult, even for skilled security and 
middleware specialists [144]. Using model-centric and generative MDA approach for 
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development of secure systems can reduce the complexity by using model 
transformation. 
The term “Model Driven Security (MDS)” [12] takes the essence of MDA for applying 
security aspects to an application and is considered as alternative method to build secure 
software systems. In MDS, security properties are modelled into the high level system 
models and thereby security infrastructures can be generated from the built models 
automatically by using tools. 
Though MDE uses security models to develop secure information systems, it is different 
from those traditional security models in that security models in MDA context are 
built-in and scattered throughout the high level system models. Under the MDA 
philosophy, these integrated security models can be transformed into executable models.   
There are currently several MDS approaches focusing on the MDE approach for 
supporting the development of secure systems. These works try to identify any gaps 
between MDE and security engineering. As described in Section 2.4.2, SecureUML 
[104] and UMLSec [83, 85, 86] are two famous secure modelling methodologies in 
MDS. SecureUML mainly focuses on access control constraints based on the RBAC in 
design models with the proposed security modelling language based on UML extensible 
mechanism (UML profile). UMLSec is another well-known MDS approach based on 
UML profiles. Unlike the SecureUML only focusing on authorisation, UMLSec 
addresses multiple security concerns such as security requirements, threat scenarios, 
security mechanisms, security concepts etc. However, lack of the automatic 
transformation from implementation to code is a big miss in UMLSec. 
In addition, the SECTET framework for securing web services in MDS is proposed by 
Alam et al. in [1, 2]. Similar to SecureUML, SECTET mainly addresses RBAC as its 
security concerns and focuses on generating XACML security infrastructure. MDS 
application in smart card development is proposed in SecureMDD [124]. In 
SecureMDD, formal abstract state machine (ASM) and Java Card Code are derived 
from UML PIMs and are used for generating code. Model driven security application in 
secure data warehouse (DW) is proposed by Soler et al. [156]. UML profile for 
modelling security is used as well to create secure PIM. A set of QVT rules are defined 
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to facilitate the model transformation from secure PIMs to secure PSMs.  
2.6 Model Slicing 
To understand and test a large software product is a very challenging task. One way to 
ease this is program slicing, which is a technique emphasising on some certain 
behavioural aspects of a program and removing non-relevant codes to this behaviour of 
the program [96]. Another is model based slicing [155], which is a technique for 
decomposing large software architecture model into smaller models to identify relevant 
model parts and extract related model elements throughout model that corresponds to 
user defined slicing criterion. 
Unified Modelling Language (UML) is widely used to represent and construct the 
architecture of software system with the help of its various model diagrams. With 
increase in the size and complexity of software product, UML models representing the 
high level design of the product tend to become huge and complicated which may 
comprise thousands of interactions involving hundreds of objects [96]. For better 
visualisation of software architecture, impact analysis and for test case generation the 
properties of system architecture with slicing can be taken into account. 
Traditional slicing techniques [161, 175, 176] usually focus on analysing the data or 
control dependency relationships among the program statements. It is not the case when 
slicing the architectural models of software is performed because there are several other 
kinds of relationships among models, such as the relationship between class and class, 
operation and class, operation and operation, object and class, and object and object etc.  
While the problem of software program slicing is a well-studied topic, there are 
relatively few works in slicing for model slicing. There are no studies which have 
investigated the work practices of model slicing for security. In Chapter 4, a model 
slicing method for security has been proposed. In this section, an overview of model 
based slicing will be revisited, including the various general approaches and techniques 
used to compute slices.  
For better understanding, classification method for model slicing in [155] is adopted 
where research on model slicing is grouped by dependency relationships, control and 
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data flow, UML/OCL constraints, modelling languages and feature. Taking 
consideration of the reverse engineering legacy system based on models, using 
dependency relationship to slice models is chosen in this research.  
Researches using dependency relationships can be found in the following works. Zhao 
describes a new dependence analysis technique in [187] to support the software 
architecture development. The work is extended by Zhao in [188] in which a static 
architecture slicing technique is introduced.  Wu and Yi [181] develop an approach 
that comprises different class relationships to define dependency relationships among 
classes. Van Langehove [166] propose an algorithm to reduce the number of 
interference dependencies in state charts by using the concept of slicing with concurrent 
states. Wang et.al [171] present an approach to slicing hierarchical automata for model 
checking in UML state diagram. Samuel et al. [148] present a methodology to generate 
dynamic slices and test cases with the help of UML sequence diagram. Lallchandani et 
al. [95] propose a technique for constructing dynamic slices of UML models using the 
integrated state-based information. This work is extended by Lallchandani et al. in [96] 
in which a dynamic model slicing method is proposed based on the proposed 
intermediate representation named MDG which is constructed from UML class diagram 
and sequence diagram.  
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that several kinds of diagrams are used 
to model slicing, for example class diagram, control and data flow diagram, sequence 
diagram, state chart and so on.  Different diagram slicing methods may have different 
features. However, up to now, the models that can be reverse engineered from legacy 
system are limited. After checking reverse engineering tools which can be used to 
extract models from source code, class diagram and sequence diagram are chosen as the 
representation models to be sliced. 
2.7 Risk Analysis 
In risk analysis domain, mathematical techniques are used to calculate several metrics 
and quantify the security level of a given system. Usually, the metrics includes the 
likelihood, exposure, and consequences of the occurrences for event relevant to security 
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[5]. McGraw highlights the need to perform risk analysis at software design level in 
[111]. According to him, “Design flaws account for 50 percent of security problems, 
and architectural risk analysis plays an essential role in any solid security program 
[111]”. 
There are methods and tools confirm the state of the art in risk assessment, such as 
BS7799, MAGERIT and OCTAVE.  BS7799 [19] is a British standard related to 
information security management which is suggested to be used in industry. SP 800-30, 
Fips 65 [159] is another information security guidance regarding to risk management 
developed by NIST. MAGERIT is an open methodology for Risk Analysis and 
Management, developed by the Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations, offered as a 
framework and guide to the Public Administration [106]. OCTAVE [3] is a 
heavy-weight risk methodology approach originating from Carnegie Mellon 
University’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI) in collaboration with CERT. 
OCTAVE focuses on organisational risk, not technical risk. However, OCTAVE is 
large and complex, with many worksheets and practices to implement and it does not 
provide a list of “out of the box” practices for assessing and mitigating web application 
security risks. CVSS is a complicated scoring system composed of three metric groups 
developed by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [116]. The disadvantage 
of CVSS is that it does not find or reduce the attack surface area or help enumerate risks 
within the target system. Each method and tool has its own benefits. Microsoft proposes 
a risk management guide to provide the security risk solution in their product [121]. 
Mehari [114] is another risk analysis assessment and management method developed by 
CLUSIF (French association of information security professionals) which complies by 
design to ISO/IEC 27005 guidelines.  
Halkidis and Tsantalis [71] propose a risk analysis approach for software systems 
considering the contained security patterns in the design. In their method, an evaluation 
is made to measure the effectiveness and extent of specific security pattern shielding 
from known attacks. Fuzzy set theory and fuzzy fault trees are used as the mathematical 
model to process the evaluation result and thereby the risks of each type of attacks are 
computed. 
Except for the risk assessment methods and tools discussed above, there are many 
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methods proposed to figure out the risk assessment for web application [28, 82, 146]. 
Cock et al. [28] propose a method to address security problems in web applications by 
modelling security tokens. All the possible threats related to web applications are 
pointed out in their method. Romero et al. [146] propose a methodological tool for web 
application focusing on one of the risk assessment steps - asset identification. In [82, 
146], STRIDE model is used to perform the risk assessment for web application but 
lack of threat identification. 
2.8 Security Pattern 
Patterns have been proven successful in many areas of software development, and they 
appear to be particularly valuable for secure systems development. Security pattern was 
first proposed by Yoder and Barcalow in [184]. For better understanding of security 
pattern, its definition derived from [151] is given as follows: 
A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in 
specific contexts, and presents a well-proven generic solution for it. The solution 
consists of a set of interacting roles that can be arranged into multiple concrete 
design structures, as well as a process to create one particular such structure. 
The advantages of a pattern approach to security are shown below [151]: 
• Patterns codify basic security knowledge in a structured and understandable way 
• The pattern representation is familiar to software developers and system engineers, 
a key portion of their audience 
• Because patterns are already used to capture organisation and system engineering 
knowledge, using patterns to capture security knowledge helps to improve the 
integration of security into systems and enterprises 
Research on security patterns has become an active theme in security domain. A number 
of security patterns have been proposed for being applied in different contexts and 
solving different security problems. Other works, such as security pattern classification, 
organisation, integration, security pattern repository, as well as developing security 
patterns play key role in security pattern application. In this section, major contributions 
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to the fields are reviewed. 
Analogy to the examination of software design patterns [54], Romanosky [145] 
addresses security concerns at high level abstraction and proposes security design 
patterns. The proposed patterns can be used to penetrate multiple layered security 
concerns and handle the problem of communication with untrusted third-party systems. 
Steel et al. publish a book [158] focusing on security patterns for Java web applications. 
These are design level patterns used for protecting Java platform application with 
detailed diagrams and sample codes. 
Schumacher et al. propose a number of security patterns in their book [151]. The 
patterns in their book include high level patterns describing the process to secure 
software development and design level patterns specifying how the detailed security 
artefacts can be created. 
Open Group propose a guide to security patterns in their report [16]. The patterns 
presented in their report are general purpose patterns range from architectural level 
patterns to design level patterns and are applicable to software systems implemented 
using many different languages. 
Kienzle et al. present a security patterns repository in the report [90]. The patterns 
involved in their report can be classified two categories: procedural patterns and design 
patterns. Procedural patterns emphasise the process to design, implement and configure 
secure software while design patterns are applicable to how to design and build secure 
applications. 
Besides the above books and reports, many other works on security patterns have been 
proposed in different contexts. Several papers describe security patterns intended for 
special purposes, such as security anti-patterns in [92], security patterns for web 
applications are proposed in [90, 177], security patterns for agent systems [128], 
security patterns for cryptographic software [17, 101], security patterns for mobile Java 
Code [107, 158], security patterns for operating systems [48], packet filter and 
proxy-based patterns for firewall [47, 150], and finally metadata, authentication and 
authorisation patterns [46, 100].  
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The increasing number of patterns and similar security patterns appear in the literature 
with different names make it necessary to develop classifications to security patterns. A 
classification organises patterns into groups of patterns that share one or many 
properties such as the application domain or a particular purpose. Many security pattern 
classification approaches have been proposed since Gamma et al. introduced the first 
classification of security patterns (GoF patterns) [53].  
Heyman et al. [77] classify 220 security patterns into three categories, guidelines, 
process and core patterns. Design guidelines described by Viega and McGraw in [168] 
are used to compare 8 security patterns by Cheng et al. in [26]. They extend their 
classification based on access types of security patterns and thereby classify in the term 
of application level: network-level, host-level and application-level. Kienzle et al. [89, 
90] classify security patterns into two broad categories, structural and procedural. 
Another broad classification of security patterns is made by Blakley et al. [16] in which 
two broad category of security patterns is made: available patterns and protected 
patterns. Halkidis et al. [69] examine the evolution feature of security patterns by 
comparing the patterns derived from [16].  Laverdiere et al. [99] propose a six sigma 
method to classify the 12 common security patterns from [26] and [69]. Hafiz et al [65, 
66] propose a multi-dimension classification scheme taking consideration of security 
CIA features, application context, security wheel, McCumber cube, STRIDE threat 
modelling, and hierarchical classification. The relationships used in their work are 
similar to the dependencies among security problem patterns suggested by Hatebur et al. 
[75]. 
In this section, related work on security patterns has been reviewed which shows lots of 
security patterns have been proposed with several methods to classify and organise them. 
Although research on security patterns have become an active topic in the security 
engineering domain, none of them can directly fulfil the purpose of this research for 
selecting appropriate security patterns to satisfy the elicited security requirement. 
Therefore, a security ontology is proposed in this research to smooth the process by 
properly organising security patterns with a proposed multiple criteria classification 
method. 
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2.9 Summary 
There is very little work concerning the improvement for software security from the 
evolution perspective.  Although several approaches have been proposed to enhance 
the security for existing software, there is currently no comprehensive method to assist 
developers in reengineering software for security concerns. Lacking of the support for 
security improvement for legacy systems is usually seen as the consequence of: (1) 
security artefacts in the current design being difficult to recognise and isolate from other 
system aspects; (2) security requirements of the legacy systems being difficult to elicit 
and analysis; (3) software developer lacking security expertise in improving security 
level for legacy systems. All these become huge challenge and special concerns when 
considering complex systems especially web based applications. 
Existing approaches are not comprehensive enough in the sense that they focus either on 
some specific developing stage, such as architecture, design and implementation, or on 
some specific security aspects, e.g. authentication or authorisation. Moreover, they 
typically offer no guidance on how they can be integrated into the current design 
component or system models. The research in this thesis will bridge the gap and provide 
a comprehensive approach to integrate security expertise into the system design and 
development. 
Most of the existing security engineering methods focus on the methodologies of 
integrating security features to new development systems. Different from the related 
studies, this research will integrate the security engineering with software evolution. 
What this proposed approach does will provide a systematic and effective guidance to 
implement security evolution process. The current research related to software evolution 
driven by security has covered a number of domains. In this chapter, the background 
and related work of SEMDA are introduced: 
• A brief introduction of software security engineering is reviewed and the key 
concepts and features are described. 
• A brief discussion on legacy system, software evolution, software reengineering 
and their definition are described. The relation between software evolution and 
software reengineering is given, and a general reengineering process of software 
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systems is represented. 
• Software security in software evolution is introduced. Three security engineering 
processes are reviewed. Detailed discussions are conducted from security 
requirement and security design point of views.  
• Security requirement engineering is introduced and detailed discussion is conducted 
from the point of view of security requirement elicitation, security requirement 
analysis and prioritisation. 
• Security implementation in design phase is presented with three main methods that 
are component-based, aspect-oriented and service-oriented security approach.  
• A brief description of MDA in the discipline of reengineering is revisited from the 
point of reverse engineering and model driven security.  
• The basic concept and related works of risk analysis are discussed.    
• Security patterns, derived from design patterns as the effective solution to the 
emerging security problems, are discussed along with the relevant researches are 
reviewed. 
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Chapter 3                     
Security Driven Software Evolution 
Approach 
Objectives 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 To summarise the rationale for the proposed approach, SEMDA 
(Security-driven Software Evolution Using Model Driven Approach). 
 To introduce SEMDA architecture. 
 To describe SEMDA process model. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
3.1 Overview 
For conforming to the upgrading security requirements, a comprehensive security 
evolution approach called SEMDA (Security-driven Software Evolution Using Model 
Driven Approach) is proposed in this chapter. The SEMDA approach aims to improve 
the security level for legacy systems from the software reengineering perspective with 
models as the centric view. Software reengineering is the core technique for successful 
software evolution which can be seen as a combination of reverse engineering, 
functional restructuring and forward engineering. Therefore, it is necessary for the 
proposed SEMDA to include existing well-established techniques and developing 
relevant approaches to support the successful implementation of security evolution for 
legacy systems. To achieve the aim, reverse engineering techniques, security 
requirement engineering techniques and forward engineering techniques have to be used 
to understand, analyse, evaluate the legacy system and thereby regenerate a security 
enhanced system. 
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In following sections, the framework of SEMDA approach is presented in detail. 
Moreover, various phases, models and techniques, their purpose and their relations are 
introduced.  
3.2 Framework of SEMDA Approach 
A unified framework is built to support the proposed approach as shown in Figure 3-1, 
which provides the guidance to the security driven evolution process. The whole 
process is divided into separate phases, activities and tasks, and structured into different 
abstraction levels with different system models. More precisely, Figure 3-1 illustrates 
the architecture (or reference model) for the proposed SEMDA. This architecture is 
composed of various models and hierarchy analysis methods. Each method computes a 
model of the system which is then fed to higher level analysis (e.g., model extraction 
yields the UML diagrams that can be used to compute system partitions). 
As shown in Figure 3-1, the whole framework can roughly be divided into three phases, 
which are a serial of:   
• Legacy System Understanding for Security. Task of this phase is to reverse 
engineer legacy systems into UML models, partition the legacy system into 
subsystems with the help of model slicing technique and detect existing security 
mechanisms in the legacy system to determine whether or not the provided 
security in the legacy system satisfies the user’s security objectives. 
• Security Requirement Elicitation. It is the process of analysing key aspects in 
the legacy systems in terms of security. A new risk assessment method is 
proposed and used to elicit the security requirements which will generate the 
detailed security requirements in a specific format to direct the subsequent 
security enhancement.   
• Security Enhancement. It is the stage that security patterns as the best practice 
which are derived from security expertise and fulfilling the elicited security 
requirements are organised, selected and integrated in the legacy system models 
with the help of proposed security ontology. 
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Figure 3-1 Framework of SEMDA Approach 
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3.2.1 Legacy System Understanding for Security 
Evolving legacy system is not easy and often encounters many problems due to 
incomplete or absence of original design information. A successful evolution of legacy 
systems depends on proper comprehension of their functionalities, contexts and 
architectures. To achieve this purpose, software reverse engineering techniques are 
usually used to extract high level diagrams from source codes. 
3.2.1.1 Choices of Models 
The first step of the proposed framework is to extract higher level models of the legacy 
system for the later security based transformation purposes. A legacy system has static 
and dynamic characteristics that display its functionality and represent its structural and 
behavioural characteristics respectively. The modelling of a legacy system concentrates 
on the reflection and comprehension of the legacy system at higher level of abstraction. 
The main purpose is to understand the structure of the target legacy system and its main 
tasks.  
UML has proved to be a good platform for modelling real systems. When modelling a 
legacy system with UML, the information in the legacy system is refined by using the 
UML diagrams. Through the extraction of UML diagrams from legacy code, the 
transformation has realised analysis platform on UML in order to be helpful on the 
comprehension of legacy systems based on the general analysis language UML. 
To evolve an existing legacy system, both static and dynamic information are useful. 
Static information describes the structure of the software while dynamic information 
specifying the runtime behaviour. Static analysis along with dynamic analysis for the 
legacy system contributes to the various software artefacts and their relationships. 
UML has static and dynamic modelling advantages. It satisfies the needs of software 
evolution. At the same time, UML presents a visual description of the system and makes 
the process of software evolution easily acceptable. Meanwhile, a large number of tools 
support the transformation from UML diagram to code, and UML facilitates the 
reusability of software evolution, which is also helpful for forward engineering in the 
process of reengineering. 
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3.2.1.2 UML Model Extraction  
Software evolution is supported by producing design models from the legacy software. 
The software evolution approach is useful when building legacy software into 
high-level information. The extracted models are utilised to get an overall picture of the 
current state of the legacy software. The dynamic models are used to support tasks such 
as understanding the current behaviour of the legacy software. 
As the first step of whole framework, the task of this phase is to extract UML diagrams 
from legacy source code. When it comes to reengineering legacy system, source code is 
thought of as the most reliable part to be modified for satisfying the new requirements. 
Traditional reengineering methods rely on software representation techniques such as 
data and control flow diagram, Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), or UML class diagram to 
represent the various software aspects and the interrelationships between them. 
There are two major stages of UML extraction from legacy systems as being structural 
and behavioural. 
• The structural stage contains UML structural or static diagrams extraction. 
UML 2.0 uses six diagrams to model the static parts of software system, which 
are class diagram, object diagram, component diagram, deployment diagram, 
package diagram, composite structure diagram. 
• The behavioural stage includes the UML behavioural or dynamic diagrams 
extraction. UML 2.0 uses seven diagram to model the dynamic parts of the 
software system, which are communication diagram, timing diagram, use case 
diagram, sequence diagram, activity diagram, state machine diagram and 
interaction overview diagram. 
In this thesis, class diagram and sequence diagram are chosen to represent static model 
and dynamic model of the legacy system and extracted by using existing extraction 
toolset. 
3.2.1.3 UML Model Slicing  
With the increase in products’ sizes and complexities, UML models extracted from the 
source code are likely to become large and complex. It is possible that hundreds of 
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objects are involved in thousands of interactions which make the extracted models from 
such large architecture harder to read and understand. Moreover, it tends to be tedious 
and poor readability on one side and it is valuable to judge the impact of a certain 
change of one model elements on other parts on the other side [96]. 
Different UML diagrams represent different system views. For a better understanding of 
the extracted UML diagrams, especially for security related analysis, it is necessary to 
slice the diagrams. Different from program slicing, model slicing aims to reduce the 
legacy system view at the model level.  
In order to slice the UML models, different dependency relationships among classes 
need to be taken into consideration, which are relation dependency, operation 
dependency, control dependency, data dependency, call dependency and message 
dependency. Moreover, an intermediate representation of diagrams is constructed based 
on the defined class dependency relationship and sliced according to the slicing 
algorithm and appropriate slice criteria. 
3.2.1.4 System Partition  
The proposed approach aims to extract the reusable legacy components from the 
underlying legacy system. In this context, method and process are needed to partition 
existing systems into notable collections of components, each of which potentially 
implements an object. However, legacy systems are huge and usually the packaged 
systems that composed by rich and old structures. To address this problem, a specific 
decomposition method is developed based on the class dependency analysis and model 
slicing technique. 
There are two main challenges to be taken up, one is how to determine the cohesion 
degree in a cluster, and the other is what kind of intermediate diagram can be used to 
facilitate the partition. After examining the dependency relationship among classes and 
objects in UML diagrams, the proposed CSDG graph is used as the intermediate 
representation to serve the system partition and each type of edges in CSDG is weighed 
as the parameter to decide the cohesion degree. Moreover, a decomposition algorithm is 
proposed to search high independent clusters on the basis of CSDG and independent 
metric. 
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3.2.1.5 Security Mechanisms Detection 
The security mechanisms detection process is to identify the existing security 
countermeasures used in the legacy system so as to conduct a fully evaluation towards 
security level of the target system. A method to conduct security countermeasures 
detection for legacy system is proposed which is divided into two main parts. 
• Extraction phase. Reverse engineering tools are used to extract and gather all 
relevant information from the legacy system under evaluation.  
• Identification phase. This phase inspects each of the gathered information in 
order to determine whether it is relevant with the security artefacts listed in 
Security Artefacts Base which stores a list on possible security issues, and is 
created and maintained by security expert. The results of the identification phase 
are a mapping list showing whether or not there are any security artefacts in the 
legacy system and what types of security countermeasures they belong to. 
After this stage, system security analyst can make an evaluation if the existing security 
mechanisms are enough to meet the user’s security objectives and based on which a 
decision can be made whether or not a security evolution is needed.  
3.2.2 Security Requirement Elicitation 
This section focuses on eliciting security requirements by performing risk analysis, 
which is one of the effective sources to identify security requirements according to the 
security standard ISO 27002 [80]. The security requirement is derived from assessing 
risks of the legacy system, taking consideration of the system’s overall security 
objectives. Through the risk assessment, threats threatening the assets are identified. 
Risk assessment is the process to assess the risk level of the legacy system taking 
security factors into account in a quantified manner. 
For further implementation, security requirement needs to be formatted and represented 
as 4-tuple <Asset, Threat, SecurityAttribute, Priority>. Element Asset means every 
requirement has to be related to one asset, element Threat represents possible threats 
threatening the asset, element SecurityAttribute means the features that make an asset 
valuable, element Priority shows the order of development which can be computed 
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from the proposed risk assessment approach.  
3.2.2.1 Asset Analysis 
Asset is anything valuable to the organisation. Asset analysis consists of asset 
identification and asset criticality ranking. Asset is the final target of a security attack. 
Knowing how many assets in the system, what categories they belong to and the 
criticality of each asset in the legacy system are important to system security design and 
security implementation. In the light of security concerns, the assets with sensitive 
information or process are especially of great importance. The result of assets analysis is 
an asset list with asset name, category, security feature and criticality. 
3.2.2.2 Threat Analysis 
Threat is the potential cause of an unwanted event, which may lead to harm to a system. 
From the asset analysis, what should be protected in the system is determined. The next 
step is to make sure how to protect the identified assets, that is to make sure what kinds 
of threats threatening the asset. An environment-driven threat elicitation approach is 
proposed for web applications taking the consideration of environments where the web 
application hosts. Quantification towards the identified threats is conducted by using 
Microsoft’s DREAD. The output of threat analysis is a threat list with threat name, 
violated CIA feature and risk score. 
3.2.2.3 Vulnerability Analysis 
Vulnerability is a weakness of an asset or control, which may be exploited by a threat. 
Vulnerability analysis is performed by using existing scanning tools and evaluation 
scheme CVSS is used to assess the severity of the identified security vulnerabilities. 
3.2.2.4 Security Evaluation 
From the previous analysis of security mechanism detection and security requirement 
elicitation, combined with the user’s security objectives, a security evaluation can be 
made by quantifying the effectiveness of detected security mechanisms to the identified 
security requirements and thereby a conclusion can be drawn after considering the 
user’s security objectives. 
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3.2.3 Security Enhancement 
In SEMDA framework, security enhancement phase is one of most important steps 
during the entire evolution process, whose task is to perform security improvement for 
the target system on the basis of the abstraction artefacts from the reverse engineering 
phase in Chapter 4 and in line with the elicited security requirements in Chapter 5. 
The approach to improve the security level of legacy system in this thesis is security 
pattern which is defined as “a security pattern describes a particular recurring security 
problem that arises in a specific context and presents a well-proven generic scheme for 
its solution [150]”. 
3.2.3.1 Security Pattern 
Security patterns are the best practices documented to solve the security problems, 
which make it possible for security novice to solve the security problems with the 
proven security expert solutions. In order to support the security evolution for legacy 
system, security patterns need to be formatted in terms of security related information 
and organised to facilitate the mapping from the elicited security requirement to the 
corresponding security patterns.   
For the security related format, security pattern is represented as 3-tuple <Context, 
Problem, Solution>, where Context means the environment the security problems arise, 
Problem means the threat or attack the security pattern solves and Solution provides the 
approach how security pattern solves the security problem in the given security context. 
In this study, thirty-two well-known security patterns are selected to form the pattern 
repository and organised by the proposed multi-aspectual classification metric including 
lifecycle, layer, threat type, application context, domain, and security concerns. 
3.2.3.2 Security Ontology 
After examining the security risks in the legacy system, a set of security requirements 
have been elicited. There exist a number of security patterns to solve the security 
problems in the corresponding context. How to associate security requirements with 
corresponding security patterns is the key of the proposed SEMDA framework.  
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Ontology is the formal representation of the entities and relationship that exists in some 
domain. Ontology is useful for representing and inter-relating many types of knowledge. 
Security ontology is the application of ontology in information security domain.  
In order to relate security requirements with security patterns, ontology is used to 
represent the concept and relationship among security requirement elements and 
security pattern elements which forms some kinds of security ontology. The proposed 
security ontology is written in OWL which is the current recommendation of the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) for exchange of semantic content on the web. By 
defining security requirement ontology and security pattern ontology properly, this 
allows to the correct results of the knowledge that can be inferred from the proposed 
security ontology by applying the corresponding restrictions and axioms. 
3.2.3.3 Security Pattern Integration 
Generally speaking, security pattern integration is fairly straightforward. The extracted 
model from legacy system can be annotated according to the elicited security 
requirement. Security patterns are represented as UML diagrams. The thing to be done 
is to integrate these UML models according to the security requirement and security 
pattern, e.g. user account is a kind of asset treated as an element in UML models and 
needs authenticator pattern to protect against unauthorised access threat. The more 
detailed integration will not be discussed in this thesis because the integration 
techniques can be adopted through existing research.  
3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, a unified reengineering approach, SEMDA (Security-driven Software 
Evolution Using Model Driven Approach), is proposed for software evolution in terms 
of security domain.  
The SEMDA Approach mainly contains three stages, which are security reverse 
engineering stage, security requirement elicitation stage and security enhancement stage. 
Some domain analysis and assessment methods, software reengineering methods, and 
intelligent information process methods and techniques are applied to implement 
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SEMDA projects: 
• Legacy system understanding and extraction. This is the process of assessing 
whether legacy system needs to be evolved according to current user’s security 
objectives. It comprises model extraction, model slicing, system partition, and 
security mechanism detection stages. The acquired results will be prepared to start 
next stages. 
• Security requirement elicitation. This is the process to elicit security requirement 
systematically. A risk assessment approach is proposed to satisfy the need which 
consists of asset analysis, threat analysis and vulnerability analysis. Quantification 
metrics are proposed to measure the security level for each security requirement as 
well as whole system. The outcome of this stage is a formatted security 
requirements list which will be satisfied by next stage research. 
• Security enhancement. It is the final stage where security patterns will be selected 
via proposed security ontology according to the elicited security requirement.  
• The proposed approach has been regarded as a semi-automatic process that involves 
a series of manual work on the representation from domain analysis, and automatic 
transformation with defined rules can be implemented with toolset support.   
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Chapter 4                      
Legacy System Understanding for 
Security 
Objectives 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 To understand the legacy system 
 To extract models from legacy system 
 To construct intermediate diagram CSDG for slicing. 
 To propose a model slicing algorithm based on the CSDG graph 
 To present system decomposition method according to independence metric 
 To detect existing security mechanisms in the legacy systems 
_____________________________________________________________ 
4.1 Overview 
Security concerns usually scatter many aspects of software system, especially for those 
based on the web called web applications. As mentioned in Chapter 2, such software 
systems are faced with lots of security problems such as design defects, vulnerability 
exploit and lack of security mechanisms etc., which increase the maintenance cost, 
difficulties and cause huge losses not only to the economy but also to the reputation of 
the corporations where the systems are applied. Evolving these software systems for 
security purpose conforms to the needs of system designer and customer.   
For a legacy system, if adequate system design documents exist at hand, it will do 
benefits to security redesign. Unfortunately, with the just opposite, in most cases, these 
documents are lost or not well documented which is insufficient to be used for redesign. 
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Under such circumstances, reverse engineering for the legacy system is needed to 
achieve high level design artefacts from the legacy code. 
However, legacy system in real world are usually huge in size, ranging from tens of 
thousands of Lines of Code (LOC) to millions of LOC. Obviously, the UML models 
generated from it would be huge. Legacy systems have static and dynamic aspects. The 
static aspects include software elements and their relationships, while the dynamic 
aspects mainly concern the sequential events that perform the tasks. In static modelling, 
high-level elements are found and subsystems or other logically connected software 
elements may be represented. In dynamic modelling, behaviour descriptions that show 
interactions among high-level static elements are abstracted. 
Dependency analysis is an important way to analyse, understand and maintain program. 
It reflects the execution sequence and call relationships among program statements and 
modules. Lots of dependency analysis methods for programs have been proposed. 
However, the program dependency analysis methods cannot be directly applied to 
dependency analysis for UML models since UML is a modelling language which is 
independent of programming language. 
When considering security concerns on the system model level, it requires the designers 
to figure out the relationships between a specific security-related model element and 
other model elements. When facing with such issues, system designers might skim 
through software design artefacts or even source code to discover the relationships. 
However, even for good software documentation, it is not easy to accomplish the task. 
Model slicing as the slicing technique in model level can meet such requirements by 
concentrating on certain relevant aspects according to corresponding slicing criteria.  
Figure 4-1 depicts the operational framework for this chapter, and each activity in the 
framework will be elaborated in the following subsections. System design model in 
UML static and dynamic diagram can be recovered during the model extraction phase 
by using reverse engineering tools. An intermediate representation graph called Class 
Scenario Dependency Graph (CSDG) is constructed based on the dependency analysis 
of class diagram and sequence diagram and then is computed by model slicing 
according to the specific slicing criteria. The output slices can be used to decompose the 
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legacy system based on the proposed decomposition algorithm. A system domain model 
describing the higher level abstraction of system will be generated after the partition.  
At last, in order to evaluate the security level of legacy system, security 
countermeasures in the current design are to be detected with the help of defined 
security artefact base. The output of Chapter 4 is a system domain model as well as 
security implementation checklist.  
 
Figure 4-1 Operational Framework for Chapter 4 
4.2 Legacy System Understanding and Extraction 
During the software evolution process, the understanding of existing software (i.e., what 
the system does) is required to decide what artefacts in the software are going to be 
modified to comply with the new requirements, software model and computing 
environments, and how to implement those modifications. 
System understanding is a prerequisite for legacy system evolution. It can be regarded 
as a deductive process of acquiring knowledge about a software artefact through 
analysis, abstraction and generalisation. It is crucial because legacy systems can be 
implemented by different building approaches and programming languages, many of 
them do not have clear specifications. 
The adopted analysis can be divided into global analysis and partial analysis in this 
research. Global analysis is used to identify the business objects, developing solutions 
and special strategies by the code and architecture design of the legacy system. Partial 
analysis has been utilised as a process to identify, capture and reorganise the relevant 
information with the purpose of reusing legacy assets for the migrated systems. A 
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thorough understanding of legacy system will facilitate the security countermeasure 
detection and the following security requirements elicitation in Chapter 5. 
In this research, the legacy system understanding process is structured as a sequence of 
activities with the help of reverse engineering tools.  
4.2.1 Functionality Identification 
The objective of functionality identification is to identify and document functionalities 
in legacy systems. During the process, the analysis primarily targets on the valuable 
legacy functionalities that may be served as a basis for risk assessment and security 
countermeasure detection discussed in later sections. Generally, the process of 
functionality identification is illustrated in Figure 4-2. 
Specify Source View Understand Business Context
Identify Functionalities
Source Code,
Abstract Syntax Tree,
Build Files,
Configuration 
Information,
Documentation,etc.
System Decomposition
 
Figure 4-2 Process of Functionality Identification 
From this understanding, the process can be divided into two parts: information 
collection and system decomposition, in which the former one is composed of 
specifying source view and understanding business context, and the latter one refers to 
identify functionalities and decompose legacy systems into subsystems according to 
their correlations.  
Developers often encountered a situation that there is very little known about the 
technical detail of legacy system from the original development team. It turns out that 
one of crucial tasks at this stage is collecting information and documentation from vary 
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valuable but incomprehensible codes. The following is a list of relevant activities to 
accomplish this task: 
• Discuss with maintainers 
• Skim the documentation 
• Observe system operation 
• Brief review codes 
In certain situations some activities are not applicable due to a lack of resources, such as 
maintainers have left, documentation becomes inconsistent etc. This is not necessarily a 
problem because some of these activities may be irrelevant for the goal of reengineering 
project. However, the absence of resource is a potential risk to the project, and it should 
be recorded as such in the project report. Developer should plan to keep the report up to 
date while reverse engineering project progresses and the understanding of the legacy 
system grows. 
Functional identification produces a functional description to legacy systems. Such a 
description is quite rough and is mainly concerned with the behaviour of the legacy 
system and not with their structures. However, that may serves as an ideal initial 
hypothesis to be further refined by applying system decomposition described in Section 
4.5. 
4.2.2 Model Selection 
UML has proved to be a good platform for modelling real systems. When modelling a 
legacy system with UML, the information in the legacy system is refined by using the 
UML diagrams. Through the extraction of UML diagrams from legacy code, the 
transformation has realised analysis platform on UML in order to be helpful on the 
comprehension of legacy systems based on the general analysis language UML. 
UML has static and dynamic modelling advantages. It satisfies the needs of software 
evolution. At the same time, UML presents a visual description of the system and makes 
the process of software evolution easily acceptable. Meanwhile, a large number of tools 
support the transformation from UML diagrams to code, and UML facilities the 
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reusability of software evolution, which is also helpful for forward engineering in the 
process of reengineering. 
UML 2.0 includes thirteen diagrams to improve its modelling quality, shown in Table 
4-1. UML 2.0 uses six diagrams to model the static parts of software system, and uses 
seven diagrams to model the dynamic parts of the software system. 
Table 4-1 Static and Dynamic Diagrams of UML [141] 
UML Diagrams Modelling Analysis 
class diagram static modelling 
object diagram static modelling 
component diagram static modelling 
deployment diagram static modelling 
package diagram  static modelling 
composite structure diagram static modelling 
communication diagram dynamic modelling 
timing diagram dynamic modelling 
use case diagram dynamic modelling 
sequence diagram dynamic modelling 
activity diagram dynamic modelling 
state machine diagram dynamic modelling 
interaction overview diagram dynamic modelling 
However, in practice, it is not necessary to use all of UML diagrams to model those 
legacy systems. Some of the UML diagrams are similar. For example, the class diagram 
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is the most fundamental of the diagrams for modelling the structure of legacy system. 
An object has the same characteristics as the corresponding class. A class diagram is the 
abstraction of the common characteristics of the object group. Therefore, if class 
diagram is used to model the static system structure, the object diagram is superfluous. 
The behavioural models, such as sequence diagrams and communication diagrams, are 
used to depict a sequence of actions in an interaction through which a use case is 
realised [96]. In essence, communication diagram emphasises on which objects interacts 
with each other while sequence diagrams put more emphasis on the actual order. But 
they are actually equivalent.  
In real systems, the static analysis itself is not adequate for a complete system 
understanding. For example, class diagram only provides a static view of the class 
hierarchy. It is impossible to statically discover the real methods and related 
components that called in an invocation referring to an interface or class. In practice, 
sometimes this set is still large and reverse engineers hardly want to screen all of them 
to detect the actual instances. Considering these difficulties, it is necessary to step 
through dynamic model analysis to learn which components are instantiated at run time 
and how they interact.  
The static model cannot depict the behaviours of objects. While, the dynamic models, 
on the other hand, cannot adequately represent concerns of structure and dependency 
relationship. In this thesis, two different UML diagrams are chosen to be reverse 
engineered from legacy software source code, class diagram and sequence diagram. 
Class diagram is an important part of UML static modelling in which the classes of the 
systems and their relationships have been depicted. Class diagram in nature reflects the 
objects and the static relationship among them in software system. Object diagram 
instantiates the class diagram. Sequence diagram, on the other hand, is another 
representation of object diagram which shows the message flow between objects in the 
software application and also implies the basic associations (relationships) between 
classes. They have the advantages for visualising how the interactive objects collaborate 
to perform a job. 
Sequence diagrams are the useful tools for system analyser to understand the dynamic 
behaviour of the software system because they highlight the most important 
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requirements of a system [94]. Through visualising the execution call traces, sequence 
diagram can be used to understand the behaviour of the existing system. Moreover, it is 
a valuable aid to capture scenarios in the software analysis and design phase. 
4.2.3 UML Model Extraction 
Models provide an abstract view of the system, while different diagrams provide 
concrete representations of the system. Model extraction is the process of generating a 
model for an existing software system [37]. Extraction of class diagrams of a legacy 
system can be obtained by identifying the classes and relationships among them, while 
the reverse engineering of behavioural models lies in analysing the sequence of actions 
in an interaction among the objects which can help understanding the behavioural 
aspects of the existing software system. As said in [72] “reverse-engineered sequence 
diagrams can be created through static or dynamic analysis, the advantages of the latter 
being increased precision, control over inputs and conditional behaviour, as well as 
resolution of polymorphism and runtime binding in object-oriented languages”. It is 
obviously that reverse engineering of sequence diagram is a mentally challenging task. 
Effective cognitive support can improve the performance of reverse engineering by 
offloading some or most of the cognitive processing onto an external tool [13]. 
There are many open sources or commercial tools that can be used to generate UML 
class diagrams from the source code, supporting most of object oriented language such 
as C++, C#, Java etc. Some of them can be integrated into the development environment 
as a plugin. EclipseUML, GreenUML, MaintainJ and Jupe are widely used open source 
plugin in Eclipse for extracting models from java code. Rational IBM, Microsoft Visual 
Studio, or Visual Paradigm are some examples of commercial tools with rich 
functionalities. 
Several tools have been developed to aid the reverse engineering for sequence diagram, 
including Omondo EclipseUML, Rational IBM, Visual Paradigm, ModelGoon, eUML 
free, MoDisco, ArgoUML, BOUML, Jsonde Call Tracer, covering most object-oriented 
languages such as Java, C++ and C#. 
After comparison with other tools, Visual Paradigm [169] is the most stable one for 
large scale source code and supports both class diagram and sequence diagram 
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extraction, thereby it is used to extract the diagrams from source code in this study. 
Visual Paradigm for UML (VP-UML) [169] is a powerful UML CASE Tool from the 
OMG. It can support modelling of UML 2, Business Process Modelling Notation 
(BPMN) and SysML. Moreover, it provides reverse engineering and forward 
engineering for java, C# programming language. Class diagram and sequence diagram 
generation for java is provided and what’s more, code generation from class diagram is 
support as well [180]. 
Visual Paradigm is a commercial tool for system modelling. It also provides a 
Community Edition which is free for non-commercial use. Besides that, four 
commercial editions are provided with different features and prices with 30 days free 
trial. Even though a community edition for non-commercial use is free, however, it has 
no reverse engineering and code generation feature. After examination, an Enterprise 
Edition with 30 days free trial is used to reverse engineering java source code into class 
diagram and sequence diagram in this thesis. Figure 4-3 shows the extraction of class 
diagram using VPUML and Figure 4-4 illustrates that of sequence diagram.  
 
Figure 4-3 Reverse Engineering of Class Diagram using VPUML 
Up to now, sequence diagram reverse engineered from source code using automatic 
tools can not represent the abstract object completely due to the specific implementation 
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technique of programming language. For example, there may be intermediate result in 
the extracted diagram, while it should be hidden in the abstract level sequence diagram. 
Therefore, a manual revision to the extracted sequence diagram is required.   
 
Figure 4-4 Illustration of Sequence Diagram Reverse Engineering using VPUML 
4.3 UML Model Dependency Analysis  
Legacy systems are very likely to outgrow the graphical model. As the complexity of 
systems keeps increasing, more nodes and edges are added to the diagram which leads 
to the diagram getting less readability. In the meanwhile, most legacy systems consist of 
a large number of interdependent elements, such as classes, procedures, data structures, 
variables and binary modules. These elements are often heavily coupled between each 
other in the intricate ways, like procedure calls, inheritance relationships and variable 
references. In such situation, modification at one program segment may affect other 
modules in unexpected and undesirable ways. Therefore, for the strategy of coping with 
legacy system evolution, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the 
functional elements which will be reflected in the relationships in UML models when 
representing the legacy systems in the higher abstraction view. 
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4.3.1 Representation of Prototype Diagram 
As mentioned earlier, class diagram is useful to describe the structure of a system by 
showing the system’s classes, operations, attributes, and the relationships among them.  
However, on one hand the static model cannot depict the behaviours of objects. 
Dynamic models, on the other hand, cannot adequately represent considerations of 
structure and dependency relationships. Therefore, when it comes to representing the 
system’s design artefacts, it is a good choice to take advantages of various kinds of 
diagrams, such as using class diagram to describe the system’s structure while sequence 
diagram as a complement to illustrate how these objects interact. 
Interactions between the objects are performed by messages transferring in object 
oriented technology. In UML models, the graphical representation of the message is a 
line segment with an arrow with which the message sender and receiver are connected. 
The type of message is represented by the arrow type. Both sequence diagram and 
communication diagram represent the interactions between objects, however, they 
emphasise the different aspects. Sequence diagram clearly depicts the time sequence 
among object interaction, but does not indicate the relationship among them. While 
communication diagram expresses the relationships among objects, but time sequence 
must be obtained from sequence number. 
Thus, in this thesis, the class diagram dependency is analysed with the help of sequence 
diagram. Since sequence diagram describes execution scenarios of the system, the 
scenario path will be taken into account in the proposed method.  
For the purpose of consistency, the definition of UML class diagram is given below. 
Definition 4.1 UML class diagram Dcl is a tuple Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, 
OPERATION, RELATION}, where 
  C LASS = {c1, c2,…, cn} is the finite set of classes in Dcl; 
 ATTRIBUTE is the finite set of attributes in Dcl; 
 ATTRIBUTE = {∀ci.attr_a | a ∈ ATTRIBUTE, ci ∈ CLASS}; 
 OPERATION is the finite set of operations in Dcl; 
 OPERATION = {∀ci.oper_p | p ∈ OPERATION, ci ∈ CLASS}; 
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 RELATION is the finite set of relationships in Dcl; 
 REALTION = {∀ r | r ∈ REALTION, r = (ci, cj), ci, cj ∈ CLASS}. 
UML class diagram depicts a variety of relationships among classes. In UML class 
diagram, relations are represented by association line and navigation arrow. 
Dependency, is a form of association that specifies a dependency relationships between 
two classes, a dependency is displayed as a dashed line with an open arrow that points 
from the client model element to the supplier model element. Different from other 
relations, dependency relation is very useful when describing class relationships with no 
attributes visible. For example, dependency relation shows whether one packet is aware 
of the existence of the other packet. The component of one packet does not reference 
any class, component, interface, method or service of the other packet if there is no 
dependency relation between them.  
As mentioned in the previous section, sequence diagram in nature is a flow chart 
depicting an execution process. It is obvious that sequence diagram includes control 
dependency information. Scenarios describe the flow of events when executing a use 
case and each event flow is called a scenario. Scenario path represents the complete 
trace of threads execution in sequence diagram and it is the trace of participated objects 
interaction as well.  
As described in [157], “a scenario is a formal description of the flow of events that 
occur during the execution of a use case instance, and it defines the specific sequence of 
events between the system and the external actors”. For the reasons above, scenario is 
used from sequence diagram to compensate the limitation of class diagram by reflecting 
the control dependency in sequence diagram to class diagram. 
Definition 4.2 For a given class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, OPERATION, 
RELATION}, a sequence diagram Dsq is a trituple = {OBJECT, LINK, MESSAGE}, 
where 
OBJECT is the set of instance of CLASS in Dcl; 
OBJECT = {∀obj| obj is the instance of ci, ci ∈CLASS} 
  LINK is the set of directed arcs connecting communication objects and it is the 
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instance of association relationship in RELATION in Dcl;  
LINK = {∀ l | l = (obji, objj), obji, objj ∈OBJECT} 
MESSAGE is a finite set of element representing the interaction between objects 
which can be either synchronous or asynchronous; 
MESSAGE = {m1, m2, …, mn } 
Message is the only way to communicate between objects in UML interaction diagram 
which conveys information with the expectation that action will occur. Links are 
thought as the instances of associations. It is against the rule to create a link in a 
sequence diagram if there is no relationship (i.e. association, aggregation, or 
composition) among the objects in the corresponding class diagram. As shows in Figure 
4-5, there exists a link between the objects of POST and SALE. Message flows along 
with the link. A total() operation needs to be defined in SALE class if a total() message 
is sent to an instance of SALE class. In sequence diagram, messages are represented as 
arrows around the Links and are labelled with sequence number, names and arguments. 
The name of the message is the same to the name of object’s operation which must exist 
in the class where the receiving object is instantiated from. The numbers in the sequence 
diagram show the order of message occurrence. The sequence numbers are nested so 
that you can differentiate which messages are sent from within other messages.  
:POST :SALE
1.1 tot:=total():integer
1.sysop()
 
Figure 4-5 Sequence Diagram Example 
A message is shown as an arrow line from the sender message end to the receiver 
message end. A label is used to identify the number, guard condition, iteration or return 
value of message. Designer can find out the collaborations among objects, trace the 
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execution path and the variation of messages by identifying the syntax. The objects in 
the communication can be instantiated from the classes. There exists a corresponding 
relation in the class diagram for each link between the objects in the sequence diagram. 
It is exactly based on which can be used to aid the dependency analysis in the proposed 
method.   
4.3.2 Dependency Analysis 
Program dependence is the dependency relationships between the statements within a 
program. Data and control flows in the program source code determine the dependency 
relationship which can be represented by some forms of visualisation using program 
dependency analysis techniques [181]. 
In a program with sequence structure, to compute the dependency set for a statement s is 
a process of computing the reachability of the corresponding graph. UML is a kind of 
modelling language independent of normal programming languages. Therefore, the 
existing dependency analysis methods for program cannot be applied directly to analyse 
UML class diagram.  
4.3.2.1 Relation Dependency Analysis 
There are several kinds of relationships among classes in UML class diagram. The 
dependences among classes can be defined according to their relationships in class 
diagram as the following. 
• Association relation. Association relation is a generic relationship between two 
classes, which indicates there are some kinds of relation among them but it 
cannot describe the relation concretely. 
• Aggregation relation. Aggregation relation is one of special form of association 
relation. Aggregation represents a “whole-part” relationship, which is known as 
“has-a” relationship. 
• Composition relation. Composition is also named as strong aggregation which 
is known as “owns a” relationship.  
• Generalisation relation. Generalisation relationship indicates the inheritance 
Chapter 4. Legacy System Understanding for Security  
71 
relation and known as "is a" relationship.  
• Relation dependency analysis of UML class diagram is the process to analyse 
how a class is correlated with other classes or how an instance of a class is is 
correlated with the other class’s instances.  
Definition 4.3  Let s1 and s2 be the classes in the UML class diagram Dcl. If there exists 
an association navigating from s1 to s2, then s1 is associational dependent on s2, denoted 
as RDass(s1, s2).  
Definition 4.4  Let s1 and s2 be the classes in Dcl. If there exists an aggregation relation 
between s1 and s2, and s1 is the “whole” class while s2 is the “part” class, then s1 is 
aggregational dependent on s2, denoted as RDagg(s1, s2).  
              Definition 4.5  Let s1 and s2 be the classes in Dcl. If there exists a composition relation 
between s1 and s2, and there is a navigation from s1 to s2, then s1 is compositional 
dependent on s2, denoted as RDcom(s1, s2).  
Definition 4.6  Let s1 and s2 be the classes in Dcl. If s1 inherits structure and behaviour 
from s2, then s1 is inherited or generalised dependent on s2, denoted as RDgen(s1, s2). 
4.3.2.2 Control Dependency Analysis 
Because of the limitation of class diagram, there are only static structure information of 
classes can be shown in class diagram. Control dependency cannot be analysed solely 
on class diagrams, however, it can be performed with the help of sequence diagram.  
The UML specification describes a precondition as: “an optional set of constraints 
specifying what must be fulfilled when the behaviour is invoked [134].” For sequence 
diagram, guard condition is a kind of precondition. 
For better understanding of control dependency analysis, a set of dependency relations 
is defined. For uniformity, ci.oper_pi represents an operation of ci while an oper_p without 
class identifier represents any operation in the given class diagram and attr_a without 
class identifier represents any attribute in the given class diagram. 
Definition 4.7 Let Г= < c1.oper_p1,…, ci.oper_pi,…, cj.oper_pj, …,cn.oper_pn> be the 
operation sequence under a specific use case scenario, thenξ< ci.oper_pi , cj.oper_pj >= 
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< ci.oper_pi,…, cj.oper_pj > is the fragment of ordered operation sequence from 
ci.oper_pi to cj.oper_pj. 
Definition 4.8 For a given UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, 
OPERATION, RELATION} and an operation sequence Г=< c1.oper_p1,…, ci.oper_pi,…, 
cj.oper_pj,…,cn.oper_pn> from a sequence diagram Dsq ={OBJECT, LINK, MESSAGE}, 
control dependency exists if and only if either one of the following conditions holds. 
• For ci.oper_pi, cj.oper_pj ∈ OPERATION, if ci.oper_pi exists in the 
<ci+1.oper_pi+1,…, cj.oper_pj,…,cn.oper_pn> and the precondition of cj.oper_pj 
includes ci.oper_pi, then cj.oper_pj is control dependent on ci.oper_pi,  denoted 
as CD(cj.oper_pj, ci.oper_pi). 
• For an operation oper_p ∈OPERATION, an attribute attr_a ∈ ATTRIBUTE, if 
whether or not oper_p can be executed depends on the value of attr_a, an 
attribute of a class, and then oper_p is control dependent on attr_a, denoted as 
CD(oper_p, attr_a). 
• Let objecti, objectj ∈ OBJECT be the instances of classes ∈ CLASS, if whether or 
not objectj can be executed depends on the execution of objecti, then objectj is 
control dependent on objecti, denoted as CD(objectj, objecti). 
In non-concurrent event flow, it is obvious to conclude that control dependencies among 
operations are transitive. 
Rule 4.1 Given a UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, OPERATION, 
RELATION}, combined with an operation sequence from a sequence diagram Dsq = 
{OBJECT, LINK, MESSAGE}, if oper_pi is control dependent on oper_pj and oper_pj is 
control dependent on oper_pk , then oper_pi is control dependent on oper_pk. 
CD(oper_pi, oper_pj)∧CD(oper_pj, oper_pk)⇒CD(oper_pi, oper_pk) 
4.3.2.3 Data Dependency Analysis 
Data dependency is such a situation in which the execution of a statement is dependent 
on the value of some relevant operations. In UML class diagram, data dependency 
means the value of a variable defined by an attribute or operation is referred by another 
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attribute or operation. 
In security domain, data as an important information carrier should be treated as assets 
and kept confidential, integrated and available so as to immune from security threat. As 
described in Chapter 2, CIA is a widely used metric for measuring of information 
systems security, emphasising on the three key security properties of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information. Confidentiality is related to the border concept 
of data privacy and refers to limiting information access and disclosure to authorised 
users. Data integrity, namely, that data should remain integrity and have not been 
modified inappropriately. To analyse read dependency between attribute and operation 
among objects of classes will lay a foundation of data confidentiality analysis, similarly, 
to analyse write dependency between attribute and operation will contribute to data 
integrity analysis. 
Definition 4.9  Given a UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, 
OPERATION, RELATION}, for an operation oper_p ∈ OPERATION, let 
• CALL(oper_p) be the set of operations directly or indirectly called by oper_p 
• RA(oper_p) be the set of attributes that are directly or indirectly read by oper_p 
• WR(oper_p) be the set of attributes that are directly or indirectly write by oper_p 
Definition 4.10  Given a UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, 
OPERATION, RELATION}, let c be a class, c∈CLASS, then 
• If oper_p  ∈ OPERATION and attr_a ∈ RA(oper_p), then oper_p is read 
dependent on attr_a, denoted as DDrd(oper_p, attr_a), short as DDrd. 
• If oper_p ∈ OPERATION and attr_a  ∈ WA(oper_p), then attr_a is write 
dependent on oper_p, denoted as DDwr(attr_a , oper_p), short as DDwr. 
• If oper_pi, oper_pj ∈ OPERATION and oper_pj ∈ CALL(oper_pi), then oper_pi 
is call dependent on oper_pj, denoted as DEPcal(oper_pi, oper_pj), short as 
DEPcal. 
Definition 4.11  Given a UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, 
OPERATION, RELATION}, for any oper_p ∈ OPERATION, the following sets are 
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defined: 
• Def(oper_p)={v| v is a variable and defined in oper_p as a parameter} 
• Ref(oper_p)={ v| v is a variable and referenced in oper_p} 
For a given UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, OPERATION, 
RELATION}, let oper_pi and oper_pj be the operations, for 
w∈Def(oper_pj)∪Ref(oper_pj), v ∈ Def(oper_pi), oper_pj is data dependent on oper_pi 
if and only if w is affected by v and there existsξ< oper_pi , oper_pj >, denoted by 
DDoo (oper_pj , oper_pi, w,v), short as DDoo. 
Rule 4.2  Given a UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, OPERATION, 
RELATION}, for oper_pi ,oper_pj ∈ OPERATION, then 
∃v (v ∈ Def(oper_pi)∩Ref(oper_pj))⇒  DDoo (oper_pj , oper_pi,v,v) 
Rule 4.3  Given a UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, OPERATION, 
RELATION}, the data dependencies between operations are transitive. That is for 
oper_pi ,oper_pj, oper_pk ∈ OPERATION, then 
DDoo (oper_pi , oper_pj) ∧DDoo (oper_pj , oper_pk) ⇒  DDoo (oper_pi , oper_pk) 
From the Definition 4.9 and 4.10, it can be concluded that DDoo is one type of DEPcal. 
4.3.2.4 Member Dependency Analysis 
In a class diagram, the attribute and operation are the inherent elements of a class. 
However, when it comes to analyse the different dependency relationships among 
various classes in the class diagram, it is necessary to represent this kind of relationships 
in a formal and clearly way which is the basis of the subsequent model slicing.   
Definition 4.12  Given a UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, 
OPERATION, RELATION}, let c be a class, c∈CLASS, oper_p  ∈ OPERATION, 
attr_a∈ATTRIBUTE, there exists a member dependency if any one of the following 
conditions holds: 
• If oper_p is one of the operation of c, denoted by DEPmem (oper_p, c) 
• If attr_a is one of the attribute of c, denoted by DEPmem (attr_a, c) 
Chapter 4. Legacy System Understanding for Security  
75 
4.4 UML Model Slicing  
Various kinds of dependencies existing among different model elements are usually 
considered when determining the impact of a change made in the system architecture 
[96]. This analysis may become even more complex when security concerns are 
considered among objects due to their cross-cutting feature in nature. 
Slicing for software in the model level needs to consider various classes and their 
relationships, objects and their interactions which have been considered in the previous 
section. An intermediate representation for UML models is the prerequisite for UML 
model slicing which is proposed and named as Class Scenario Dependency Graph 
(CSDG) in this section. 
4.4.1 Class Scenario Dependency Graph (CSDG) 
4.4.1.1 Framework of CSDG Method 
This section presents an intermediate representation of the extracted UML models, 
named CSDG which lays a foundation for the subsequent model slicing. 
CSDG
Node Edge
Class(CL) Attribute(AT) Operation(OP) Relationship
Data
Message
Control Call
1
0..* 0..*
1
1 *
1*
Member
CompositionGeneralization AggregationAssociation
 
Figure 4-6 Class Diagram of CSDG Meta-model 
A class diagram of CSDG meta-model is shown in Figure 4-6. The structural design of 
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CSDG is illustrated with the elements involved which can be roughly classified into two 
categories, node and edge. Each instance of CSDG consists of a set of nodes along with 
a set of edges describing the different kinds of dependencies shown in Figure 4-6. 
The various CSDG nodes are listed as：  
• Class nodes. Class are represented by CL1…CLi. 
• Attribute nodes. The attributes of a class CL are represented by AT1…ATm. 
• Operation nodes. The operations called by a class CL are represented by 
OP1…OPn. 
The edges representing the various kinds of dependencies relationships among the 
above nodes can be listed as: 
• Member dependency edge. Member dependency edges represent the composition 
of operations, attributes and class which means that AT node and OP node are the 
member of CL node. 
• Relationship dependency edge. Relationship dependency edges represent the way 
of how classes and instances of classes are interrelating with each other. CSDG 
represents the class relationships in the same way to its corresponding class 
diagram which can be classified into association, generalisation, composition and 
aggregation.  
• Message dependency edge. Message dependency edges represent messages flows 
among the objects which can be classified into the following types according to 
different message transferring. 
 Data dependency edge. Data dependency edges represent the flows of 
data where arise the class operation. There exists the data dependency if 
the parameter and return values of the operation directly or indirectly 
make use of the class attribute.   
 Control dependency edge. Control dependency edges exist when whether 
or not the operation of an object is executed is determined by another 
operation of the object or another object.  
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 Call dependency edge. Call dependency edges represent the flow of 
operation calls invoked by objects. 
4.4.1.2 Definition of CSDG 
For better understanding of CSDG, a graphical method to represent the dependencies in 
UML diagram is given in this section. 
Definition 4.13 For any class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, OPERATION, 
RELATION} and its sequence diagram Dsq = {OBJECT, LINK, MESSAGE}, the 
corresponding CSDG is a directed graph, can be represented as CSDG(G) = (N, E), 
where N is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. N = CL ∪ AT ∪ OP, E = Emem ∪ 
Eass ∪ Eagg ∪ Ecom ∪ Egen ∪ Ecd ∪ Erd ∪ Ewr ∪ Eoo ∪ Ecal, for attr_a ⊆ ATTRIBUTE, 
oper_p ⊆ OPERATION, where: 
CL =CLASS={μ | μ ∈ CLASS}; 
AT=ATTRIBUE={μ | μ ∈ c.attr_a, c.attr_a ⊆ ATTRIBUTE, c ∈ CLASS}; 
OP=OPERATE={μ | μ ∈ c.oper_p, c.oper_p ⊆ OPERATION, c ∈ CLASS }; 
Emem={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ AT∨μ1 ∈ OP∧μ2 ∈ CL∧DEPmem(μ1,μ2)}; 
Eass={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ CL∧μ2 ∈ CL∧RDass(μ1,μ2)}; 
Eagg={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ CL∧μ2 ∈ CL∧μ1≠μ2∧RDagg(μ1,μ2)}; 
Ecom={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ CL∧μ2 ∈ CL∧μ1≠μ2∧RDcom(μ1,μ2)}; 
Egen={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ CL∧μ2 ∈ CL∧μ1≠μ2∧RDgen(μ1,μ2)}; 
Ecd={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ OP∧μ2 ∈ OP∧CD(μ1,μ2)}; 
Erd={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ AT∧μ2 ∈ OP∧DDrd(μ1,μ2)}; 
Ewr={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ OP∧μ2 ∈ AT∧DDwr(μ1,μ2)}; 
Eoo={(μ1,μ2)|∀v, w ∈ AT·μ1 ∈ OP∧μ2 ∈ OP∧DDoo(μ1,μ2,v,w)}; 
Ecal={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ OP∧μ2 ∈ OP∧DEPcal(μ1,μ2)}; 
From the description of message dependency edge, it can be concluded that: 
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Emes={(μ1,μ2)| μ1 ∈ OP∧μ2 ∈ OP∧DEPcal(μ1,μ2)∨CD(μ1,μ2)∨DDoo(μ1,μ2)} 
For any pair of nodes μ1, μ2 ∈ N, edge (μ1, μ2) ∈ E, μ1 is a predecessor of μ2 and μ2 is a 
successor of μ1, thereby there exists an associated edge from μ1 to μ2, if any one of the 
following conditions holds in the CSDG of class diagram Dcl: 
• μ1 is either OP node or AT node and μ2 is CL node, then there exists a member 
dependency Emem between them. 
• Both μ1, μ2 ∈ CL, then there exist a relationship dependency Eass, Eagg, Ecom, or 
Egen between them. 
• One of the nodes is OP node, the other is either an AT node, or an OP node, and 
there exists a data dependency Erd, Ewr or Eoo between them. 
• A message dependency edge can exist due to one of the following: 
 Both nodes of μ1, μ2 are OP nodes, and there exists a call dependency Ecal 
between them. 
 Both nodes of μ1, μ2 are OP nodes, and there exists a control dependency 
Ectl between them. 
 Both nodes of μ1, μ2 are OP nodes, and there exists a data dependency Eoo 
between them. 
Definition 4.14 For any pair of nodes μ1, μ2 ∈ N in the given UML class scenario 
diagram CSDG = (N, E), and there exists ξ<μ1, μ2>, then  
 RD(μ1,μ2)= RDass(μ1,μ2)∨RDagg(μ1,μ2)∨RDcom(μ1,μ2)∨RDgen(μ1,μ2) 
 DD(μ1,μ2)=DDrd(μ1,μ2)∨DDwr(μ1,μ2)∨DDoo(μ1,μ2) 
 MD(μ1,μ2) =CD(μ1,μ2)∨DEPcal(μ1,μ2)∨DDoo(μ1,μ2) 
Definition 4.15  For any pair of nodes μ1,μ2 ∈ N in the given UML class scenario 
diagram CSDG=(N,E), and there exists ξ<μ1, μ2>, then μ1 depends on μ2 if and only if 
there exists RD(μ1, μ2)∨DD(μ1, μ2)∨MD(μ1, μ2)∨DEPmem (μ1, μ2), denoted as DEP(μ1, 
μ2). 
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4.4.1.3 Semantics Analysis of Dependency in CSDG 
In the description of CSDG, the semantics of edges depend on the pair of nodes and the 
specific scenario. The same notations to [96] are used to represent the dependency 
semantic in CSDG. The edge is represented using a pair of nodes (from-node, to-node).  
The meaning of the from-node is that the dependency starts with from-node and ends 
with to-node. The direction from the from-node to the to-node depicts the dependency 
in the CSDG. The various dependencies semantics in CSDG and their corresponding 
notations are depicted in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 Dependency Semantic in CSDG 
Dependency Semantics in CSDG Description 
DEPmem(ATx, CLx)    DEPmem(OPx, CLx)             
       
 
Member dependency 
Member dependency: 
• Attributes and operations are 
members of a class 
 RDass (CLx, CLy)     RDagg (CLx, CLy) 
 
 RDcom (CLx, CLy)     RDgen (CLx, CLy) 
 
Relationship dependency 
Relationships between a pair of 
classes: 
• Association 
• Aggregation 
• Composition 
• Generalisation 
 DDrd(OP, AT)      DDwr(AT, OP) Data dependency: 
• An operation reads an attribute 
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 DDoo(OP, OP) 
 
Data dependency 
value 
• An operation writes an attribute 
value 
• An variable in a operation is 
affected by the variable in 
another operation  
DEPcal(OP, OP)    DEPcal(CL, OP) 
 
DEPcal(OP, CL)    DEPcal(CLx, CLy) 
 
 
Call dependency 
Call dependency: 
• An operation invocation involves 
invoking another operation 
• An object calls an operation 
• An operation calls an object 
• An object instances another 
object 
 CD(OP, OP)        CD(OP, AT) 
 
 CD(OP, CL)       CD(CLx, CLy ) 
 
 
Control dependency 
Control dependency: 
• An operation invocation is in the 
precondition of another operation 
invocation 
• An operation invocation is 
determined by an attribute value 
of a class  
• The execution of an object is 
determined  by another object 
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4.4.1.4 Algorithm for CSDG Construction 
CSDG(N,E) Construction Algorithm 
Input:                       UML class diagram Dcl = {CLASS, ATRRIBUTE, OPERATION,        
RELATION}  
UML sequence diagram Dsq = {OBJECT, LINK, MESSAGE} 
Output: CSDG 
Initialisation CSDG(N, E)=NULL 
Procedure ConstructionCSDG(Dcl, Dsq) return CSDG 
1. for every class (i←1 to n ) in Dcl do 
    {*identify class node CL from class diagram*} 
2.     add classi as CLi node to CSDG; 
3.     for every attribute (j←1 to m) and operation (k←1 to x) in classi CLi do 
         {*identify nodes AT and OP from class diagram*} 
4.          add attributej as ATj node to CSDG; 
5.          add operationk as OPk node to CSDG; 
         {* add member dependency edge Emem to CSDG*} 
6.          add member dependency edge Emem (ATj,CLi) to CSDG; 
7.          add member dependency edge Emem (OPk,CLi) to CSDG; 
8.       end for 
9.  end for 
 {* add relationship dependency edge Eass, Eagg, Ecom and Egen to CSDG*} 
10. for every CLi (i←1 to n) node in CSDG do   
11.    for every CLj(j←1 to n) node in CSDG do 
Chapter 4. Legacy System Understanding for Security  
82 
12.        identify the relationship dependency between CLi and CLj from Dcl 
13.        switch (type of edge(CLi, CLj)) do 
14.           case(RDass(CLi, CLj)): do 
15.                add association relationship dependency edge Eass(CLi, CLj) to 
CSDG; 
16.                 end case; 
17.           case(RDagg(CLi, CLj)): do 
18.                add aggregation relationship dependency edge Eagg(CLi, CLj) 
to CSDG; 
19.                end case; 
20.           case(RDcom(CLi, CLj)): do 
21.               add composition relationship dependency edge Ecom(CLi, CLj) 
to CSDG; 
22.               end case; 
23.           case(RDgen(CLi, CLj)): do 
24.               add generalisation relationship dependency edge Egen(CLi, CLj)       
to CSDG; 
25.               end case; 
26.          end switch 
27.     end for 
28. end for 
{* identify message dependency by examining sequence diagram Dsq *}  
29. for every CLi (i←1 to n) node in CSDG do 
30.    identify the instance of CLi node in Dsq and mark CLi; 
31.    for (every marked CLi) do 
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32.       identify each interacting object (class) to which an instance of class CLi    
sends a message ; 
       {*these may require reference attributes within the class, depending upon 
the visibility*} 
33.       identify every message received by an instance of CLi; 
       {*these will be the methods for that class*} 
34.       if (there exists any message) do 
35.           for each message mk (k←1 to x) do 
36.                analyse the type of the message mk ; 
37.                switch(type of message mk) do 
38.                     case(CD(OP, OP)||CD(OP,AT)||CD(CL,CL)): do 
39.                         add control dependency edge Ecd to CSDG; 
40.                         end case; 
41.                     case(DDrd(OP, AT)||DDwr(AT, OP)|| DDwr(OP, OP)): do 
42.                         add data dependency edge Edd to CSDG; 
43.                          end case; 
44.                      case(DEPcal(OP, OP)||DEPcal(CL, OP)||DEPcal(OP, CL) 
|| DEPcal(CL, CL)):do 
45.                          add call dependency edge Ecal to CSDG; 
46.                          end case; 
47.                end switch 
48.            end for 
49.     end for 
50. end for 
51. return CSDG; 
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Note: the shapes of line and arrow of different dependency edge can be found from 
Table 4-2 
List 4-1 CSDG Construction Algorithm 
In this section, the proposed method is illustrated with an example referred from [96]. 
Figure 4-7 illustrates the class diagram of the example case. Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-9 
are two sequence diagrams depicting the interactions among the objects of the given 
example. 
+oper_a1()
-attr_a1 : int
-attr_a2 : string
ClassA
+oper_b1(in integer)
-attr_b1 : int
ClassB
+oper_c1() : int
+oper_c2(inout string) : string
-attr_c1 : int
#attr_c2 : int
ClassC
11..*
1..*
1
0..1
*
**
+getAttrib_E()
+getAttrib_F()
-attrib_d1 : string
-attrib_d2 : int
ClassD
+getAttrib_e1() : string
+create_E()
-attrib_e1 : string
ClassE
+getAttrib_f1() : int
+getAttrib_f2() : int
+getAttrib_f3() : string
+destroy_F()
-attrib_f1 : int
-attrib_f2 : int
-attrib_f3 : string
ClassF
+opr_g1()
-attrib_g1 : int
#attrib_g2 : string
ClassG
* *
*
*
1
1
1 1
 
Figure 4-7 Class Diagram of an Example UML Model [96] 
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[else]
alt
1:<<create>>
                                                                       3:<<create>>
2:opr_b1(integer=attrib_a1)
                       4:opr_c1()
5:integer
[attrib_c1<0]
loop
6:opr_b1(integer=attrib_c1)
[attrib_a1>0]
7:opr_c2(string=attrib_a2)
8:string
9:<<delete>>
10:<<delete>>
11:opr_a1()
:ClassA
:ClassB
:ClassC
 
Figure 4-8 Sequence Diagram I of the Example UML Model [96] 
:ClassD
:ClassE
:ClassF
3.getAttrib_e1()
1.getAttrib_E()
2.create_E()
4.string
5.getAttrib_F()
6.getAttrib_f2()
7.integer
8.getAttrib_f3()
9.string
10.<<delete>>
11.destroy_F()
 
Figure 4-9 Sequence Diagrams II of the Example UML Model [96] 
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CSDG of the given example can be constructed by using the proposed construction 
algorithm, and the result is shown in Figure 4-10. 
 
Figure 4-10 CSDG of the Example UML Model 
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4.4.2 Slicing Algorithm 
Slicing algorithm is presented in the form of pseudo code as follows.  
Compute Slice Algorithm 
Requirement                       UML class diagram Dcl={CLASS, ATRRIBUTE, OPERATION,        
RELATION},  
UML communication diagram Dsq={OBJECT, LINK, MESSAGE} 
Input  CSDG(N, E) 
 N= CL ∪ AT ∪ OP,  
 E = Emem ∪ Eass ∪ Eagg ∪ Ecom ∪ Egen ∪ Ecd ∪ Erd ∪ Ewr ∪ Eoo ∪ Ecal, 
 µi, µi∈N, µi is a class, attribute or operation in the given class diagram 
Output 
 
Slice(N', E') 
N'=CL' ∪ AT' ∪ OP',  
E'= Emem' ∪ Eass' ∪ Eagg' ∪ Ecom' ∪ Egen' ∪ Ecd' ∪ Erd' ∪ Ewr'∪ Eoo'∪ Ecal' 
Initialisation CSDG(N,E)=NULL 
Work=∅, is the work set of CSDG nodes used for slice computing   
Phase 1 
 
CSDG construction 
CSDG=Procedure constructCSDG(Dcl, Dsq); 
Phase 2 Procedure ComputeSlice(CSDG, µi) return Slice(N', E') 
1. N'=∅; 
2. E'=∅; 
3. work={ µi }; 
4. while (work≠ ∅) do 
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{*select an element µj and remove it from work*} 
5. work=work-{µj};   
6.    mark µj; 
7. for(every unmarked element µk in N) do 
8.   if (there exists an edge (µj, µk) in E) do 
9.           work=work∪{ µk}; 
10.        E'=E' ∪ (µj, µk); 
11.   end if 
12.   switch(type of edge(µj, µk)) do 
13.      case(RDass(µj, µk)): do 
14.           Eass'= Eass' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
15.           end case; 
16.      case(RDagg(µj, µk)):do 
17.           Eagg'= Eagg' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
18.           end case; 
19.      case(RDcom(µj, µk)): do 
20.           Ecom'= Ecom' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
21.           end case; 
22.      case(RDgen(µj, µk)):do 
23.           Egen'= Egen' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
24.           end case; 
25.       case(DDrd(µj, µk)): do 
26.           Erd'= Erd' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
27.           end case; 
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28.       case(DDwr(µj, µk)): do 
29.           Ewr'= Ewr' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
30.           end case; 
31.       case(DDoo(µj, µk)): do 
32.           Eoo'= Eoo' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
33.           end case; 
34.       case(CD (µj, µk)):do 
35.           Ecd'= Ecd' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
36.           end case; 
37.       case(DEPcal(µj, µk)):do 
38.           Ecal'= Ecal' ∪ {(µj, µk)}; 
39.           end case; 
40.  end switch 
41.  end for 
42.  switch(type of µj) do 
43.  case(µj 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 AT):do 
44.            AT'=AT'∪ { µj }; 
45. if(computeSlice(CSDG, µj) has not been  
computed) do 
46.              (Nj', Ej')=computeslice(CSDG, µj); 
47.              E'= E' ∪ Ej'; 
48.              N'= N' ∪ Nj'; 
49.           end if 
50.           end case; 
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51.      case(µj is in CL): do 
52.           CL'=CL' ∪ { µj }; 
          {*Compute slice based on the slicing 
criteria(CSDG, µj)*} 
53. if(computeSlice(CSDG, µj) has not been 
computed) do 
54.              (Nj', Ej')=computeslice(CSDG, µj); 
55.              E'= E' ∪ Ej'; 
56.              N'= N' ∪ Nj'; 
57.           end if 
58.           end case;  
59.      case(µj is in OP): do 
60.           OP'= OP' ∪ {µj}; 
               {*Compute slice based on the slicing  
criteria(CSDG, µj)*} 
61.     if(computeSlice(CSDG, µj) has not been  
computed) do 
62.               (Nj', Ej')=computeslice(CSDG, µj); 
63.               E'= E' ∪ Ej'; 
64.               N'= N' ∪ Nj'; 
65.            end if 
66.            end case;  
67.       end swtich 
68.   end for 
69. end while 
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70. return CSDG(N', E') 
List 4-2 CSDG Slicing Algorithm 
Suppose given a slicing criteria (CSDG, CLA) for Figure 4-10, the slicing result is 
shown in Figure 4-11 by using the slicing algorithm in List 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-11 Slicing Output using CLA as the Slicing Criteria 
4.5 Legacy System Partition 
As legacy systems are always huge in size, it is useful to break a complicated system 
down into a collection of small and manageable subsystems which respectively contains 
relevant functionalities. Clustering technique is usually used to break down a system 
into a set of meaningful sub-clusters by using some certain decomposition criteria. High 
cohesion, low coupling and interface minimisation are the goals that such criteria try to 
achieve.  
Legacy systems always contain a large number of cooperating components, and these 
components are often organised into identifiable clusters, namely, subsystems. That is, 
components which contribute to the same business logic are included in a subsystem. 
Hence, according to domain-expert knowledge, a legacy system is preliminarily 
decomposed based on the discrepancy of business logic that embedded in various 
subsystems. Figure 4-12 shows the structure of a legacy system after decomposition. 
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Legacy System
Subsystem1
(Cluster1)
Subsystemn
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(Cluster2)
Functionality11
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Functionality1n1
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Figure 4-12 Structure of a Legacy System after Decomposition 
Based on the CSDG, the following sections will concentrate on clustering legacy 
systems according to the high cohesion and low coupling principle. The clustering in 
this thesis refers to the software systems written in object oriented languages, such as 
java.  
4.5.1 Relationship Type Weight 
As described in previous section, there are different types of relationships among 
classes in object oriented systems which play different roles in system architecture. 
Relationships between classes can tell people something about cohesion and coupling of 
modules, or about the layers built into the legacy system. For example, class B inherits 
from class A, class B is hardly independent from class A because the methods and 
attributes of class B may be inherit from class A. When it comes to system 
decomposition, if class A and class B are separated into two different components, 
reusability of the component where class B hosts may be low due to its tight dependence 
on the component where class A hosts. It will make the difference if the relationship 
between class A and Class B is message link. Therefore, taking into consideration of 
relationships among different classes in system decomposition may improve the 
correctness of decomposition. 
For a given object oriented system, CSDG defined in Section 4.4 can be constructed 
based on the extracted static and dynamic models from the object-oriented system to 
represent the dependency relationship. Suppose G= (N, E) is a CSDG, for any edge 
e ∈ 𝐸, W (e) = F (t) is defined as a weight function as follows: 
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𝐹(𝑡) =
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧
𝑊𝑚𝑒𝑚(𝑡 = 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)               
𝑊𝑎𝑠𝑠(𝑡 = 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)                    
𝑊𝑐𝑜𝑚(𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)                 
𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛(𝑡 = 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)               𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑔(𝑡 = 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)                    
𝑊𝑐𝑑(𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)      𝑊𝑑𝑑(𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)          
𝑊𝑐𝑎𝑙(𝑡 = 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)          
      (1) 
It can be concluded from Formula 1, the weight of each edge in CSDG only depends on 
its relationship type. There are three types of node in CSDG (class node CL, attribute 
node AT and operation node OP) which accurately describing to what extent the classes 
are dependent on each other when analysing the dependency relationships among 
classes. Obviously, it is meaningless if AT nodes and OP nodes are separated from CL 
nodes and thereby they should be treated as a whole when considering system 
decomposition. Therefore, the value of Wmem should not be taken into consideration of 
independency metric calculation defined in Section 4.3.2 and thereby its value is set to 0 
for the purpose of uniform. 
Based on the coupling degree of class diagram relationships, there exist: generalisation 
> composition > aggregation > association > dependency. Therefore, the weight value 
of each edge in CSDG is set according to their corresponding relationship derived from 
coupling degree and shown in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3 Weight Value for Edge in CSDG 
Weight  Relationship Value Remarks 
Wmem membership 0 Membership link 
Wass association 0.6 relationship link 
Wagg aggregation 0.7 relationship link 
Wcom composition 0.8 relationship link 
Wgen generalisation 0.9 relationship link 
Wcd control dependency 0.5 message link 
Wdd data dependency 0.5 message link 
Wcal call dependency 0.5 message link 
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4.5.2 System Decomposition Algorithm 
In this thesis, a greedy algorithm based on [105] is proposed to search for high 
independent clusters within limited scope of each node taking relationships among 
different classes into consideration.  In [123], suppose that C = (G1, G2, … Gn) is a 
cluster for a given graph G = (V, E), where Gi = (Vi, Ei) (1≤i≤n) is a subgraph of G, the 
quality measurement model for object oriented system decomposition QMOOD is 
defined as: 
𝑀𝑄(𝐶,𝐺) = ∑ 𝑠(𝐺𝑖,𝐺𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
−
∑ ∑ 𝑠(𝐺𝑖,𝐺𝑗)𝑛𝑗=𝑖+1𝑛−1𝑖=1
𝑛(𝑛−1)/2    (2) 
Where s(Gi, Gi) represents the cohesiveness of Gi, and s(Gi,Gj) represents the coupling 
between Gi and Gj. It is obvious to figure out that the higher cohesion of the subgraph, 
the better the decomposition quality and the higher coupling among subgraph, the worse 
the decomposition quality. The term subgraph is used in this thesis to represent the 
cluster in graph domain. 
Inspired by QMOOD, for a given G = (V, E) representing an object oriented system 
with each V representing each class and E={<u, v, t>|<u, v, t> ∈ E and u,v ∈ V, t ∈ 𝑇}, 
T={membership, association, aggregation, composition, generalisation, control 
dependency, data dependency, call dependency} is the set of relationships among 
classes, a sub-graph G' = (V', E') of G = (V, E), the relation set from G' to its 
complementary graph is O = {<u, v, t>|<u, v, t> ∈ E and u ∈ V', v ∈ V-V', t ∈ 𝑇}, the 
independent metric (IM) defined in [105] is listed in Formula 3 which will be used to 
calculate the independence for each cluster in this thesis.  
𝐼𝑀(𝐺′) = ∑ 𝑊(𝑒)𝑒∈𝐸′ −∑ 𝑊(𝑒)𝑒∈𝑂|𝑉′|       (3) 
In Formula 3, three considerations are taken into account including cohesion within 
subgraph, coupling between subgraph and its complement, the size of subgraph. 
Cohesion can be obtained by calculating the sum of weights of inner relationships 
within the subgraph, while coupling is achieved by calculating the sum of weights of 
outward relationship, and size of subgraph V' can be represented using the number of 
vertices in the subgraph. 
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Large software systems are usually composed of basic clusters and composite clusters 
due to the different abstraction level. Composite clusters can be further decomposed 
into basic clusters. The proposed decomposition algorithm is composed of two phases. 
In first phase IM in Formula 3 is used to compute the independency metric so that the 
basic clusters can be identified and then removed from the graph. The remaining of the 
graph is treated as composite cluster on which further decomposition can be performed 
in second phase. Detailed description of the proposed decomposition algorithm is 
specified in List 4-3. 
System Decomposition Algorithm 
Input CSDG G(N, E), representing an object oriented system 
Output: The set of candidate clusters ClusterList={CL'} 
Initialisation ClusterList = ∅; 
Slice(N',E')=∅, is the slicing output used as intermediate work set of 
cluster computation; 
NodeSet=∅, is the CL node set in Slice.   
Phase 1: Cluster Detection: 
procedure ComputeCluster(G) return ClusterList  
1: ClusterList = NULL; 
2: for each node Ni in graph G do 
3:    Slice(N',E')=ComputeSlice(G, Ni);  
     {*Compute the slice based on the slicing criteria Ni using the  
slicing algorithm proposed in Section 4.4.2*}  
4:    NodeSet={CL'}; {* Pick out CL node in the slice*} 
5:    IM=calculateIM(NodeSet);  
     {*Compute IM according to independence metrics formula*} 
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6:    ContrIMList=calculateElementContrIM(NodeSet); 
{*Calculate the contribution value measured by IM of each 
Node in the NodeSet to itself*} 
7:    TmpNodeSet=DeleteNegativeElements(ContrIMList,NodeSet); 
     {*Delete nodes whose IM value is negative from the NodeSet*} 
8:    TmpIM=calculateIM(TmpNodeSet) 
9:    if IM>TmpIM do 
10:       ClusterList.add(NodeSet); 
11:   else 
12:       ClusterList.add(TmpNodeSet); 
13:   end if 
14:   return ClusterList; 
15: end for 
Phase 2: Cluster sorting and removal: 
After detecting cluster, the cluster list is sorted by their IM values and 
clusters whose IM values are higher than the threshold are chosen as 
candidate clusters and removed from the graph. 
List 4-3 System Decomposition Algorithm 
The proposed algorithm improves the accuracy of that in [105] in the following reasons: 
• The graph used in the decomposition algorithms in [105] is static diagram, while 
the graph used in this thesis is a combination of static and dynamic diagram. 
Dynamic diagram depicts the interactivity between classes which cannot be 
shown in static diagram, and improves the accuracy when evaluating the 
independency among classes. 
• The initial node set of a cluster is obtained by setting the minimal path length as 
4 in the algorithm in [105], while it is obtained by model slicing according to the 
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dependency extent among classes in the proposed algorithm in this thesis which 
is more accurate than that in [105]. 
An example in Section 4.3 is used to illustrate the application of the proposed 
decomposition method, shown in Table 4-4, Table 4-5 and  
Table 4-6. 
Table 4-4 Results of One Iteration 
Cluster No. Slice Criteria Slice Note Set IM 
1 CLA CLA ,CLB ,CLC 2.7 
CLB CLA ,CLB ,CLC 2.7 
CLC CLA ,CLB ,CLC 2.7 
2 CLD CLA,CLB,CLC, CLD,CLE ,CLF 2.28 
3 CLE CLE 0 
4 CLF CLF 0 
5 CLG CLA,CLB,CLC,CLE,CLF,CLG 2.15 
After removal the cluster 1 including the node of CLA, CLB and CLC with the highest 
IM value, the remaining graph is treated as composite and the second iteration 
decomposition is performed on it. The result is shown in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5 Result of Second Iteration 
Cluster No. Slice Criteria Slice NoteSet IM 
2 CLD CLD ,CLE ,CLF 1.57 
3 CLE CLE 0 
4 CLF CLF 0 
5 CLG CLE ,CLF,CLG 1.13 
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Table 4-6 Result of Final Cluster 
Cluster No. Class name 
1 CLA ,CLB ,CLC 
2 CLD ,CLE ,CLF 
3 CLG 
4.6 Security Mechanisms Detection 
The security mechanisms detection process is to identify the existing security 
countermeasures used in the legacy system so as to conduct a fully evaluation towards 
security level of the target system. The best way to fulfil this task is to go through the 
system design specifications and inspect all of software documents from various phases 
of the development process. However, many legacy systems are lack of such documents 
due to a variety of reasons, while as the one who knows the system best, system 
administrator may have some useful knowledge about countermeasures of legacy 
systems. Under such circumstances, security countermeasure detection can be smoothly 
performed with the participation of system administrators. 
In this section, a method to conduct security countermeasures detection for legacy 
system, shown in Figure 4-13, is proposed which is divided into two main parts: 
extraction phase and identification phase. The first phase is automated with a tool, while 
the other, where the actual analysis takes place, is performed by a human expert who 
has expert knowledge in security domain. 
In the extraction phase, reverse engineering tools are used to extract and capture all 
relevant information from the legacy system under evaluation and store it in a collection 
of so-called system model.  
Subsequently, in the identification phase, each of the gathered system model is 
inspected in order to determine whether it is relevant with the security artefacts listed in 
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security artefacts base which stores a checklist of possible security issues, and is created 
and maintained by security expert. The results of the identification phase are a mapping 
list showing whether or not there are any security artefacts in the legacy system and 
what types of security countermeasures they belong to. It is motivated by searching for 
security core structure in the software design to determine the built-in security 
mechanisms of a legacy system. 
 
Figure 4-13 Security Countermeasure Detection Overview 
4.6.1 System Artefacts Extraction  
The purpose of the extraction phase is to create a model of the analysed system that 
stores all basic information necessary for further security mechanism identification. It is 
constructed using reverse engineering techniques. The result of this phase contains 
information about diverse software artefacts such as classes, packages, relations 
between classes or packages, and any other structural information that may potentially 
contribute to further security analysis. The result of class diagram reverse engineering in 
Section 4.2 can be used as system artefacts.  
4.6.2 Security Artefacts Identification  
The idea of the identification phase is to detect the security mechanism in use in the 
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legacy system. It is not easy to detect the built-in security mechanism in a legacy system. 
For simplification, the process is divided into several steps shown in Figure 4-14. 
 
Figure 4-14 Process of Security Mechanism Detection 
Firstly, core structure detection is used to match the structure of legacy system with the 
core security structures, which attempts to find a set of classes whose relationships 
among them match the relationships among the classes in the core structure of Security 
Artefacts Base. The core security structure can be handled as a graph with the nodes 
representing the classes and edges representing the relationships among classes. The 
proposed method of identification security structure is similar to design pattern 
detection. However, security core structures derived from security patterns tend to be 
more abstract and allow more variability in the implementation than design patterns 
which results in more uncertainty matching [167]. For example, the reference monitor in 
the authorisation pattern could be a proxy or a wrapper, or some other form of mediator. 
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In order to eliminate negative matching, it is necessary to make a semantic analysis to 
the matching structure with the knowledge from security expert. Security patterns can 
be detected from refinement. Due to the large size and wide range of security patterns, 
only two most important security patterns, Authentication and Authorisation, will be 
considered in this thesis. 
Although some security concerns such as authentication and authorisation, have several 
forms of patterns for different needs. But their core elements are common. Recognising 
the core elements and then building a bigger match could facilitate matching over a 
range of related patterns [167]. 
Secondly, on the consideration that the outcome of the first step may be nothing since 
none of security core structure is detected, security mechanism detection is extended by 
matching system models with the artefacts listed in security artefact base which is 
established with the help of security architect or expert. Security checklist will be 
produced during the two-step identification. 
4.6.3 Security Artefacts Base 
One of the important steps of this method is to establish the Security Artefacts Base. 
From best practice and ISO 27001 control, it can be concluded that security must 
embody some form of activities such as authentication, authorisation, encryption and 
accounting. Security services such as access control, emphasises on a prevention 
approach to security. Accounting as a detection security approach should also be taken 
into account in the proposed framework. Other security services such as authentication, 
supports both protection and detection.  
4.6.3.1 Authentication 
In authentication, a subject is some kind of user who has to identify itself to the system 
so as to gain authorisation. There are various ways to make authentication. The typical 
ones involve password which may possibly use a security service like Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) or Radius. Some other mechanisms like ID cards or 
biometrics are popular authentication means. Figure 4-15 shows the core structure of 
authentication mechanism. 
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Figure 4-15 Authentication Core Structure 
Typical mechanisms used for authentication are listed as follows: 
• User ID and Password 
This technique generally scores high on cost effectiveness and usage 
requirements, but lower on reliability and protection of passwords. Password’s 
ability to avoid confirming imposters is medium at best, because passwords can 
be obtained through theft or other means. This ability depends on good 
password practice—for example, the use of hard-to-guess passwords, and not 
recording passwords in easy-to-find locations. Password’s ability to avoid 
denying legitimate users depends on the likelihood of remembering passwords: 
good passwords can be somewhat difficult to remember. 
• PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)  
This technique depends somewhat on the population to which it is applied. It 
can score very highly on reliability with a relatively sophisticated user base, but 
has high cost. 
• SSL or password digests 
Basic authentication uses SSL or password digest to protect the password. 
• Server-side authentication 
Authentication should be in the server side (instead of client side/JavaScript). 
• Credentials 
Authentication token / password are stored with encryption / salted hash. 
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• SSO (Single Sign On) / centralised security service 
Users don't have to have many accounts/passwords, users don't have to share 
their passwords with many applications/resources, and the developers don't 
have to maintain multiple authentication mechanisms in different systems. With 
federated identity provider, you can centralise the credentials across 
organisations. 
4.6.3.2 Authorisation and Access Control 
Access control exists to ensure that unauthorised access is not allowed and that 
authorised users cannot make improper modifications. A reference monitor is used in 
access control to check whether or not the access request from the subject to the 
protected object is authorised. The request with a valid authorisation can be forwarded. 
In the implementation phase, the reference monitor can be realised as proxy, wrapper or 
mediator. Figure 4-16 shows the core structure of access control mechanism. 
 
Figure 4-16 Access Control Core Structure 
Access control policies are a collection of access control rules. As shown in Figure 4-17, 
access control rule is a tuple involving entities of Subject, ProtectedObject, and Right 
which means for a given Subject whose accessible objects are determined by the Right 
representing by “allow” or “deny”. In implementation phase, the rules may be 
implemented and stored in a XML document or a table rather than appearing as a class. 
The subject in access control policies may be a role with related users or with groups 
and sessions. 
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Figure 4-17 Access Policy Core Structure  
The typical access control techniques may include： 
• Group grants 
• Role grants 
• Delegation 
• Access control lists 
• Policy objects 
• Rules 
4.6.3.3 Encryption Mechanism 
Encryption techniques play a vital role in secure software from unauthorised access.  
The well encrypted data or information cannot be read by unauthorised parties even if it 
is hacked. Encryption is typically required for services involving personal information, 
for example, online banking.  
In an encryption scheme, information or data referred to as plaintext is encoded into a 
different unreadable form using some kind of encryption algorithm, and the encrypted 
form is called cipher text. There are various encryption algorithms exist which are open 
to public. An encryption key is needed to perform the encryption which specifies how 
the data is to be encoded.  An unauthorised party without the key should not be able to 
understand anything from the cipher text while an authorised one can decode the cipher 
text with a secret decryption key. The keys are usually produced by a key generation 
algorithm randomly for security reasons. 
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Encryption scheme can be classified into two kinds according to the different encryption 
key schemes: 
• Symmetric key encryption 
In such scheme, the key used to encrypt and decrypt are same. Therefore, the 
communication parties have to reach an agreement on the secret key before 
starting the communication. The example of symmetric algorithm includes DES, 
AES, and IDEA etc. 
• Asymmetric key encryption 
The keys used to encrypt and decrypt are different. The encryption key also 
called public key is published to anyone who wish to encrypt the messages, while 
only the receiving party holds the decryption key and then cipher text can be 
decrypted and read. The most frequently used asymmetric encryption scheme is 
RSA. 
Key size or key length is the size measured by bits of the key used in an encryption 
algorithm. Generally speaking, the more bits the key size is, the more strength the 
encryption algorithm is and the more security of the encryption scheme provides. 
• Well-proven encryption algorithms 
Use well-proven encryption algorithms (e.g. AES) in well-proven libraries 
instead of inventing and implementation your own algorithm. 
• Sensitive data encryption 
Encrypt/hash sensitive data e.g. bank-accounts in the LDAP production copy 
used for development/test. 
• Enough encryption key 
Use enough key size. Securely distribute, manage, store the keys, and change the 
keys periodically. 
The equivalent relation between symmetric key and asymmetric key scheme can be 
found in [131], shown in Table 4-7. RSA security claims that the keys with 1024 bits 
are likely to become crackable during the time between 2006 and 2010 and that keys 
with 2048 bits are sufficient until 2030. An RSA key length of 3072 bits should be used 
Chapter 4. Legacy System Understanding for Security  
106 
beyond 2030. NIST key management guidelines [131] further suggest that 15360-bit 
RSA keys are equivalent in strength to 256-bit symmetric keys.  
Table 4-7 Comparable Strength between Symmetric Key and Asymmetric Key 
RSA Keys (bits) Symmetric Keys (bits) 
1024  80 
2048 112 
3072 128 
15360 256 
4.6.3.4 Accounting 
The function of security accounting is to track security-related actions or events, such as 
damage to property, attempts at unauthorised database access, or transmission of a 
computer virus, and provide information about those events [151]. The information 
provided includes identifying those who participated in the events, so that they may be 
held accountable. The primary security property supported by security accounting is 
accountability. 
For application domain, security accounting mechanisms are usually some kind of 
auditing. Audit is the review of events stored in logs, sometimes called audit logs or 
audit trails, to determine inadequacies during operation or non-compliance with policy. 
Audit specifically scrutinises information for security relevance. Some form of auditing 
from [149] is listed below. 
• Centralised audit log 
• Encrypted checksums on log records 
• Encrypted log records 
• Digital signature (non-repudiation) 
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4.6.3.5 Input Validation 
Improper or lack of user input data validation is one of the biggest security issues in 
web applications. The issues include Buffer Overflows, SQL Injection, Cross-Site 
Scripting attacks, and many others. Input validation is the process to test the correctness 
of any input to the applications. All application have the specific requirement for user 
input which could come from various sources, for example, end user, malicious user, 
another application or any other sources. All input should be validated before processed 
by application. 
Input validation only on the client side is not sufficient in many cases. For example, 
JavaScript can be used to validate client side input. However, this kind of validation can 
be easily bypassed by using some proxy tools, such as TamperIE or WebScarab tool. As 
a result, it is very important to have a validation on server side while make it on the 
client side at the same time because there is no guarantee that validations on the client 
will be executed. 
4.6.3.6 Session Management 
A common vulnerability of web applications is caused by not protecting account 
credentials and session tokens. There are four types of session id attacks: interception, 
prediction, brute-force, and fixation. In each attack, an unauthorised user can hijack a 
session and assume the valid user’s identity.  Encrypting sessions is effective against 
interception; randomly assigned session ids protect against prediction; long key spaces 
render brute force attack less successful; forcing assignment and frequent regeneration 
of session ids make fixation less problematic. Some security suggestions on session 
management are listed as follows. 
• HMAC(Hash Message Authentication Code) or encrypt session ID 
• Logout mechanism 
• One time Nonce 
• Random generated Session ids 
• Session ID length 128 bits or more 
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4.6.3.7 Configuration Management 
Configuration management also referred to as change management, it documents much 
configuration information in the system, for example, how the networks devices are 
configured, what version of the application are running, and what are the last patches 
installed on the devices. There is no doubt that attackers are interested in this 
information. Therefore, how to manage configurations has close relations with system 
security. The following lists typical suggestions of configuration management for 
security concerns. 
• Restrict access to configuration file 
• Encrypt/hash sensitive configuration data 
• Centralised security management 
• Configuration change detection 
• Restrict message size 
4.6.3.8 Error Handling 
Error is inevitable during software development. Errors may force an application stop 
working. How to solve the error securely is vital to application security. Detailed error 
information may include sensitive information which can be exploited by attacker. 
Therefore, error messages should be handled properly so as to avoid being exploited by 
attackers. The typical error handling suggestions are listed as follows. 
• Policy for handling errors 
• Hide sensitive information in the error pages 
• Centralised error handling 
After identifying the system artefacts with security artefacts base, an assessment 
checklist is to be generated which has three columns in total. The first two columns 
enumerate the security services and the security mechanisms supporting the services. 
The next one is checkbox denoting if the mechanism is implemented in the current 
design. 
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4.6.4 An Example 
Let’s consider an application architecture that delivers a Web-based business-to- 
consumer portal that integrates a variety of back-end applications. The application 
security architecture adopts a basic authentication using username and password for 
authenticating the user, authorises the user as a customer or administrator to perform 
further operations, and captures all events and actions using a logging mechanism for 
accountability. The back-end applications running on heterogeneous platforms make use 
of a shared security context to provide single sign-on access and to participate in 
portal-initiated transactions. Table 4-8 shows the checking result of the given example. 
Table 4-8 Example of Security Implementation Checklist  
Security Service Security Mechanism Current 
Authentication Username and password √ 
Client-certificate √ 
SSL or Password digest  
Credentials  
PKI  
Server-side Authentication  
SSO / centralised security service √ 
Authorisation and 
Access Control 
Group grants √ 
Role grants  
Delegation  
Access control lists  
Policy objects  
Rules  
Encryption Well-proven encryption algorithms √ 
Sensitive data encryption  
Symmetric encryption key 80 bit or more  
Asymmetric encryption  key 1024 bit or more √ 
Accounting 
 
Centralised audit log √ 
Encrypted checksums on log records  
Encrypted log records  
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Digital signature (non-repudiation)  
Input Validation Server-side validation  
Client-side validation  
Session Management HMAC or encrypt session ID  
Logout mechanism  
One time Nonce  
Random generated session ID  
Session ID length 128 bits or more  
Configuration 
Management 
Restrict access to configuration file  
Encrypt/hash sensitive configuration data  
Centralised security management  
Configuration change detection   
Restrict message size  
Error Handling Policy for handling errors  
Hide sensitive information in the error pages  
Centralised error handling  
4.7 Summary 
The analysis and extraction of a legacy system are very important before the security 
oriented evolution. There are huge amounts of legacy software applications which must 
be understood to decide whether they are needed to be evolved under the specific 
environment and security requirements. In order to analyse and understand the legacy 
system at model level, an intermediate representation graph is defined with the 
consideration of different relationships among classes and dynamic scenario 
information. The contents covered in this chapter are concluded as follows: 
• Firstly, class diagram and sequence diagram of UML models are chosen to be the 
stereotype models and extracted from the legacy system using existing reverse 
engineering tools. The process is the basis for the subsequent steps and as an initial 
step for the evolution of legacy systems. 
• Secondly, dependency relationships among classes in static and dynamic models   
are analysed and an intermediate representation graph called CSDG is constructed 
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based on which a model slicing method is proposed to assist the legacy system 
understanding and security analysis in the later phase. 
• Thirdly, software clustering technique is adopted to decompose the legacy system 
into several clusters. An improved decomposition algorithm is introduced to 
extract the independent components based on the proposed CSDG graph using the 
independence metric. The architect’s view and users’ requirements help to decide 
the cutting point in the dendrogram. Reverse engineering plays a vital role in the 
process. 
• Fourthly, method of existing security mechanisms detection for legacy systems is 
presented to help the decision making whether or not the legacy system needs to be 
evolved by evaluating the risk assessment discussed in Chapter 5. Detection is 
composed of two steps：known security core structure matching and security 
artefact base mapping. A security checklist is acquired in this process which is 
further analysed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5                             
Security Requirements Elicitation  
Objectives 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 To present a threat modelling method for web application 
 To propose a risk assessment framework for security requirement elicitation 
 To evaluate whether the provided security features satisfy the user security 
objectives 
 To conclude the security requirements  
__________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Overview  
In Chapter 4, UML models can be generated by reverse engineering the legacy software. 
Refining the UML models to achieve security related artefacts shows a clear and 
focused view for security analyser. A method to detect existing security mechanisms in 
a legacy system is proposed in Chapter 4 as well. However, environment where the 
legacy systems are hosted may change with the rapid development of information 
technology. Before determining and adopting any security design strategies, it is 
necessary to perform a risk assessment of the application security architecture to decide 
whether or not the current security designs in use protect against the security risk to the 
legacy system and to what extent they satisfy the security needs from users. The 
following section will focus on the risk assessment and security evaluation of legacy 
system. 
The increasing number of attacks on software systems makes it more important than 
ever to develop secure software systems. Especially web-based applications and 
services are facing numerous threats due to their public access. As introduced in 
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Chapter 2, a legacy system is the system that was developed in the past or has become 
outdated in the business area. Typically, more and more systems become legacy because 
of the use of modern software engineering methods and the ever changing requirement. 
Security as an important non-functional requirement has become one of the key driven 
factors to software evolution. Integration of security into software engineering has not 
yet been achieved completely as the amount of security knowledge, including theoretic 
models, technologies and standards, developed until now is complex, often diffused, 
and seldom structured enough to be used in software development process [34]. 
Concrete security requirements and their security risks to the software system should be 
examined. In the following sections of this Chapter, a novel threat elicitation approach 
[63] and a risk assessment method [62] are proposed which have been published in the 
international journals. 
Asset Analysis Vulnerability Analysis
Security Evaluation
Not 
Satisfied
Legacy System Security Evolution
Satisfied
Threat Analysis
Risk Assessment
User security 
need 
Provided security 
features satisfy the 
security needs
 
Figure 5-1 Activity Diagram of Risk Assessment and Security Evaluation 
Due to the complexity of security implementation, legacy systems are developed using 
different kinds of techniques and deployed diversity of security countermeasures. 
Therefore, it is essential to make an assessment to the security risks that the legacy 
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systems face, whether or not it deploys the security countermeasure and to what extent 
the assets are protected against the threats. During the assessment process in this chapter, 
many criteria are required to rank the alternatives of the decisions. To decide whether or 
not the legacy system needs to be evolved for security, an assessment framework is 
proposed and the assessment process is described in Figure 5-1. The operational 
framework of Chapter 5 is shown in Figure 5-2. There exist several kinds of models 
after the processing of the first phase in SEMDA including system design models and 
higher level of domain models. These models can be further processed to produce 
security requirement conceptual model. 
 
Figure 5-2 Operational Framework for Chapter 5 
5.2 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a process of assessing the security level in a quantitative or 
qualitative mode of an organisation by evaluating one’s exposure to the threats to its 
assets and operating capabilities.  
There exist different kinds of application software. Due to the universal adoption of web, 
web based applications tend to increasing rapidly and especially popular on mobile 
devices such as smart phones and tablets. Distinctions between web-based applications 
written in HTML, JSP or any other web technologies using the web browser and 
traditional applications written with whatever programming languages running in the 
traditional computers have emerged. There also exist some debate on whether or not 
web based application should replace traditional applications. Anyway, web 
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applications have indeed greatly increased in popularity for many uses.   
Hence, web applications are chosen to be the research case due to their popularity in use 
and complex security concerns. Risk assessment for web application is one of the 
effective methods to help decision makers determining how much they need to invest in 
security so as to achieve a desired security level. It is the process to make sure all risks 
have been considered and thereby make it possible to find proper countermeasures to 
mitigate those risks. Threat risk modelling methods can be used to facilitate this 
process. 
As described in Section 2.6, several important concepts are usually used in risk analysis, 
including Asset, Threat, Vulnerability, Risk and Attack. Figure 5-3 shows how different 
security factors, involved in risk analysis, are related. It is obvious that the target of 
attack is the assets whose vulnerabilities are exploited by threats which in turn lead to 
risks and do harm to assets.  
Attack
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Vulnerability
Asset
Risk
abuse to
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harm to
lead to
to
has
 
Figure 5-3 Security Concepts Relationship 
In this section, a quantitative risk assessment method for web application taking 
consideration of criticality of asset, threat and vulnerability is shown in Figure 5-4. 
The proposed model consists of five phases with difference phases in different colours. 
Every phase in the framework needs more than one step. Here are the detailed meanings 
of each phase. 
Phase 1: Architecture and Environment Analysis 
• Step 1: Architecture Analysis. System architecture analysis is the recognition 
process of entire system architecture and business processes so as to precisely 
understand the platform structure, security boundary, business processes, 
internal and external environment of the target system. The system architecture 
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model can be established which is the foundation for data flow analysis.  
• Step 2: Application Type Identification. In order to have a precise risk 
estimation of the target web application, it needs to be classified into one of 
types (from web-app1 to web-app6) according to the proposed web application 
classification in Section 5.2.2.1. When it is done, the security risks of this kind 
of web application can be evaluated preliminarily.  
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Identify the application type and 
its security risk
Using tools to diagnose
 vulnerabilities
 Key Asset Criticality Analysis 
Rank the assets according to their 
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Threat Security Analysis
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Figure 5-4 Proposed Risk Analysis Process 
Phase 2: Key Asset Analysis 
• Step 1: Key Assets Identification. In this step, the key information assets 
representing as the key data and services which determine system security 
should be identified. The key information assets are the kernel for risk 
assessment.  
• Step 2: Asset Criticality Ranking. The criticality of assets is determined based 
on the type of information handled in the applications.  
Phase 3: Threat Analysis 
• Step 1: Threats Identification. Threat identification is the process of recognising 
the threats related to each key asset identified in phase 2. The result of threat 
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identification is a list of threats associated with the target system.  
• Step 2: Threat Quantification. Threat quantification is an important step to risk 
assessment and it is the process of quantifying the threats listed in the previous 
step by using threat DREAD [139] which is a risk assessment model proposed 
by Microsoft. A risk value may be calculated to each threat after this step. 
Phase 4: Vulnerability Analysis 
• Step 1: Vulnerability Identification. The diagnosis tools can be used to perform 
vulnerability analysis. A list of system vulnerabilities can be detected after this 
step. 
• Step 2: Vulnerability Security Scoring. In this study, vulnerability “scoring” 
systems - Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [116] is used to 
quantify each vulnerability that identified from the previous step, and produce a 
total score for the vulnerabilities of system.  
Phase 5: Risk Analysis and Security Requirement Specification  
• Step 1: Potential Risk will be evaluated based on the results of asset, threat and 
vulnerability analyses using the security vector <A, T, V> in Formula (4).  
• Step 2: Security Requirement Specification. Security requirements can be 
specified according to the results of the previous phases. 
System 1
System 2
Threat
Criticality of Asset
Vulnerability
SV1
SV2
 
Figure 5-5 Security Vectors 
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From Figure 5-5, it can be concluded that the computation of security evaluation vectors 
is the combination of the factors themselves (A for Asset, T for Threat, V for 
Vulnerability) and the weight of each factor.  
SV= vta WVWTWA ×+×+× 222 . (4) 
Where Wa for the weight of asset, Wt for the weight of threat and Wv for weight of 
vulnerability. The values of Wa, Wt and Wv range from 0 to 1 and it must meet the 
restriction that the sum of them equals to 1. In this case, taking consideration of 
importance of each factors, the weights of them are treated as the same which can be 
formulised as 
SV= ( )3
222 VTA ++  
(5) 
5.2.1 Asset Analysis 
Asset is the protection object in an information system. Asset analysis is the process to 
discover all assets relevant to the legacy system and rate the criticalities of each of them 
in order to prioritise them with respect to information security.  
In this section, an environment critical asset assessment method is proposed to perform 
the asset identification and asset criticality analysis. The asset analysis process is briefly 
explained based on the international standard ISO 17799, improved by BS7799 [19]. 
The proposed method to assess the assets in information system includes analysing 
information security requirements, understanding asset criticality, and checking 
sensitivity of data asset.  
5.2.1.1 Asset Identification 
The British BS7799 [19] suggests the asset classification as follows:  
• Information Asset: DB, data file, system document, user manual, study and 
training materials, regulations for management, plan document, provision for 
alternative system   
• Documents: contracts, guidelines, company documents, important business 
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documents   
• Software Asset: applications S/W, system S/W, development tool and utility  
• Physical Asset: computer and communication equipment, magnetic tape, 
magnetic disk, power supply, air conditioner, furniture, facilities  
• Personnel Asset: individuals, customer, subscriber  
• Image and Reputation of a Company 
• Service: computer and communication service, warm, light, air conditioning   
This thesis attempts to deal with the assets associated with information system rather 
than all the listed assets in an organisation. Thus, the following asset domains are 
concerned in this thesis:   
• Software: including applications to support the objectives and business 
processes in an organisation   
• Information: including data to achieve the objectives and business process   
Asset identification plays a key role in risk assessment. Systematically and explicitly 
identify the types of assets that need protection and determine the types of protection 
they need is essential. This activity is typically performed by a system architect or 
strategic planner, and includes following steps: 
• Identify the asset type, as described in this section, the following assets are 
concerned in this thesis 
 Information or data assets, such as personal and financial data 
 Software asset, such as applications to support the business processes 
• Identify sensitive business processes 
 Business process, such as ordering processes 
 Sensitive process, such as logging process, paying process etc. 
• Identify what types of security may be needed for each asset type 
 Confidentiality, protection against inadvertent or unauthorised disclosure 
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 Integrity, protection against inadvertent or unauthorised modification 
 Availability, making business assets available for authorised use 
 Accountability, attribution of responsibility for action 
• Prioritise each assets according to the proposed ranking criteria 
 Sensitivity, such as personal information should be ranked higher 
criticality 
 Application environment, such as external use should be ranked higher 
criticality 
In this thesis, an asset identification method is proposed by capturing vocabularies of 
the legacy system with the help of system diagrams. The vocabularies of a system 
include all the software and conceptual information which are treated as the assets that 
needs to be identified during the asset analysis phase for the legacy system. System 
diagrams extracted from the reverse engineering phase can facilitate the identification of 
information assets. In this section, a diagram based approach is proposed to extract or 
discover all the assets from system diagrams derived from the legacy system. 
For those software designed using traditional techniques, data flow diagram (DFD) 
illustrates how data is processed by a system, what the system accomplishes and how it 
will be implemented, when it is refined with further specification. Asset identification 
for such information-processing systems can be facilitated by analysing DFD. 
Components of DFD-- data store, flow, and process can be treated as assets and further 
analysed according to their relevance to sensitive information in the system.  
For the system designed using object oriented technique, UML diagrams are commonly 
used to modelling all aspects relevant to the being developed system in the design phase. 
UML 2.0 can be classified into 13 diagrams. Among all of the UML diagrams, class 
diagram shows the structure of the entire system and involves all the possible elements 
in the system, which is the most appropriate diagram for asset extraction.  
When extracting asset from class diagram, all the fields of each class need to be 
examined by the system designer, security analyst along with the stakeholders of the 
given legacy system. If the field is thought to be of importance to the organisation or 
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having impact to system security, it should be treated as an asset. The first field of a 
class in the class diagram is the class’s name which is a good source to find asset. For 
example, a class with the name of MedicalHistory can be treated as an asset if a hospital 
management system is considered. The second field of a class in the class diagram lists 
the attributes of the class which can facilitate the judgement whether a class is a good 
asset or not. The last section describes the methods or operations of a class which is 
used to depict the interaction or behaviour of this class to other classes. Operations can 
be used to convey information based on which the data flows among different objects in 
the system. Therefore, carefully examining the operation can be another good source to 
discover asset. 
Based on the analysis above, Table 5-1 concludes information asset category and 
security protection for web application. 
Table 5-1 Information Asset Category and Security Protection of Web Application 
Asset types Type Security Needed Description 
Internal data Data Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Accountability 
Privacy information may be contained in this 
data 
Public data Data  Integrity 
Availability 
Unauthorised modification or unavailable of 
this data or could result in loss of business 
reputation 
Sensitive data Data  Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Accountability 
This kind of data loss or  unauthorised 
modification could result in financial loss  
Sensitive 
process 
Business 
process 
Confidentiality 
Availability 
Accountability 
The business processes contain sensitive 
information processing service. Unauthorised 
access or unavailable of these service may 
result in financial loss or business reputation. 
Non-sensitive 
process 
Business 
process 
Availability The business process may contain the key 
services for the customer. Unavailable of this 
service may affect the business task. 
Chapter 5. Security Requirements Elicitation 
122 
5.2.1.2 Asset Criticality Quantification 
The criticality of assets is treated according to their property and the environment where 
they host. If the application deals with personal information such as name, password, 
and finance related information such as credit card and bank account information, and 
the application is designed for external use, the criticality level is treated as high. 
Otherwise, the criticality level is treated as medium if the application deals with 
personal information for internal use, and low if it does not deal with personal 
information. The relationship of asset criticality with the processed data and its applied 
environment is shown in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 Asset Criticality Scale 
Asset 
Type 
Sensitive  Environment Criticality 
Level 
Risk 
Scale 
Description 
Data 
Business 
process 
 
No Internal use Very low 0.0-1.99 The asset has insignificant 
importance and has no security 
requirements 
No External use Low 2.0-3.99 The asset has minor financial value. 
Comprise of it results in little 
business impact 
Yes Internal use Medium  4.0-5.99 The asset is of moderate value. It 
has some security needs and 
financial value. Comprise of it 
would impede the enterprise’s 
mission 
Yes External 
facing 
known users 
High 6.0-7.99 The asset is highly value because of 
its security requirements or 
customer focus. Its loss would 
result in considerable harm to 
customer services and reputation 
Yes External 
facing public 
users 
Very high 8.0-10.0 The asset represents or supports a 
critical business function. Loss or 
damage of it results in severe 
financial or reputation 
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5.2.2 Threat Analysis 
Web application is some kind of different one due to its application environment and 
complexity. Accordingly, threats to this kind of software are different to some extent. 
The number and category of the threats to different kind of web applications may not be 
the same when taking account of complexity and environment where the applications 
are hosted. Sometimes, the applications may be developed with security in mind, and 
may be difficult to penetrate as well, but if the environment where the application is 
hosted is not properly secured, it is easy to penetrate the environment , and as a result, it 
is easy to compromise the whole application including its subsystems and platform. 
As far as the web application developers are concerned, on one hand, they need to keep 
security on mind when developing the web application, on the other hand, they are 
usually forced to face the dilemma that how to trade-off among so many product factors 
such as security requirements, product deadline and budgets etc. Thus, this section 
proposes a novel approach to ease the elicitation of the threats for web applications by 
defining web application classification as the filter to rule some threats out immediately 
according to the security requirement and the given scenery. Before diving into the 
details of the proposed model, it is better to give an overall idea of this model, described 
in Figure 5-6, where SR represents the security requirement and Category represents the 
web application category. 
 
Figure 5-6 Illustration of the Proposed Approach EDTEM  
The proposed model, called environment-driven threat elicitation model, short as 
EDTEM, is working as a sieve to sift the inappropriate threats. With this approach, it 
starts with a laundry list of common threats [115] grouped by network, host, and 
application categories. Next, apply the threat list to the given application architecture 
and screen out the threats matching its own web application category. Then, further 
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filtering can be done to the result threat set according to the security requirements of the 
given web application. Some threats will be ruled out because they do not apply to the 
scenario of the given application. As a result, a set of filtered threats specific to the 
given web application can be obtained. 
This section depicts a new method to ease eliciting threats to web application by using 
web application classification which is proposed taking consideration of security-related 
environmental factors. 
5.2.2.1 Classification of Web Application 
All web-applications are not same, the architecture and its supporting systems could be 
different for each application depending on the complexity, but the resources or 
techniques needed for running those applications may be same. So, it is possible to 
create a common threat model and identify all possible threats that can be used for all 
web-applications [62]. The Web Application Classification is a cooperative effort to 
clarify and organise the types of web application with different security risk level so as 
to ease the process of threats identification. It helps you to identify which threats are 
relevant to your application through the proposed model. 
It is certainly that the risks to web applications are certain to be different when they are 
hosted in well secured and non-secure environments. Thus, it is necessary to take 
consideration of the web application type before further discussion. 
For the consideration of the environment where web application hosts, three attributes 
of web applications have been taken into account, which are the usage scope, target user 
and connectivity mode. Then, the circumstances of all the attributes of web application 
are listed in Table 5-3. Some symbols are used to represent these attributes, US (Internal 
use only, Internal and External use, External use only) for the usage scope and its values, 
TU (Known users, anonymous) for target user, and CM (Intranet, VPN, Internet) for 
connection mode. 
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Table 5-3 Attributes of Web Application 
Usage Scope (US) Target User (TU) Connection Mode (CM) 
Internal use only (US1) Know users (TU1) Intranet (CM1) 
Blended use (US2) Anonymous (TU2) VPN (CM2) 
External use only (US3)  Internet (CM3) 
The number of web application types abbreviated as WA equals to: 
WA= Card(Domain(US)) ×Card(Domain(TU)) ×Card(Domain(CM))  (6) 
Where Card(Domain(US)) denotes the cardinality of Domain(US). There should be 18 
web application types according to the Formula 6. However, some of them are not 
applicable in real web application which should be ignored. For example, the 
combinations of (US1, TU1, CM3) or (US1, TU2, CM3) are not incompatible. All of the 
applicable web application types are listed in Table 5-4 with the bigger value the higher 
possibility of risk level. 
Table 5-4 Web Application Classification 
ID Name Attribute Definition Security Risks 
WA1 Internal use 
facing known 
users via 
intranet 
US1 
TU1 
CM1 
Application used 
primarily on the 
internal network of 
an organisation for a 
mount of known 
users. 
This kind of applications is designed 
for internal use so that only internal 
users can access from intranet. 
Therefore, the security risk is 
considered as low.   
WA2 Internal 
blended 
External use 
facing known 
users via 
VPN 
US2 
TU1 
CM2 
Application used 
primarily on the 
internal network of 
an organisation, but 
amount of known 
external clients can 
access through VPN 
The security risk is low but there are 
possibilities for sharing 
user-credentials, impersonation and 
sniffing on the external client site.  
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WA3 External use 
facing known 
users via 
Internet 
US3 
TU1 
CM3 
 
Application used for 
external use. A mount 
of known users can 
access  from the 
Internet 
The security risk is a bit higher 
compared to previous types because it 
is exposed to all kinds of attacks from 
internet, however, it is not very high 
for only known users can access  
WA4 External use 
facing public 
users via 
Internet 
US3 
TU2 
CM3 
Application used for 
external use. Public 
users can access  
from internet 
The security risks of these applications 
are considered little bit high compared 
to previous types since they are open to 
public from Internet  
WA5 Internal 
blended 
external use 
facing known 
users via 
Internet 
US2 
TU1 
CM3 
Application used for 
internal users and 
external known users 
from Internet 
The security risks of these applications 
are higher due to their design 
complexities. Usually, this kind of 
applications are designed primarily for 
internal use, it is a little more 
dangerous when known users access 
from Internet  
WA6 Internal 
blended 
external use 
facing public 
users via 
Internet 
US2 
TU2  
CM3 
Application used for 
internal users and 
external public users 
from Internet 
The security risks of these applications 
are highest due to their design 
complexities. Usually, this kind of 
applications are designed primarily for 
internal use, it is the most dangerous 
when public users access from Internet 
due to lack of security controls 
5.2.2.2 Threat Identification  
The methods of threat elicitation mentioned in Section 2.7 are general purpose for all 
kinds of applications. However, web application is some kind of different one due to its 
application environment and complexity. Accordingly, threats to this kind of software 
are different to some extent. The number and category of the threats to different kind of 
web applications may not be the same when taking account of complexity and 
environment where the applications are hosted.  
In this section, the proposed web application classification is used to filter the threats 
proposed in [115] according to the given security requirements. In order to illustrate the 
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detailed the steps of our approach, threats list used as the threats set to be filtered is 
described below. 
For comprehensiveness, a collection of threats proposed by [115] are chosen which 
enumerates the popular threats that affect web applications at the network, host, and 
application levels. For the sake of being used conveniently in this thesis, two related 
factors, web application category and CIAA requirement are added in Table 5-5, Table 
5-6, Table 5-7. 
Table 5-5 Network Level Threat [115] 
No. Threat Name and Description WA  Category 
CIAA 
Risk 
1 Information Gathering 
Information (Network device type, operating system and 
application versions) may be detected by port scanning in 
order to perform attack 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
 
2 Sniffing 
Monitoring traffic on the network for data such as plaintext 
passwords or configuration information 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
3 Spoofing 
Spoofing may be used to hide the original source of an attack 
or to work around network access control lists (ACLs) that are 
in place to limit host access based on source address rules 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
I 
 
4 Session Hijacking 
Session hijacking deceives a server or a client into accepting 
the upstream host as the actual legitimate host. Instead the 
upstream host is an attacker’s host that is manipulating the 
network so the attacker’s host appears to be the desired 
destination 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
I 
 
5 Denial of Service 
Denial of service denies legitimate users access to a server or 
services. The SYN flood attack is a common example of a 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
A 
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network level denial of service attack 
Table 5-6 Host Level Threat [115] 
No. Threat Name and Description WA Category 
CIAA 
Risk 
6 Viruses, Trojan horses, and Worms 
Although these three threats are actually attacks, together they 
pose a significant threat to web applications, the hosts these 
applications live on, and the network used to deliver these 
applications 
ALL C 
I 
A 
7 Footprinting 
Examples of Footprinting are port scans, ping sweeps, and 
NetBIOS enumeration that can be used by attackers to glean 
valuable system-level information to help prepare for more 
significant attacks 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
8 Password Cracking 
The attacker cracks the password if the default account names 
are used. The use of blank or weak passwords makes the 
attacker’s job even easier 
ALL C 
 
 
9 Denial of Service 
An attacker can disrupt service by brute force against your 
application, or an attacker may know of a vulnerability that 
exists in the service your application is hosted in or in the 
operating system that runs your server 
ALL A 
10 Arbitrary Code Execution 
If an attacker can execute malicious code on your server, the 
attacker can either compromise server resources or mount 
further attacks against downstream systems 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
I 
 
11 Unauthorised Access 
Inadequate access controls could allow an unauthorised user to 
access restricted information or perform restricted operations 
ALL C 
I 
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Table 5-7 Application Level Threat by Application Vulnerability Category [115] 
Input Validation 
12 Buffer Overflow 
Buffer Overflow exploits are attacks that alter the flow of an 
application by overwriting parts of memory 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
 
I 
 
13 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
An XSS attack can cause arbitrary code to run in a user’s 
browser while the browser is connected to a trusted Web site 
WA4 
WA6 
 
I 
 
14 SQL Injection 
A SQL injection attack exploits vulnerabilities in input 
validation to run arbitrary commands in the database 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
 
I 
 
15 Canonicalization 
Canonicalization attacks can occur anytime validation is 
performed on a different form of the input than that which is 
used for later processing. 
WA4 
WA6 
 
I 
 
Authentication 
16 Network Eavesdropping 
An attacker armed with rudimentary network monitoring 
software on a host on the same network can capture traffic and 
obtain user names and passwords 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
17 Brute Force Attacks 
Brute force attacks rely on computational power to crack 
hashed passwords or other secrets secured with hashing and 
encryption 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
 
A 
18 Dictionary Attacks 
An attacker uses a program to iterate through all of the words 
in a dictionary (or multiple dictionaries in different languages) 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
 
A 
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and computes the hash for each word 
19 Cookie Replay 
An attacker captures the user’s authentication cookie using 
monitoring software and replays it to the application to gain 
access under a false identity 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
 
 
20 Credential Theft 
Credential theft occurs when an attacker obtains and uses 
valid account credentials (username and password) for 
unauthorised access to a computer 
ALL C 
I 
 
Authorisation 
21 Elevation of Privilege 
An attacker may try to elevate privileges to a powerful 
account such as a member of the local administrators group or 
the local system account 
ALL C 
I 
 
22 Disclosure of Confidential Data 
The disclosure of confidential data can occur if sensitive data 
can be viewed by unauthorised users 
ALL C 
23 Data Tampering 
Data tampering refers to the unauthorised modification of data 
ALL I 
 
24 Luring Attacks 
A luring attack occurs when an entity with few privileges is 
able to have an entity with more privileges perform an action 
on its behalf 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
I 
 
Configuration Management 
25 Unauthorised Access to Administration Interfaces 
Malicious users able to access a configuration management 
function can potentially deface the Web site, access 
downstream systems and database 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
I 
 
Chapter 5. Security Requirements Elicitation 
131 
26 Unauthorised Access to Configuration Stores 
Because of the sensitive nature of the data maintained in 
configuration stores, you should ensure that the stores are 
adequately secured 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
I 
 
27 Retrieval of Clear Text Configuration Data 
Sensitive data such as passwords and connection strings 
should be encrypt in that it helps prevent external attackers 
from obtaining sensitive configuration data 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
C 
28 Lack of Individual Accountability 
Lack of auditing and logging of changes made to 
configuration information threatens the ability to identify 
when changes were made and who made those change 
WA3 WA4 
WA5 WA6 
Ac 
29 Over-Privileged Process and Service Accounts 
If application and service accounts are granted access to 
change configuration information on the system, they may be 
manipulated to do so by an attacker 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
I 
 
Sensitive Data 
30 Access sensitive data in storage 
Sensitive data must be secured in storage to prevent malicious 
users from gaining access to and reading the data 
ALL C 
 
31 Network Eavesdropping 
An attacker uses network monitoring software to capture and 
potentially modify sensitive data 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
 
32 Data Tampering 
Data tampering refers to the unauthorised modification of 
data, often as it is passed over the network 
ALL I 
Session Management 
33 Session Hijacking WA4 C 
Chapter 5. Security Requirements Elicitation 
132 
A session hijacking attack occurs when an attacker uses 
network monitoring software to capture the authentication 
token (often a cookie) used to represent a user’s session with 
an application 
WA6 
34 Session Replay 
Session replay occurs when a user’s session token is 
intercepted and submitted by an attacker to bypass the 
authentication mechanism 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
I 
 
35 Man in the Middle 
A man in the middle attack occurs when the attacker 
intercepts messages sent between you and your intended 
recipient 
ALL C 
I 
Cryptography 
36 Poor Key Generation or Key Management 
Attackers can decrypt encrypted data if they have access to 
the encryption key or can derive the encryption key 
WA3  WA4 
WA5  WA6 
C 
37 Weak or Custom Encryption 
Weak encryption algorithm provide no security if the 
encryption is cracked or is vulnerable to brute force cracking. 
Custom algorithms are particularly vulnerable if they have not 
been tested 
WA3  WA4 
WA5  WA6 
C 
38 Checksum Spoofing 
Some Hash algorithm can be interpreted and changed 
WA3  WA4 
WA5  WA6 
 
C 
Parameter Manipulation 
39 Query String Manipulation 
The application is vulnerable to attack if the query string 
values represent sensitive data such as monetary amounts 
WA3  WA4 
WA5  WA6 
C 
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40 Form Field Manipulation 
Form fields of any type can be easily modified and client-side 
validation routines bypassed 
WA4 
WA6 
C 
 
41 Cookie Manipulation 
Cookie manipulation is the attack that refers to the 
modification of a cookie, usually to gain unauthorised access 
to a Web site 
WA4 
WA6 
I 
 
42 HTTP Header Manipulation 
An attacker may have to write his own program to perform the 
HTTP request, or he may use one of several freely available 
proxies that allow easy modification of any data sent from the 
browser 
WA3  WA4 
WA5  WA6 
I 
 
Exception Management 
43 Attacker Reveals Implementation Details 
Internal implementation details such as exception details 
should not being reviewed by an attack which can greatly help 
them exploit potential vulnerabilities and plan further attack 
WA3  WA4 
WA5  WA6 
C 
 
44 Denial of Service 
Attackers will probe a web application, usually by passing 
deliberately malformed input 
WA3  WA4 
WA5  WA6 
A 
 
Auditing and Logging 
45 User Denies Performing an Operation 
The issue of repudiation is concerned with a user denying that 
he or she performed an action or initiated a transaction 
ALL Ac 
46 Attacker Exploits an Application Without Trace 
System and application-level auditing is required to ensure 
that suspicious activity does not go undetected 
ALL Ac 
 
47 Attacker Covers His or Her Tracks ALL Ac 
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Your log files must be well-protected to ensure that attackers 
are not able to cover their tracks 
5.2.2.3 Threat Elicitation Algorithm 
In this section, the process of filtering threats from common threat list according to its 
web application type and security requirements is described in the following algorithm. 
Starting from the web application classification, each threat in common threat list is 
sieved by the rule, as a result, a threat list applying for the given web application can be 
obtained. 
Just like described in [115], “a threat is any potential occurrence, malicious or otherwise, 
that could harm an asset”. In other words, a threat is any bad thing that can happen to 
your assets. It is meaningless to discuss threats without connection to their assets. Hence, 
it is necessary to associate the threats to their comprised assets so that web application 
developer can design proper security mechanism to protect the assets. 
Threat Elicitation Algorithm 
Input   Common ThreatList CTL 
   WA, is the web application type 
Output ThreatList TL 
Initialisation TL=∅ 
Phase 1 
 
  Procedure ThreatElicitation(CTL, WA) return TL 
1. classify(wa); 
{*Classify the given web application into one of the proposed 
web application type according to three attributes, use WAi to 
represent*} 
2. rate(); 
{* Web application is rated “Low”, “Medium”, or “High” on the 
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metrics of Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, and 
Accountability use {CIAA requirements} to represent *} 
3. for all threats Ti in common threat list CTL do 
4.     if Ti. WA Category == All then 
5.            Ti→{TL}  {*Insert Ti to TL*} 
6.     end if 
7.     if WAi. WA Category∈ Ti. WA type then 
8.             Ti→{TL}  {*Insert Ti to TL*} 
9.     end if 
10.   end for 
11.   for all TLi in TL do  
12. if TLi. CIAA risk does not match the {CIAA 
requirements}  then 
13.        TLi←{TL} {*Remove TLi from TL*} 
14.  end if 
15. end for 
16.   connect () 
{* Establish the connection of each filtered threat to its target 
assets *} 
Notes   C: Confidentiality                I: Integrity                    
  A: Availability                  Ac: Accountability  
List 5-1 Threat Elicitation Algorithm 
5.2.2.4 Threat Risk Quantification 
A threat list can be obtained by using the proposed threat elicitation method. Threats 
should be quantified in order to perform a comprehensive risk assessment for the target 
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system. In this case, DREAD [139] is used to rate the security risk for each threat. 
DREAD is part of a system for classifying computer security threats used at Microsoft. 
DREAD is a scheme used at Microsoft for classifying security threats. DREAD is an 
acronym for a set of principles that can used to estimate the overall risk for a given 
application. DREAD stands for: 
• Damage Potential: what are the amount of potential damage caused by a 
successful attack 
• Reproducibility: how easily the attack can be performed and repeated 
• Exploitability: what are the skill level and resources required to perform the 
attack successfully 
• Affected Users: how many users are affected if the attack is successfully 
executed 
• Discoverability: how quickly and easily an occurrence of an attack can be 
identified 
DREAD use numeric scheme to represent the serious level of each category. The 
calculation always generates a number between 0 and 10, the greater the number, 
the more serious the risk. Here is a use case [139] of how to quantify the DREAD 
categories in this study.  
Table 5-8 DREAD Use Cases [139] 
Category Use Cases Value 
Damage potential 
 
Leaking trivial information 0 
Individual user data is compromised or affected 5 
Complete system or data destruction 10 
Reproducibility 
 
Very difficult to reproduce 0 
One or two steps required 5 
Just a web browser, without authentication 10 
Exploitability Very skilled 0 
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 Malware or attack tool available  5 
Novice programmer 10 
Affected users 
 
None 0 
Some users 5 
All users 10 
Discoverability 
 
Unlikely 0 
Accessible only to few users 5 
Published 10 
5.2.3 Vulnerability Analysis 
Once the potential threats are identified, a vulnerability analysis is performed to show 
what weaknesses exist in the system that may be exploited by the threat. The 
vulnerability analysis considers how to identify vulnerabilities and their potential impact 
of loss from a successful attack. 
Existing vulnerability identification tools for application can be used to perform 
vulnerability identification and calculation of the severity scale produced. Vulnerability 
analysis aims at discovering the vulnerabilities within the application assets rather than 
data asset. 
In this thesis, a vulnerability scanner for web application named N-Stalker [132] is 
chosen as the sample toolkit. N-Stalker provides a free edition to enhance the overall 
security level of web applications, using the most complete web attack signature 
database “N-Strealth Web Attack Signature Database”. 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [116] is one of the frequently used 
vulnerability scoring systems providing free and open standard quantification approach 
for scoring the severity of vulnerability and facilitates to determine the priority and 
urgency of response. The vulnerabilities identified by the N-Stalker will then be 
evaluated using CVSS. A total score of the vulnerabilities in the application can be 
produced. The scores are generated from a serious of metrics based on expert 
measurement involving base metric, temporal metric and environmental metric. For 
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each of metric, the score ranges from 0 to 10 which means that vulnerabilities with a 
base score in the range 7.0-10.0 are critical, those in the range 4.0-6.9 as major, and 
0-3.9 as minor [116]. 
5.2.4 An Example  
In order to illustrate the usefulness of web application classification, this section will 
examine a case study used in [152]. The case study is described as: “Widgets 
Incorporated is a medium-sized consumer goods company. They have determined the 
need to create I-Tracker: a custom-built inventory tracking application to facilitate 
growing customer demand. The most common use case will be for sales staff to enter 
data from a sales order which will automatically update the inventory levels and alert 
the logistics staff to prepare the order for shipment. When the inventory level for a 
particular widget drops below a certain threshold the manufacturing division will be 
notified. The main types of data used in the application include inventory levels, 
customer IDs, sales orders numbers, descriptions of orders, and product IDs. I-Tracker 
will be used by 30 internal users spread across the manufacturing, sales, and logistics 
departments, and that number is anticipated to grow to as much as 100 in the next few 
years. The business has indicated that the application may need to interface with a 
partner Widget Accessory supplier in the future. Widgets Incorporated currently receive 
50-60 orders per day and anticipates that number grow to around 150.[152]” 
According to the description of I-Tracker, data flow diagram can be drawn and shown 
in Figure 5-7. 
Sales Order
Order 
ProcessingSales Staff Update Inventory Data Alert
Logistical Staff 
Prepare Order
Logistical Staff 
Notify
Manufacturing 
Division
Product DataCustomer Data
 
Figure 5-7 Data Flow Diagram of the I-Tracker 
Phase1. Architecture and Environment Analysis 
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From the case description, the example web application is used within internal 
environment facing a number of known users. Thus, it belongs to the first type of web 
application categories. 
Phase2. Asset analysis 
Based on the description of section 5.2.1, assets can be identified as data store, data 
flow and processes. Process is the dynamic execution of application, while data flow is 
the dynamic representation of a “flow” of data in the system.  
Table 5-9 Asset Criticality Analysis 
ID Asset Name Type Sensitive Environment Criticality Rating  
1 Customer data Internal Data Yes Internal use Medium  5 
2 Sales order Sensitive Data  Yes Internal use Medium 5 
3 Inventory data Public Data No Internal use Very Low 1 
4 Product data Public Data No Internal use Very Low 1 
5 Order 
processing 
Sensitive process  Yes  Internal use Medium 5 
6 Order updating  Sensitive process Yes Internal use Medium 5 
7 Logistics staff 
alerting 
Non-sensitive 
process 
No Internal use Very Low 1 
8 Inventory level 
notifying 
Non-sensitive 
process 
No Internal use Very Low 1 
9 Preparing order Non-sensitive 
process 
No Internal use Very Low 1 
Phase3. Threat analysis 
Step1: Threat identification 
1. Security requirement rating. It is necessary to rate the security requirements CIAA 
of target application when using the proposed EDTEM. Using internal guidelines based 
on documents such as [30], the following application classification may be produced: 
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• Confidentiality: Low  
All data in the application is readily available to anyone in the company. 
Sensitive financial data and client private information are not handled by this 
application.  
• Integrity: High  
Poor inventory and shipping tracking may result in significant financial loss to 
the company and may result in customer dissatisfaction / loss of customers.  
• Availability: Medium  
A major disruption of the application will cause a backlog in shipping and have 
some financial consequences to the organisation. Minor disruptions, however, 
can be tolerated as customers expect a 4-6 week delay in receiving their goods. 
• Accountability: Low 
Data processed in the system are not sensitive or personal. For the consideration 
of budget and time, system accountability is not included in the system design.  
2. Filtering. According to the EDTED described in the previous section, the most likely 
threats are filtered and listed in Table 5-10. 
Table 5-10 Threat List after Filtering 
ID Threat Name CIA 
6 Viruses, Trojan horses, and Worms CIA 
9 Denial of Service A 
11 Unauthorised Access CI 
20 Credential Theft CI 
21 Elevation of Privilege CI 
23 Data Tampering I 
35 Man in the Middle CI 
It can be inferred from the table above that internal attackers are the major factors to 
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perform the attacks.  
3. Further Filtering. The threat list can be further screened out according to the security 
requirements of CIAA aspects. In terms of the EDTEM algorithm, threats with 
Confidentiality (C) and Accountability (Ac) requirements can be rule out in that the 
given application has low level requirements, while threats with Integrity (I) and 
Availability (A) are remained.  
Step2: Threat quantification 
DREAD is used to quantify the security level for each threat identified from our 
EDTEM according to the rating value in Table 5-9. 
Table 5-11 Threat Risk Quantification 
ID Threat Name D R E A D Total 
6 Viruses, Trojan horses, and Worms 10 10 10 10 10 10 
9 Denial of Service 10 5 5 10 0 6 
11 Unauthorised Access 5 5 5 5 0 4 
20 Credential Theft 10 0 5 5 5 5 
21 Elevation of Privilege 5 5 0 5 0 3 
23 Data Tampering 10 5 5 5 5 6 
35 Man in the Middle 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Phase4: Vulnerability analysis 
Using the vulnerability scanning tools, vulnerabilities can be identified and quantified 
with an overall evaluation number between 1 and 10 by using CVSS.     
Phase5: Potential risk  
From previous steps, the average score for asset and threat is 2.78 and 5.5 respectively. 
Suppose the vulnerability score of target application is 3 for simplicity.  
According to Formula 5, security vector of the target application SV=
( )
3
VTA 222 ++ = ( )3
35.578.2 222 ++ ≈3.84. For a given qualitative metric 
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shown in Table 5-12, it can be concluded that the security risk of target web application 
is low. 
Table 5-12 Risk Rating Scale 
Value Treat Severity Rank 
0.0-1.99 Very low 1 
2.0-3.99 Low 2 
4.0-5.99 Medium 3 
6.0-7.99 High 4 
8.0-10.0 Very high 5 
5.3 Security Evaluation 
Each security attribute requires one or more trusted mechanisms that are implemented in 
software components [170]. Security mechanisms mitigate the threats posed by 
exploiting vulnerabilities.  As shown in Figure 5-8, a security evaluation method is 
proposed to assess whether the built-in security mechanisms in the legacy system satisfy 
the security requirements when facing elicited threats, which results in a decision 
whether the legacy system needs to be evolved to satisfy the user’s security needs. 
 
Figure 5-8 Security Evaluation Method 
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Let’s consider the security mechanisms provided in I-Tracker case study in Section 
5.2.4. Suppose the security mechanisms provided in I-Tracker are similar to those of the 
case study described in Section 4.6.4, Table 5-13 lists the result of security evaluation. 
Table 5-13 Security Evaluation for I-Tracker 
Security Objectives Security Threats Security Mechanisms 
CIAA 
Requirements 
Threat  
ID 
Threat Name CIAA Risk level 
(0--10) 
Detected  
Security 
Mechanisms 
Security 
level 
Confidentiality(C):  
Low 
Integrity(I):  
High 
Availability(A): 
Medium 
Accountability(Ac):
Low 
T6 Viruses, 
Trojan 
horses, and 
Worms 
CIA Very High 
(10) 
  
T9 Denial of 
Service 
A High 
(6) 
  
T11 Unauthorised 
Access 
CI Medium 
(4) 
Username and 
password 
Low 
T20 Credential 
Theft 
CI Medium 
(5) 
Well-proven 
encryption 
algorithms with 
enough 
encryption  key 
High 
T21 Elevation of 
Privilege 
CI Low 
(3) 
Group grants Low 
T23 Data 
Tampering 
I Medium 
(6) 
Well-proven 
encryption 
algorithms 
High 
T35 Man in the 
Middle 
CI Medium 
(5) 
Well-proven 
encryption 
algorithms 
High 
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5.4 Security Requirements Elicitation 
Security requirements represent the types and levels when attempts to protect the assets 
to meet security policy [98]. A complete and consistent group of security requirements 
can be produced by using an elicitation method. Specially, security requirements are 
identified by risk analysis—“the systematic use of information to identify sources and to 
estimate the risk” [80]. As discussed in the previous section of this chapter, threat 
identification is one of the key parts during performing the risk analysis. Shown as 
Figure 5-9, threat modelling is one of the effective methods to elicit security 
requirements which can figure out the threats to the application security at the early 
stage. Security requirement elicitation for web application is proposed in the previous 
section due to its representativeness and complexity. 
 
Figure 5-9 System Security Engineering [129] 
Usually most functional requirements are specified as what must happen, while security 
requirements are stated in terms of what must not be allowed to happen. After the risk 
analysis in the previous section, assets can be enumerated with criticality level, threats 
threatening the assets can be elicited with severity risk level, security features that 
would be violated by potential threats on assets can be analysed, and priority level 
representing the developing order of the security requirements can be computed.  
In this thesis, security requirements are elicited by risk analysis and represented as a list 
with columns of asset, threat, security features and priority, which means, for a given 
asset, the threats threatening to it and the severity level the threats may cause to the 
asset. It can be used as the priority order of security requirements when system 
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designers develop security aspects to satisfy them. Table 5-14 shows an example of 
security requirement format in this thesis. 
Table 5-14 Example of Security Requirements 
SR No. Asset Threat CIAA Priority 
SR1 User bank 
account 
Sniffing Confidential High 
SR2 User account Cross-site Scripting Confidential 
 
High 
SR3 Place order User Denies Performing an 
Operation 
Accountability Low 
SR4 Display 
product 
Denial of Service Availability Medium 
SR5 Product 
Catalogue 
Data tampering  Integrity Medium 
5.5 Summary 
Identification and evaluation of threat and assets are of great significance during 
security evolution. Identifying threats tells the security engineers how many and what 
kind of threats threatening the system, while evaluation shows to what extent the threats 
may do harm to the assets. By identifying and evaluating key threats and assets of the 
target system, it provides the detailed security requirements specifying which asset 
facing what kind of threats and resulting in what degree of the security risk to the 
system. 
In order to identify and assess the risks the legacy system faced and the security 
mechanisms built in in a legacy system, this chapter proposed an assessment approach 
to evaluate the security risks level of the legacy system. The contents covered in this 
chapter are concluded as follows: 
• For security requirements elicitation, a risk assessment framework based on 
security vector <threat, asset, vulnerability> is proposed as the means to evaluate 
the risk level a legacy system faced. 
• Method for asset identification and asset criticality quantification is described  
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• A method to web application classification is proposed as the foundation to 
modelling threat for web applications. The environment where the web 
applications host is taken into account.  
• Threat modelling is the most important part during the security requirement 
elicitation. A threat elicitation method is presented based on the proposed 
environment web application classification, which is a light weight and easy to 
use especially for security novice users. 
• Security evaluation for legacy system is the prerequisite for security-driven 
software evolution. With the detection of security implementation in the legacy 
system and the security objective from the users, the system designers can make 
the decision whether or not the current security implementation satisfies the 
security requirement and whether or not the security evolution is required. 
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Chapter 6                     
Security Enhancement in Evolution 
Objectives 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 To illustrate the framework for security enhancement in evolution 
 To illustrate the method to organise the security patterns  
 To define mechanisms to automate search security patterns to fulfil the 
security requirements 
 To illustrate the integration of security patterns with the system models 
__________________________________________________________________ 
6.1 Overview 
Experience shows that it is difficult to design a system that can fulfil the specific 
security requirements by simply integrating security mechanism and be error free at the 
same time, even for a small system. Security expertise tends to be valuable in such 
circumstances. However, such security expert knowledge is not always available for 
ordinary software developers. What’s more, with the systems are getting larger and 
complicated, which makes the situation getting worse. 
Inspired by design patterns, security patterns incorporate security expertise to solve the 
security problems occurred in the specific contexts. For security novice, security 
patterns represent security best practices which are a convenient way to design secure 
and reusable software systems [150]. They document basic mechanisms, process or 
approaches which provide ways to safeguard CIA features of data [151].  
In this thesis, the security problems of legacy system are addressed through the use of 
security patterns. Patterns are well-known solutions to common problems in the given 
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contexts. Pattern writers have introduced many collections of security patterns recently 
(see the Chapter 2 “related work on Security Pattern”). However, there are some 
features missing which impedes the benefit of taking advantage of security patterns. 
One of the most fundamental features is how to find the appropriate from the existing 
security pattern to solve the given security problems. 
It is not possible to get right and meaningful answers automatically because of no 
syntax defined in security patterns [150]. Therefore, a framework for semantic 
description and management of security patterns by the light of defining proper security 
ontology is developed in this chapter. The fundamental idea is to ease the searching of 
“right” security patterns with the help of ontology technique. Security patterns can be 
descibed based on the proposed security core ontology which describes security patterns 
semantically and precisely. Therefore, sophisticated retrieval and search of security 
patterns are enabled. 
6.2 Framework of the Security Enhanced Approach 
In this section, an overview of the proposed security enhancement framework is shown 
in Figure 6-1. All activities in the framework form the following sections of this chapter. 
The input of the security enhanced approach includes system design model extracted 
from Chapter 4, security requirments conceptual model derived from Chapter 5 and 
existing security patterns. The outputs of the proposed approach are security enhanced 
design models which can be further transformed into code by using MDA automation 
tools. 
 
Figure 6-1 Operational Framework for Chapter 6 
In the proposed approach, security patterns are represented with specific profiles and 
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solutions for various environments. The descriptions of security pattern include 
abstraction level, type of solution, applicability, context conditions and security 
properties provided by the pattern. A series semantic properties is defined to each 
pattern, such as “security attribute: Confidentiality”, “Deployed in design phase” …and 
so on. The incorporation of precise and rich semantic descriptions of the security 
patterns enables the use of automated reasoning mechanisms capable of searching 
proper patterns to fulfil the given security requirement.  
In order to achieve this goal, a security ontology is developed and stored as one part of 
security knowledge base together with security pattern organised as the other one. 
Figure 6-2 shows the structure of the proposed security knowledge base. A pattern 
search engine is designed to find the right security pattern with the proposed security 
ontology inference to satisfy the corresponding security requirements. 
Security Knowledge Base
Security Ontology
Security SolutionContext Security Problem
Asset Threat Security Attribute Priority
Security Requirement Ontology Security Pattern Ontology
Pattern Level Pattern Element Level
Security Pattern Pattern Relationship
Security Pattern Base
Security Pattern1     **                 *
 
Figure 6-2 Class Diagram for the Security Knowledge Base Meta-model 
Basically, Figure 6-2 shows that the structure of the security knowledge base is similar 
to a tree structure for storing security related information that helps to reveal and 
organise the security relevant features, and for relating these properties to fundamental 
security requirements. It consists of two sub repositories, security ontology base and 
security pattern base. Security ontology base is used to store the established ontology 
including concepts and relationships while security pattern base is the repository to store 
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and organise the common security patterns for further processing. Considering the 
reusability of the stored security relevant information, the information is expressed in a 
generalised way and focuses on abstract level.  
It is impossible to develop a completely secure system because of the cost, time, and 
resources needed for the development and the emerging new kinds of attacks, even if it 
could be done, the usability and efficiency of the developed system may be decreased. 
Thus, developing secure systems is about trade-offs and it is quite a challenge to find a 
balance point. Prioritising of each elicited security requirement and incorporating user’s 
security objectives play a key role when facing such a dilemma. 
The criticality of each asset has to be decided, which implies a criterion for the security 
threshold of an asset is decided according to not only the value impact but also the risk 
for the asset, including likelihood and impact. Therefore, analysing the threat and 
vulnerability of a system in order to evaluate the risk is required. Specially, analysis of 
the threats threatening to the system is used as s a means of identifying why the assets 
need protection. In addition, the vulnerability of a system is analysed in order to 
understand what weakness exist in the system that can be exploited by the threats. This 
is the process of security requirement elicitation. The outcome of this process will be a 
list of security requirements with priorities representing their criticalities to the system.  
The process is established during the security requirement analysis by using the 
proposed EDTEM in Chapter 5.  
6.3 Security Pattern 
Security patterns incorporate proven security expertise solution to the recurring security 
problems. Usually, the security requirements are addressed by abstracting the security 
problems arising in a specific context and providing a well proven solution to them 
[158]. The ability to mitigate and stop security threats of security patterns can be found 
in [69, 70] which means that security patterns incorporated into the system could 
contribute to the system’s security level [49].  
It should be noted that security patterns can be designed and developed by security 
experts for different kinds of problem solving and be applied in different contexts. For 
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example, they can be abstract higher level architectural patterns that specify how to 
resolve a security problem architecturally, or they can be even more abstract patterns 
that depict the process to secure software development, or they can be defensive design 
level patterns describing how the detailed security artefacts can be created [158]. 
6.3.1 Security Pattern Format 
The documentation of security patterns were originally built by Yoder et al. [184] in 
1997.  Seven architectural security patterns are presented and structured using the 
formats in POSA [21] or GoF [53] which are generic scheme for describing design 
patterns in architecture level. 
The format is composed of several elements shown as follows [26]: 
• Intent: description of goal and issues the pattern addresses; 
• Context: description of situations or environment in which the pattern is used; 
• Problem: description of the problem that this pattern solves;  
• Description: description of the scenarios that illustrate the design problem;  
• Solution: description of the solution to the problem; 
• Consequences: description of the trade-offs and results when this pattern is used; 
• Forces: description of constraints that should be considered when the pattern is 
applied. 
• Known uses: description of the patterns use found in real systems;  
• Related patterns: description of the related patterns that use this pattern as a 
reference.  
In the view of pattern format, pattern authors can describe all sections which they 
consider of importance. Therefore, to detect proper security, just Problem and Context 
elements will be used as security pattern problem section patterns from a security point 
of view. 
The structure of security patterns adopted in this thesis is based on the traditional design 
patterns. They have an expressive name, an application context, to be solved problem 
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and a solution to that problem.  
Therefore, security pattern is represented as a 3-tuple <Context, Problem, Solution> 
where: 
• Context defines the conditions and situation in which the pattern is applicable 
Time and location are usually regarded as important characteristics of context in 
the security domain. Time relates to when a security problem occurs and the 
location specifies at which level of system infrastructure a security problem 
occurs. In terms of software domain, typical example of the time within a 
context is software life cycle phases which are analysis, design, implementation, 
integration, and location where the operation occurs usually expressed as 
application, host and network [150].     
• Problem defines the vulnerable aspect of an asset  
The problem field of a security pattern is important for software developers to 
determine whether a security pattern is appropriate for their situation. This field 
defines the security problems occur in the specific contexts and can be solved by 
the security pattern. A security problem occurs whenever a system is 
unprotected or is protected insufficiently against abuse or misuse. Generally 
speaking, security problem can be some kinds of threats which cause possible 
danger or damage when someone or something violates security policies. 
• Solution defines the scheme that solves the security problem which occurs in the 
security context 
Security solution is a group of one or more countermeasures which have to be 
applied in order to mitigate the risk. For each threat there should exist at least 
one security countermeasure. 
6.3.2 Security Pattern Relations 
Experience shows that some security solutions may introduce new security problems, 
and in some cases only a part of the problem might be solved by using them. Under 
such circumstances, additional security patterns should be taken into account. That it is 
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why some security patterns should be applied along with other patterns in reality. For 
example, Single Access Point pattern requires Check Point as a prerequisite. Figure 6-3 
shows how the access control patterns are related to each other [151]. Therefore, it is 
necessary to identify and explicitly consider their relationship to effectively select a set 
of patterns. 
 
Figure 6-3 Access Control Patterns Relationship [151] 
There can be various types of relations among security patterns. However, as described 
in [150], “all pattern relations can be expressed in terms of the primary relationships 
namely refines, uses and conflicts”. Two relations refines as specialises and uses as 
requires are taken into consideration in this thesis. The definition of the two relations in 
[150] is adopted in this thesis: 
• Specialises relations. It usually used to make an abstract pattern more specific in 
terms of the context and problem domain. For example, Role Base 
Authentication pattern is the specialisation of Authenticator pattern with more 
specifications.  
• Requires relations. It specifies that another security pattern is needed during the 
application of a security pattern. This may be caused by the following reasons. 
Firstly, a single pattern is not enough to address the security problem caused by a 
particular threat or attack and another pattern is needed as a complement. 
Secondly, the application of a pattern may lead to a new security problem. For 
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example, Single Access Point pattern requires Check Point as a prerequisite. 
6.3.3 Security Pattern Organisation 
A significant number of security patterns have been proposed since the first effort in 
1977 by Yoder et al. [184]. A security pattern may address more than one security 
feature, for example, Authentication pattern can protect both confidentiality and 
integrity security features. At the same time, for a specific security property, there may 
be more than one security pattern can address it. It is a many-to-many situation. 
Additionally, security patterns may be organised by different parameters from abstract 
to more specific. Hence, it is difficult to find the “right” security patterns for solving a 
particular security problem without a proper classification scheme of security pattern 
[65]. A suitable classification scheme not only contributes to efficient information 
storage and retrieval, but also benefits both pattern navigators and pattern miners.  
In this section, on the basis of several existing classification frameworks, an efficient 
classification framework for security patterns has been described to facilitate finding the 
proper security patterns according to the elicited security requirements in Chapter 5. As 
the security requirement is based on threat modelling and asset analysis, the properties 
of threat and asset will be considered as the factors for selecting security patterns. The 
proposed classification scheme is based on multiple aspects of the relevant information. 
• Lifecycle Stage. 
While most of the security patterns take the form derived from design patterns, not 
all security patterns are dedicated to design phase. Therefore, classification on the 
lifecycle stages are meaning for organising security patterns ordered on the 
dichotomy of beginning and end, which are: Analysis, Architecture, Design, 
Implementation, and Deployment. 
• Architectural Layer. 
Layer provides another useful dimension, since problems and their solutions in 
different layer of the architecture differ, yet all are important. Roughly, the 
architecture has been divided with an ordering from low to high level of 
abstraction. The following distinctions are used as the architecture layers, which 
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are: Data, Application, System, and Network.    
• Application Context.  
Another classification factor considers the structure of the system which is called 
Application Context and partitions the patterns according to which part of the 
system they are trying to protect [65]. The security of a system is analysed from 
three levels: core security, perimeter security and exterior security. The core 
security deals with the security implementation within the system while the 
perimeter security focuses on security related issues at the system entry points, 
such as authorisation, authentication and security. The exterior security considers 
protecting data during transmission and securing communication protocols. 
• Domain Specific 
Application domain can provide an important differentiator or filter to narrow the 
field of applicable knowledge [167]. Some security pattern solutions are specific to 
a particular domain or application type. This dimension is an exception in that it 
does not have a dichotomy or ordering—the space is freely defined. Pattern 
designers can create patterns for their own domain as a form of knowledge capture. 
After examining the existing security pattern, several example domains are 
provided in this thesis: Ubiquitous computing, Distributed computing, Web and 
J2EE, Embedded system, Operating system, Service oriented architecture, SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), and not limited to this coverage. 
• Threat Type.  
The classification scheme based on threat modelling is more intuitive because it 
uses the security problems that the patterns solve. Security architects use threat 
modelling to identify and prioritise a system’s security threat. This let them 
prioritise the mitigation effort. STRIDE [160] is one of the widely used models to 
classify threats according to different sources, and their relevance to security 
features is shown in Table 6-1. It is the English acronym of the following six threat 
types [160]: 
 Spoofing is someone or something masquerades to be legitimate and valid. 
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 Tampering is data interfered or modified during network communication. 
 Repudiation is the situation that user denies performing a certain action 
which could be illegal and harmful. 
 Information disclosure is when an unauthorised user gets access to 
confidential information, which he or she is not supposed to have access to. 
 Denial of service is basically when a service is brought down intentionally 
or unintentionally resulting in the disruption of normal services for 
legitimate users. 
 Elevation of privilege is when an unauthorised user gets higher privilege 
access from the one he or she was supposed to have, which might result in 
access to restricted information, or might apply dangerous tasks. 
Table 6-1 Threat and Security Features [64] 
Threats Type Security Features 
Spoofing Authentication 
Tampering Integrity 
Repudiation Non-repudiation 
Information disclosure Confidentiality 
Denial of service Availability 
Elevation of privilege Authorisation 
• Security Concerns 
Software patterns are usually chosen by developers with a particular goal in mind. 
Developers tend to view security in terms of software requirements rather than 
taking the perspective of an attack. Therefore, it is necessary to employ security 
goals or concerns to classify the security patterns. This metric is more straight and 
easier understood to software designer to select proper security patterns in their 
security design. The security concerns used in this thesis are: Access control, 
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Authentication, Filtering, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Accountability, 
and Non- repudiation. 
Table 6-2 summarises the classification scheme for security patterns, based on which 
the security patterns repository with security relevant format <Context, Problem, 
Solution> is shown in Appendix A.  
Table 6-2 Summary of the Proposed Multiple Aspects Classification Scheme 
Criteria Classification 
Lifecycle Stage Analysis Architecture Design 
Implementation Deployment  
Architectural Layer Data Application System 
Network   
Application Context Core Perimeter Exterior 
Domain Specific 
(Not limited) 
Ubiquitous computing Distributed computing Web and J2EE 
Embedded system Operating system SOA 
Threat Type 
(STRIDE) 
Spoofing Tampering Repudiation 
Information disclosure Denial of service Elevation of privilege 
Security Concerns Access control  Authentication Filtering 
Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
Accountability Non-repudiation  
6.4 Security Ontology 
An ontology, in the field of knowledge representation, is most often defined as “a 
representation of a conceptualisation” [61]. A more detailed description of ontology is 
that “it is a formal representation of the entities and relationships which exist in some 
domains, it should also represent a shared conceptualisation in order to meet any useful 
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purpose” [35]. Ontologies are useful for representing and inter-relating many kinds of 
knowledge. In 2003, Marc Donner urged the necessity of having good security 
ontologies. He argued that too much security terminology is vaguely defined, thus it 
becomes difficult to communicate between colleagues and, worse, confusing to deal 
with the people we try to serve: “What the field needs is an ontology – a set of 
descriptions of the most important concepts and the relationships among them. A great 
ontology will help us report incidents more effectively, share data and information 
across organisations, and discuss issues among ourselves” [36].  
The advantages of applying ontology technology into the information security domain 
are specified in [142] from three viewpoints: (1) ontologies can eliminate the ambiguity 
of items to a properties list and organise information in a systematic way at detailed 
level; (2) ontological technology can induce the modularity which can be used by other 
approaches, for example, to detect some new features by establishing relations among 
different measurements; and (3) an ontological approach has the ability to forecast 
security problems by providing inference mechanisms. 
The approach proposed in this thesis can be summarised by the following. The security 
patterns for software engineering are created to document the knowledge of the experts 
in security field. These patterns are designed by using the ontology techniques that 
provide reusable and structured activities or solve security problems that can arise 
during the development of software systems. Moreover, due to the OWL representation, 
the security patterns are available in a machine readable format and it is expected to be 
utilised in the system automatically. 
This chapter addresses the issue of fulfilling security requirements elicited in the 
previous chapter. The approach uses ontologies as a tool for managing different security 
requirements and associating them with corresponding security solutions provided by 
security patterns. 
The main goal is to provide a security ontology based framework which unifies the 
proposed methods in security evolution for legacy system. The ontology “knows” which 
threats threaten which assets, and which security patterns could lower the probability of 
occurrence in which contexts. It is meaningful for the software developer to find the 
Chapter 6. Security Enhancement in Evolution 
159 
appropriate security patterns by adopting an ontology based approach [38]. 
6.4.1 Existing Security Ontology 
Even though several ontologies in information security domain have been proposed [36, 
44, 76, 150], most of these approaches focus on technical aspects of security or aims at 
particular application domains. Therefore, they cannot be used directly since they don’t 
specifying the general security model which can be used to describe security patterns. 
The security ontology selected to be the basis of the proposed framework has been 
proposed by [44] which is developed based on the security relationship model described 
in the National Institute of Standards [81]. Figure 6-4 shows the high level concepts and 
corresponding relations of this ontology. 
The four core concepts in [44] are: Asset, Threat, Vulnerability, and Control. Asset is 
something that has value to the Organisation and it requires certain level of security 
attribute. A threat is some kind of potential danger which threatens the asset with 
affecting the required security attributes. Each threat is specified by the threat origin 
such as human or natural, and by the threat source, deliberate or accidental. 
Vulnerability is the weakness in asset of the system that can be exploited by the threat, 
and a severity scale is used to represent the severity level caused if it executes 
successfully. A control is implemented to mitigate the vulnerability and protect the asset 
against corruption from threat. Control is derived from information security standard 
control and it is classified into several types [44]. 
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Figure 6-4 Security Ontology Top Level Concepts and Relationships [44] 
Chapter 6. Security Enhancement in Evolution 
160 
6.4.2 Proposed Security Ontology 
The proposed security ontology is designed to achieve the following goals: 
• Describe risk relevant information especially security requirement 
information applicable to web application 
• Design security pattern ontology at two abstraction levels 
• Facilitate mapping security requirements to security pattern 
• Provide the ability to annotate security related information to facilitate the 
security pattern selection 
• Create reusable and easy to extend ontologies  
The designed ontologies are supposed to be used by both the security pattern providers 
who design new security patterns and edit the corresponding ontology into the ontology 
base to express their security capabilities, and the security requirement requestors who 
have got security requirements to be fulfilled by security patterns. From the security 
requestor’s point of view, security requirements can be stated in terms of 4-tuple <Asset, 
Threat, Security Attribute, Priority> which is elicited from the proposed risk assessment 
method in Chapter 5. From the security pattern provider’s view of point, the security 
capabilities are expressed in terms of security patterns which are organised as 3-tuple 
<Context, Security Problem, Security Solution>. 
The proposed ontology has been developed by using OWL, which is a language based 
on RDF for processing web information by the computer rather than being read by 
people.  OWL is the current recommendation of W3C (World Wide Web Consortium) 
for processing the content of web information. OWL is a part of semantic web and has 
three sublanguages, OWL Lite, OWL DL (includes OWL Lite), and OWL Full 
(includes OWL DL). Based on Description Logics, OWL-DL has been used to design 
the proposed ontology for its expressivity is suitable for the requirement and allows for 
complete reasoning by DL reasoner, for example, Racer, FaCT++ or Pellet.  
The tools used for developing and querying the security ontologies are Protégé and 
FaCT++. The Protégé Ontology Editor [140] provides the graphical interface for 
ontology designers to build OWL ontologies. However, the Protégé itself only provide 
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editing function and a reasoner (FaCT++ in this study) is required to check the 
consistency of the developed ontology.  
6.4.2.1 Security Ontology Development  
Designing OWL ontology is not only defining a set of classes and properties, but also 
including a collection of restriction and axioms. This ensures that the correct result can 
be inferred from the proposed ontology.  
There are several methods to develop ontology. The method used in this thesis is based 
on METHONTOLOGY [58] which is shown in Figure 6-5.  
 
Figure 6-5 Tasks of the Conceptualisation Activity according to METHONTOLOGY [61] 
The development of security ontology is carried out in the following phases: 
• Define questions.  A collection of questions within the domain is defined to 
indicate what kind of answers and information are expected by using the 
ontology. The questions are informal and loosely structure as any forms.  
Some important concepts can be identified during this process, which can be 
termed as the basis when building ontology classes. 
• Build classes. Based on the previous phase, a lot of relevant concepts and 
terms have been identified and recorded. They can be classified and selected 
according to their relevancy to the domain to form the classes, or properties of 
the proposed ontology.  
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• Build Relationships. This process involves clarifying the relationships among 
the classes and defining the hierarchy. It is the process of adding axioms and 
restriction to the ontology. Axiom is a set of assertions specifying what is true 
in the domain. It is used to connect classes and properties with some logical 
information about them. Restriction is special kind of class description with 
that all individuals in that class will satisfy the restriction.  
• Build ontology instance. This is the procedure to create instances of the 
classes which refers to inserting the individual information or providing 
examples of each of the classes. 
• Validate ontology. The competence questions built in the first phase can be 
used to validate the correctness of the proposed ontology 
The aforementioned phases have been repeated several times until the provided answers 
from the proposed ontology satisfy the competency question. 
 
Figure 6-6 Proposed Security Ontology Top Level Concepts and Relations 
Figure 6-6 shows the top-level concepts and relations of the proposed security ontology 
based on [44]. It is composed of two subontologies: security requirement subontology 
(sr) and security pattern subontology (sp). The security requirement subontology 
consists of the core concepts: Asset (sr:asset), Threat (sr:threat), Vulnerability 
(sr:vulnerability), Attribute (sr:attribute), Priority (sr:priority). The security pattern 
subontology is composed of the core concepts: Security Context (sp:context), Security 
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Problem (sp:problem), Secutity Solution (sp:solution). The concepts of sr:asset have 
been derived from [19], sr:vulnerability and sr:threat from [115], while security pattern 
subontology concepts are derived from [150]. 
6.4.2.2 Security Requirement Subontology 
As described in Chapter 5, the security requirement is identified by risk analysis, which 
is one of the sources to elicit security requirement. Consequently, the requirement 
ontology (Figure 6-7) is developed with the concepts derived from the risk analysis 
using Protégé Editor shown in Figure 6-8. The meta-information associated with risk 
analysis (such as asset and threat) can be used to define axioms, constraints and rules 
that help to maintain the consistency of the proposed security requirement ontology. 
 
 
Figure 6-7 Top Level of Security Requirement Ontology 
Every security requirement is a description of which asset is threatened by which kind 
of threat by violating which security objective and which severity extent of this 
requirement. The properties defined in security requirement ontology are described 
below: 
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• Each requirement is characterised by a unique identifier and has been defined as 
Datatype property in OWL. 
• hasAsset: it represents the asset related to this requirement. It is defined as an 
object property with domain defined as class SecurityRequirementElement and 
range as class asset. 
• hasThreat: it represents possible threats endanger the asset and then make the 
requirement unfulfilled. This property is represented by an object property and its 
range is the class Threat (Figure 6-9) defined in this ontology. There are 
constraints of which threat can be occurred to which asset according to the risk 
analysis in Chapter 5. 
• hasSecurityAttribute: the feature that make an asset valuable. There exist four 
types of security properties using an object property: “Confidentiality”, 
“Integrity”, “Availability” and “Accountability”. 
• hasPriority: the value can be computed from Formula 5 in Chapter 5 taking asset 
criticality, threat severity and vulnerability severity scale into account and shows 
the order of development. Datatype property {“high”, “Medium”, “Low”}. 
 
Figure 6-8 Taxonomy of the Elements of the Security Requirement Ontology in Protégé Editor 
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Figure 6-9 Top Level of Threat Ontology 
List 6-1, List 6-2, and List 6-3 show the part of implementation of classes, object 
properties and instances in the proposed security requirement subontology in OWL 
code. 
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<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Asset --> 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;Asset"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Priority --> 
    < owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;Priority"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
    </ owl:Class> 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityAttribute --> 
    < owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityAttribute"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
    </ owl:Class> 
 <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Threat --> 
    < owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;Threat"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
    </ owl:Class> 
     <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ThreatType --> 
    < owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;ThreatType"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ClassificationKey"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
List 6-1 Top Level Classes Definition of Security Requirement Subontology 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#isThreatenedBy --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;isThreatenedBy"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityProblem"/> 
        <inverseOf rdf:resource="&Security;hasAsset"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
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     <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#residesOn --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;residesOn"> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;Layer"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
        <inverseOf rdf:resource="&Security;containsThreat"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasSecurityAttribute --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasSecurityAttribute"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityAttribute"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasThreat --> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasThreat"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&Security;hasProblem"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
List 6-2 Partial of Object Property Definition of Security Requirement Subontology 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DataTampering --> 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DataTampering"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authorisation"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Sensitive_Data"/> 
        <Security:residesOn rdf:resource="&Security;Application"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DenialOfService --> 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DenialOfService"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ExceptionManagement"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;HostLevel"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;NetworkLevel"/> 
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        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ThreatType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
 <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Accountability --> 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Accountability"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#NetworkEavesdropping --> 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;NetworkEavesdropping"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authentication"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Sensitive_Data"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
    ….. 
List 6-3 Partial of Instance Declarations of Security Requirement Subontology 
6.4.2.3 Security Pattern Subontology 
As described in Section 6.3.1, the structure of the security pattern is a 3-tuple <Context, 
Problem, Solution> from the security point of view. Moreover, there are relationships 
among security patterns.  
The security pattern subontology is based on [150], where the main properties are 
shown below: 
• Security patterns are characterised by a unique identifier and a text description. 
Both have been defined in OWL as Datatype properties. 
• hasContext: it represents the situation in which the security problem occurs and 
is defined as object property. The range of it is subclass SecurityContext. Two 
subproperties are hasLayer and hasLifeCycle whose ranges are Layer and 
LifeCycle respectively. 
• hasProblem: it represents the security problem occur in such a security context 
and is defined as object property. The range of it is subclass SecurityProblem 
and an axiom is added as equivalent as subclass Threat in Security 
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Requirement subontology.  
• hasSolution: it represents the security solution to the security problem that 
occurs in the given security context. 
• hasThreatType: it represents the problem type classified according to threats 
with domain is SecurityPattern and range is ThreatType. 
• hasSecurityConcerns: it represents the security features the security pattern 
holds. 
• hasDomain: application domain the security pattern serves. It is defined as 
object property with domain is SecurityPattern and range is Domain. 
• requires: it represents the Require relationship between security patterns. It is 
added as object property with the range is SecurityPattern. 
• isSpecialisedBy: it represents the Specialise relationship between security 
patterns. It is added as object property with the range is SecurityPattern. 
Figure 6-10 shows the illustration of security pattern subonotolgy and Figure 6-11 
displays the screenshot of exemplifying the development of security pattern in Protégé 
Editor. 
 
Figure 6-10 Top Level of Security Pattern Ontology 
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Figure 6-11 Screenshot of Intercepting Validator Pattern Implementation in Protégé Editor 
List 6-4, List 6-5, and List 6-6 show the part of implementation of classes, object 
properties and instances in the proposed security pattern subontology in OWL code. 
 <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityPattern --> 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityPattern"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&owl;Thing"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A Security Pattern is a description of one particular 
recurring security problem that arises in specific contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme 
for its solution.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
  <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityContext --> 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityContext"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPatternElement"/> 
      </owl:Class> 
 <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityProblem --> 
    < owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityProblem"> 
        <equivalentClass rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
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        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPatternElement"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
  <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecuritySolution --> 
    < owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;SecuritySolution"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPatternElement"/> 
    </ owl:Class> 
List 6-4 Top Level Classes Definition of Security Requirement Subontology 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#containsThreat --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;containsThreat"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Layer"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
    </ owl:ObjectProperty> 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasApplicationContext --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasApplicationContext"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;FunctionalProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;AppicationContext"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </ owl:ObjectProperty> 
 <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasDomain --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasDomain"> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </ owl:ObjectProperty> 
 <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasLayer --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasLayer"/> 
     </ owl:ObjectProperty> 
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 <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasLifecycle --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasLifecycle"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
  <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasProblem --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasProblem"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasSecurityConcerns --> 
    < owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasSecurityConcerns"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasSolutionType --> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasSolutionType"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;FunctionalProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecuritySolution"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
List 6-5 Partial of Object Property Definition of Security Requirement Subontology 
       ……. 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Authentication --> 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Authentication"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
        <Security:hasLayer rdf:resource="&Security;Application"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;DataTampering"/> 
        <Security:hasLifecycle rdf:resource="&Security;Design"/> 
        <Security:hasSecurityAttribute rdf:resource="&Security;Integrity"/> 
</NamedIndividual> 
     …… 
<!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Intercepting_validator --> 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Intercepting_validator"> 
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        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Several well-known attack strategies involve 
compromising a system by sending requests with invalid data or malicious code. This entails injection 
of malicious scripts, SQL statements, XML content and invalid data. These attacks can be avoided by 
validating data before use. Because of the constantly changing attack patterns, the data validation 
mechanism has to continuously change to prevent against new attacks. Another concern is the 
freshness of data.Verify the user input before they are used.</rdfs:comment> 
        <Security:hasLayer rdf:resource="&Security;Application"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;BufferOverflow"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;Canonicalisation"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;CrossSiteScripting"/> 
        <Security:hasLifecycle rdf:resource="&Security;Design"/> 
        <Security:hasSecurityConcerns rdf:resource="&Security;Filtering"/> 
        <Security:hasSecurityConcerns rdf:resource="&Security;Integrity"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;SQLInjection"/> 
        <Security:hasDomain rdf:resource="&Security;WebAndJ2EE"/> 
    </NamedIndividual>  
   ….. 
  <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Secure_pipe --> 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Secure_pipe"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;BruteForceAttack"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;CookieReplay"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;CredentialTheft"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;DictionaryAttack"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;NetworkEavesdropping"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
       …… 
List 6-6 Partial of Instance Declarations of Security Pattern Subontology 
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6.4.3 Security Ontology Validation 
To evaluate the usefulness of ontology, consistent answers must be given to real world 
questions when using it for inference. According to [162], competency questions have 
been defined and used to validate the proposed ontology.  
In this section, a number of questions are listed which are likely involved in the project 
development and come up with by the developers. The questions are designed as 
indicative of what the ontology can handle and reason about rather than as exhaustive as 
possible. Each of the questions is firstly expressed formally as a DL-query, which is a 
query language that can be used to query RDF and OWL-DL ontologies, and then the 
query results are presented with comments in appropriated place. Figure 6-12 illustrates 
one of the query executions in Protégé Editor. Several of competency questions 
designed for validating the proposed security ontology are shown as follows. 
  
Figure 6-12 Example of Query Result in Protégé Editor 
Q1: Which assets are confidential? 
    DL Query: Asset and (SecurityAttribute value Confidential)) 
    DL Result: Internal data 
             Sensitive data 
             Sensitive process 
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Q2: Which threats threaten the integrity attribute of internal data assets in the network 
layer? 
    DL Query: Threat and (threaten some (Asset and (Asset value InternalData) and 
(SecurityAttribute value Integrity)) and (resideOn value Network)) 
    DL Result: Spoofing 
             Session Hijacking                   
Q3: Which security patterns protect the sensitive data against network eavesdropping 
threat? 
  DL Query: SecurityPattern and (hasProblem some (Threat and (Threat value 
NetworkEavesdropping) and (threaten value SensitiveData))) 
    DL Result: Secure pipe 
             Secure communication 
             Secure Association 
Q4: Which security patterns can be used in Web and J2EE domain to address the SQL 
injection threat? 
       DL Query: SecurityPattern and (hasDomain value WebAndJ2EE) and 
(hasProblem and (Threat value SQLInjection)) 
    DL Result: Input validator 
6.4.4 Ontology based Security Pattern Selecting 
Security patterns are used by developers to fulfil the security requirements.  In this 
section, a method is developed to identify and retrieve the “right” security patterns from 
the security pattern base to fulfil the security requirements elicited from the previous 
evolution stage. Then, the selected patterns will be instantiated and integrated into the 
system design model. Figure 6-13 depicts the pattern selecting process. 
To facilitate the selection of security patterns from pattern repository, a pattern search 
engine is designed. For a given security requirement, pattern search engine will try to 
find one or more security patterns that fulfil it. Two kinds of people can be the potential 
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users of this search engine. One of them is the software system developer. This kind of 
users can input the specific request according to the security requirement or treat the 
whole security requirement list as the input, and then the search engine attempts to 
match the security requirements with the security patterns by inferring the proposed 
security ontology using Protégé OWL API and then search the corresponding security 
pattern specification from the pattern repository. The other kind of user is the security 
pattern developers who update the patterns and its corresponding ontology description 
in both security pattern repository and security ontology repository. 
The patterns have been organised and classified with the proposed multiple aspects 
method with the consideration of dependency relationships between patterns.  
 
Figure 6-13 Pattern Selection Process 
The pattern search engine can be implemented by incorporating OWL API and is 
composed of four functions: 
• Input function. An input function receives the user’s required security 
requirement or takes the set of security requirements as input. 
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• Infer function. An infer function infers the developed security ontology to find 
the security patterns according to the user input by using OWL API. The core of 
infer function is the algorithms realising the mapping.  
• Search function. A search function will search the security pattern repository 
according to the mapping result of infer function and returns the development 
specification of the selected patterns which can be used by developer. 
• Output function. An output function returns the mapping index between security 
requirement and mitigation security patterns.  
The key part of the pattern search engine are some algorithms that match the security 
patterns with required security requirements until either there are no more security 
requirements existing, or no more security patterns which can be matched with them.  
In order to extract the corresponding results from the proposed security ontology, the 
Protégé OWL API can be used to encode the competency questions in the algorithm 
structure. The OWL API is a Java application interface and reference implementation 
for creating, manipulating and serialising OWL Ontologies [78]. In the following, two 
of representative algorithms are given in a pseudo code format to show how the search 
engine performs the infer function. 
By incorporating OWL API, Algorithm 1 is used to determine the assets threatened by a 
given threat with the consideration of a given stakeholder. In GetRelated(x, y) function, 
x is a given concept, while y is a relation (also called object property in Protégé OWL). 
GetRelated(x, y) function returns a collection of concepts which are related with x via y. 
The GetInstances(x) function returns a collection of instances (also called individuals in 
Protégé OWL) belonging to concept x.  
Algorithm 1  Asset Owned by a Given Stakeholder and Threatened by a Given 
Threat  
Input T is the given threat 
S is the given stakeholder 
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Output A is the asset array  
Initialisation A=∅ 
procedure getAsset(T, S) return A 
1. T← given threat  
2. S← given stakeholder 
3. A←Null 
{* A returns a collection of asset owned by S and threatened by T *} 
4. RAL←GetRelated(T, sr:hasAsset) 
{*sr:hasAsset specifies that the object property “hasAsset” in security 
requirement subontology “sr” as the relation *} 
5. for i← 0 to RAL.Length do 
6.    I← GetInstances(RAL[i]) 
{*Exact the instances from each of related asset classes *} 
7.    for j←0 to I. Length do 
8.         if I[j].sr:ownedBy==S then 
{*sr:ownedBy specifies that the object property “ownedBy” in security  
requirement subontology “sr” as the relation *} 
9.            A.Add(I[j]) 
10.          end if 
11.      end for 
12. end for 
13. return A 
List 6-7 Algorithm of Exacting Asset Threatened by Given Threat 
Algorithm 2 is used to search the security patterns which can mitigate the threats 
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threatening the given asset by violating the given security attributes in a given domain. 
Algorithm 2 Security Patterns Searching 
Input A is the given asset 
SA is the given security attribute 
D is the given application domain 
Output SP is the security pattern array 
Initialisation SP=∅ 
procedure getAsset(A, SA, D) return SP 
1. A ← given asset 
2. SA← given security attribute 
3. D← given domain 
4. SP←Null 
5. TL← GetRelated(A, sr:isThreatedBy) 
6. for i←0 to TL.Length do 
7.     T← GetInstance(TL[i]) 
8.     for j←0 to T.Length do 
9.         if T[j].sr:hasSecurityAttribute ==SA then 
10.             P← GetRelated(T[j],sp:isSolvedBy) 
11.             for k← 0 to P.Length do 
12.                 PI ← GetInstance(P[k]) 
13.                 for m ← 0 to PI.Length do 
14.                     if PI[m].sp:hasDomain= = D then  
15.                         if PI[m].sp:hasLayer = = T[j].sr:residesOn then 
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16.                             PR← GetRealted(PI[m], sp:requires) 
{*PR is the pattern set in which pattern is required by the exacted pattern with 
“require” relation in security pattern subontology sp*} 
17.                             PS←GetRelated(PI[m], sp:isSpecialisedBy) 
{*PS is the pattern set in which pattern specifies the exacted pattern with 
“isSpecialisedBy” relation in security pattern subontology sp*} 
18.                             if PS.Length !=0 then 
19.                                for l← to PS.Length do 
20.                                   SP.Add(PS[l]) 
21.                                 end for 
22.                              else  
23.                                  SP.Add(P[m]) 
24.                              end if 
25.                              if PR.Length !=0 then 
26.                                for n← to PR.Length do 
27.                                  SP.Add(PR[n]) 
28.                                  Line 16 to Line 27 with PR[n] for PI[m] 
29.                                 end for 
30.                               end if 
31.                         end if 
32.                     end if 
33.                 end for 
34.              end for 
35.          end if 
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36.     end for 
37.  end for 
38.  return T    
39.  return SP 
List 6-8 Algorithm of Exacting Security Pattern  
6.5 Security Pattern Application 
Once the mappings between security requirements and security patterns have been done, 
it is time to integrate the selected security patterns into the extracted UML diagrams to 
protect the assets which are the elements representing in diagrams against their potential 
threats. From the output of security pattern selecting, an index will be generated which 
can be used as the prerequisite of this section. 
The idea is to integrate security patterns at higher level of abstraction in system design.  
In this phase, system class diagram and security pattern diagram can be treated as two 
sets of class diagram. Therefore, the task of this phase is to integrate or merge these two 
sets. In the set theory of mathematics, the method to merge two sets is to find the set 
intersections. Afterwards, a merged set can be achieved by utilising the elements from 
two sets with subtracting the intersection elements. The method used in this thesis to 
integrate system models elements with security pattern elements is inspired by the 
method used in set merging. Figure 6-14 depicts the process of the proposed method. 
The main steps of pattern integration process are: 
• Input 
This step involves (1) the system model that describe the key assets of the legacy 
system; (2) a set of selected security patterns. Those patterns are organised using 
the proposed multiple aspects approach, in a security pattern repository. The 
structure of the selected pattern is represented as a UML class diagram, and the 
behaviour of the pattern is shown as sequence diagram to facilitate the 
understanding and using. 
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• Mapping 
This step includes adding the annotation to the class where security patterns are 
applied and analysing the elements of the corresponding security pattern also 
called pattern participants so as to make the association between the elements of 
the selected security pattern and system model elements.  
• Integration 
This operation includes adding the pattern participant classes of the pattern to the 
stereotype class in the system model and adjusting the relations between them. 
• Output 
The security integrated model is generated after applied security pattern in the 
appropriate place in the system model. This UML profile provide a suitable way 
to define a semantic for each solution provided by security pattern and allow 
applying this semantics directly to developing application model’s elements. 
 
Figure 6-14 Security Pattern Integration Process 
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6.5.1 Security Annotation in System Diagram  
A security annotation is an attribute or Meta that can be assigned to an element of the 
system diagram. In order to map the participants of the security pattern with the asset 
class in the system UML model, stereotype as one of the extensibility mechanisms in 
UML has been chosen to show where a security pattern should be applied.  
6.5.2 Security Pattern Integration 
The key to integrate the system diagram elements with security pattern participants is to 
find the junction between them, based on which the relationships between classes can be 
taken into consideration when a refined integration is analysed. The detailed 
considerations are listed below. 
• Check whether there are some classes having the same or similar function in 
both parts, even if they are called different names in their own part, there still 
exists some degree of redundancy. Hence, the redundant class should be taken 
out of the combined diagram. 
• Check if there exists the “Whole-Part” relationship between classes in both parts. 
If yes, they should be connected as Aggregation or Combination relationship. 
• Check if there exists “Collaboration” relationship between classes to perform a 
particular function. If yes, the Dependency or Association relation is to be 
considered between them. 
• If there are no obvious relations between them, some coordination classes could 
be added to implement the connection. 
   By combination, deletion of redundancy, creation relationships and coordination, an 
integrated system diagram with security pattern is realised.  
Figure 6-15 shows part of class diagram of a web application. Suppose there is a 
security requirement that the web clerk can only do the use cases with the allocated 
authority, which means Authorisation pattern is suggested to be used. However, 
authentication is required before the authorisation is applied. Figure 6-16 depicts the 
Authenticator pattern in class diagram and Figure 6-17 shows the class diagram after the 
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Authenticator pattern is applied in a web application. According to the above, web clerk 
class is the junction and is judged as Subject role of the Authenticator pattern and a 
stereotype is added to indicate the correspondence. Figure 6-19 describes the class 
diagram for the example case after the Authorisation pattern shown in Figure 6-18 is 
applied, where web clerk is recognised as the subject of Authorisation pattern and 
customer is judged as object of Authorisation pattern with the stereotype added to them.  
 
Figure 6-15 Example Class Diagram 
 
 
Figure 6-16 Class Diagram of the Authenticator Pattern 
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Figure 6-17 Class Diagram after Authenticator Pattern is Applied 
 
Figure 6-18 Class Diagram of the Authorisation Pattern 
 
Figure 6-19 Class diagram after the Authorisation pattern is applied 
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6.6 MDA Forward Engineering 
The security enhanced design models derived from this chapter are some kinds of PIMs 
in the form of UML class diagram. As MDA philosophy shows PIMs can be 
transtformed into PSMs based on a specific implementation platform and then be 
transformed into code with the specific programming language.  
MDA forward engineering aims to deriving code from the models by using automatic 
tools. Presently, there are many case tools available provided by modelling vendors. 
Most of the transformation works on models to codes are realised by various tools by 
different mapping methods. However, it is only capable to generate template codes as 
the automatic transformation result generally. For some tools, code generation process 
can produce the source code by replacing the token predefined by program developer in 
the program skeleton. 
In the following content, there is summary and catalogue for most common UML tools 
supporting MDA code generation till Jan. 2014. 
Table 6-3 Part of UML Tools Supporting Code Generation 
Tool (Latest 
version) 
UML 
Ver. 
Code  XMI Platform License  Note 
Acceleo 
(3.4) 
2 J2EE,.Net, 
PHP 
No Java Comme
rcial 
Integration with Eclipse and 
EMF 
AndroMDA 
(3.4) 
2.2 J2EE/EJB, 
Spring, 
Hibernate, 
 
Yes  Free  An open source code 
generation framework that 
follows the Model Driven 
   
Apollo for 
Eclipse(3.0) 
2.1 Java No Java Comme
rcial 
A UML extension to Eclipse. 
Supporting Round-trip 
engineering for Java 5.  
ArgoUML 
(0.34) 
1.4 C#, Java Yes Java Free ArgoUML is the leading open 
source UML modelling tool and 
includes support for all standard 
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Astade 
(1.1.2) 
2 C++ No  Free UML tool for C++ code 
generation 
BOUML 
() 
2 Java,C++, 
IDL, PHP 
No Windows
Linux, 
MacOS 
Comme
rcial 
A UML diagram designer, 
supporting code generation and 
code reverse engineering 
Dia2code 
(0.8.5) 
2 C, C++, 
C#, Java, 
 
No Linux, 
Windows 
Free A small utility used to generate 
code from a Dia diagram 
EclipseUML 
(2.2) 
2.2 JavaEE Yes Java Comme
rcial 
A UML tool integrated Eclipse. 
It supports reverse engineering 
from the byte code to class and 
sequence diagram and forward 
engineering to Java code 
Enterprise 
Architect 
(10) 
2.4 Java, 
C++,C#, 
VB.net, 
XML 
Yes Windows 
Linux 
Comme
rcial 
Full lifecycle modelling for 
business, software and system. 
It supports code generation from 
UML Class or Interface model  
MagicDraw 
(17.0.5) 
2.2 Java, C++, 
C# 
Yes Java Comme
rcial 
Provide code engineering 
mechanism with full round-trip 
support. It provides the 
industry's best code engineering 
mechanism (with full round-trip 
support for Java, C++, C#, CL 
(MSIL) and CORBA IDL 
programming languages). 
OpenAmeos 
(10.2) 
2 C, C++, 
Java, 
Ada95 
Yes Windows 
Linux, 
Windows 
Free A real-time embedded system 
modelling tool supporting MDA 
based code generation templates 
PowerDesig
ner 
(16 5) 
2 Java, C++, 
C#, 
VB.net, 
 
No Windows Comme
rcial 
Support MDA software design, 
data modelling, code generation 
and Eclipse plugin 
Rational 
Software 
Architect 
(9.0) 
2.1 Java, C++, 
VB, SQL, 
Delphi, 
Oracle 
Yes Windows
Linux, 
Unix 
Comme
rcial 
An IBM powerful Product 
supporting integrated design, 
modelling and development  
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StarUML 
(5.0) 
2 Java, C++, 
C# 
Yes Windows Free UML/MDA platform 
TopCased  
(5.3.1) 
2.1 Java No Java Free UML plugin in Eclipse focusing 
on critical system modelling 
Visio 2010 2 C++, 
C#,VB 
Yes Windows Comme
rcial 
A Microsoft diagram tool 
supporting UML and code 
generation from UML 
Visual 
Paradigm 
(11.0) 
2 C++, Java Yes Windows 
Linux, 
Mac, 
 
Comme
rcial 
Support software development 
in requirement gathering, 
software design with UML, 
database design and code 
 From the above tables, there are a large amount of UML tools on the market with 
various functions and aiming at different systems which are shown in the details 
specification. The available tools might not as strong as expected. However, they are 
supports on current research stage and can be valuable references for the future 
improvement on transformation. 
6.7 Summary 
In this chapter, security enhancement in software evolution is realised by adopting 
security patterns as security countermeasures, which incorporates proven security expert 
knowledge. Due to the lack of semantic, security patterns are organised by multi-aspect 
classification and a security search engine is designed to support the automatic matching 
security pattern according to the specific security requirement.  The contents covered 
in this chapter are concluded as follows: 
• A multiple aspects classification approach is proposed to organise the security 
patterns from the different perspectives, which are life cycle, architectural layer, 
application context, problem type, domain, and security concern. 
• A security ontology is developed to model the concepts and relationships in 
security requirements and security pattern domain.  
• With the proposed security ontology, a security search engine is designed to 
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support the matching of security requirement with the security pattern which is 
used to address the security needs of the software developer.  
• At last, the selected patterns are instantiated and integrated into the system 
models with the proposed method.  
• The features of the proposed security enhancement approach lie in: 
 Security patterns, as the security solution to the elicited security 
requirements, incorporate proven security expertise. They can be used by 
security novice or software developer other than the approaches in in [85] 
and  [142] which are meant to be used by security expert. 
 Combining ontology technique with security pattern contributes to a 
better flexibility and reusability to the evolved system.  The developed 
security ontology includes the concepts of risk analysis and security 
pattern at a higher abstraction level, than that of the approach in [142] or 
[127]. Therefore, it provides a more flexible way to integrate with existing 
approaches. 
 It can be used to manage the security patterns by annotation. Security 
patterns can be annotated by assigning corresponding meta-information in 
the proposed security ontology which will keep the patterns themselves 
untouched. Usually, the software developers open mapped patterns 
documents (e.g. HTML page) according to given security requirements, 
can browse through it and integrate into existing design models. 
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Chapter 7                        
Case Study 
Objectives 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 To illustrate how to use the related tools in the proposed approach 
 To demonstrate the way of applying the overall proposed reengineering 
approach SEMDA to evolve software for security concerns 
__________________________________________________________________ 
7.1 Overview 
This chapter presents how the SEMDA approach is implemented in a real legacy system. 
There are five core techniques proposed in this thesis for security evolution: model 
slicing, system decomposition, security mechanism detection, security requirement 
elicitation, and ontology based security pattern for security improvement. In this chapter, 
the case study is examined by employing the proposed techniques respectively. 
7.2 Case Study Introduction 
WebStoreApp [174] is an open source online shopping application project based on 
GNU General Public License version 2.0 (GPLv2) which allows customers to shop 
brand new products as well as used items. WebStoreApp is written in Java using Struts 
2.x and Hibernate 3.x frameworks.  It Includes 62 classes, including 21 action classes 
(servlet), 12 beans classes (EJB), 12 interface classes and 1 POJO class implementation 
of Facade design pattern etc. It contains 10740 lines of code and provides the basic 
function for online shopping. Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2 show the user account 
screenshot and order processing screenshot of this application respectively. 
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Figure 7-1 User Account Screenshot of WebStoreApp 
 
Figure 7-2 Order Processing Screenshot of WebStoreApp 
7.3  Legacy System Understanding and Extraction 
The analysis for the legacy system is to understand the current system and designing a 
decomposition strategy for the reusable legacy assets identification. It is crucial because 
legacy systems can be implemented by different building approaches and programming 
languages, many of them do not have clear specifications. 
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7.3.1  Architecture Recovery 
Being imported into java NetBeans, the file directory structure of WebStoreApp is 
shown in Figure 7-3. The execution of Login function shown in Figure 7-5 is chosen as 
the example of analysing in order to recovery the real architecture of the WebStoreApp 
with the help of typical J2EE application architecture shown in Figure 7-4.  
In Figure 7-4, the typical client of J2EE application is a web browser which accesses the 
web tier where the servlets reside. Servlets then forward the requests to EJBs 
(Enterprise Java Beans) which reside in the business tier. Then, some of them access the 
database to perform the request. Based on the analysis of Figure 7-3, Figure 7-4, the 
architecture of WebStoreApp is recovered and illustrated in Figure 7-6. 
 
Figure 7-3 File Directory Structure of WebStoreApp 
 
Figure 7-4 A Typical J2EE Web Application Architecture 
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Figure 7-5 Source Code Screenshot of LoginAction Servlet 
 
Figure 7-6 Architecture of WebStoreApp based on Struts and Hibernate 
Chapter 7. Case Study 
194 
WebStoreApp was developed using Hibernate and Struts techniques building on MVC 
(Model-View-Controller) pattern. Model-View-Controller (MVC) is a popular 
architecture to separate concerns in a software development. The Model represents the 
business or database code, the View represents the page design code, and the Controller 
represents the navigational code. The Struts framework is designed to help developers 
create web applications that utilise MVC architecture. Hibernate is an open source 
framework used to manage the persistent data from Java environment to database. 
Facade pattern is used in WebStoreApp design which hides the complexities of the 
system and provides an interface to the client using which the client can access the 
system. It often makes sense to have a higher-level interface for a model, called the 
facade.  
7.3.2 System Model Extraction 
Visual Paradigm for UML (VP-UML) [169] is a powerful UML CASE Tool from the 
OMG. It can support modelling of UML 2, Business Process Modelling Notation 
(BPMN) and SysML. Moreover, it provides reverse engineering and forward 
engineering for java, C# programming language. Class diagram and sequence diagram 
generation for java is provided and what’s more, code generation from class diagram is 
supported as well. 
 
Figure 7-7 Entire Class Diagram of WebStoreApp  
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In this section, VP-UML is used to generate class diagram and sequence diagram from 
the source code of WebStoreApp. Figure 7-7 shows the entire class diagram of 
WebStoreApp, and all of the bean classes and their relationship are shown in Figure 7-8. 
Several extracted sequence diagrams are depicted in Figure 7-9, Figure 7-10 and Figure 
7-11. 
 
Figure 7-8 Class Diagram of WebStoreApp Bean Classes 
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Figure 7-9 Sequence Diagram of Cart Update Operation 
 
Figure 7-10 Sequence Diagram of Add Product to Cart Operation 
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Figure 7-11 Sequence Diagram of PlaceOrder Operation 
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7.3.3 CSDG Construction of WebStoreApp 
This section a CSDG is constructed based on the extracted system diagrams according 
to the algorithm described in Section 4.4. Figure 7-8, Figure 7-9, and Figure 7-10 are 
selected as the source graph to construct CSDG. In view of readability and complexity 
of whole system, only parts of them are shown in Figure 7-12. 
 
Figure 7-12 Part of CSDG for WebStore Application 
Using the model slicing algorithm in Section 4.4.2, Figure 7-12 is sliced based on the 
given slicing criteria and the result is shown in Figure 7-13. 
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Figure 7-13 Slicing Output using Product as the Slicing Criteria 
7.3.4 Legacy System Partition  
According to the algorithm of system partition proposed in Section 4.5, the 
Independence Metrics are computed and the result is shown in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1 Results of One Iteration for WebStoreApp 
Cluster No. Slice Criteria Slice NoteSet IM 
1 UserAccount UserAccount, Address 1.6 
2 Address Address 0 
3 Order Order, CreditCard, Cart, UserAccount, 
    
0.55 
4 CreditCard CreditCard 0 
5 Cart Cart, CartProduct, Product, Item, Images 1.2 
6 CartProduct CartProduct, Product, Item, Images 1.75 
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7 Product Product, Item, Images 2.33 
8 Item Item, Images 2.15 
9 Catalog Catalog, Images, Product, Item, Category 0.36 
10 Category Category, Product, Item, Images 1.13 
11 Images Images 0 
After iteration computing for several times, the final partition result is shown in Table 
7-2. 
Table 7-2 Partition Result of WebStoreApp Application 
Cluster No. Class name 
1 Product, Item, Images 
2 UserAccount, Address 
3 Cart, CartProduct 
4 Order, CreditCard 
5 Category, Catalog 
From the result of system partition, it can be concluded that there are five main modules 
in WebStoreApp which can be described as a system use case diagram in Figure 7-14. 
User
UserAccount
Managemenht
Order Management
Cart Management
Product Management
Catalog Management
 
Figure 7-14 System Use Case Diagram of WebStoreApp Application 
Chapter 7. Case Study 
201 
7.3.5 Security Mechanism Detection 
According to the checklist listed in Table 4-8 in Section 4.6.3, the detected security 
mechanisms in the current design in WebStoreApp are: 
• User name and password as authentication 
• Client-Certificate 
7.4 Security Requirements Analysis 
According to the Chapter 5, security requirement is represented by the assets, the threats 
threatening to them and the priority representing the development order when it is to be 
satisfied.   
7.4.1 Asset Analysis 
By using the approach proposed in Section 5.2.1, assets in WebStoreApp are identified 
and their criticalities are evaluated according to Table 5-2. Table 7-3 shows the final 
result and the average criticality value is appended to the bottom of the table. 
Table 7-3 Part of Asset Criticality Analysis for WebStoreApp 
ID Asset Name Asset Type Sensitive Criticality Rating 
1 UserAccount Customer data Yes Very high  10 
2 Address Customer data Yes Very high 10 
3 CreditCard Financial data Yes Very high 10 
4 Order Customer data Yes Very high 10 
5 Cart Public data No Low 3.99 
6 CartProduct  Public data No Low 3.99 
7 Product Public data No Low 3.99 
8 Item Public data No Low 3.99 
9 Category Public data No Low 3.99 
10 Catalog Public data No Low 3.99 
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11 User Registration Business process Yes Very high 10 
12 User Logging Business process Yes Very high 10 
13 Place Order Business process Yes Very high 10 
14 Clear Cart and Order  Business process No Low 3.99 
15 Add Product to Cart Business process No Low 3.99 
16 Display Item Business process No Low 3.99 
17 Display Product Business process No Low 3.99 
18 List Catalog Business process No Low 3.99 
19 List Category Business process No Low 3.99 
20 List Items Business process No Low 3.99 
21 List SubCategory or Product Business process No Low 3.99 
22 Remove Item Business process No Low 3.99 
23 Remove Product Business process No Low 3.99 
24 Show Cart Business process No Low 3.99 
25 Show help Business process No Low 3.99 
26 Show Order Detail Business process Yes Very high 10 
27 Show Registration Form Business process Yes Very high 10 
28 Show User Account Business process Yes Very high 10 
29 Sign Out Business process Yes Very high 10 
30 Update Cart Business process No Low 3.99 
The average asset scale value 6.19 
7.4.2 Threat Analysis 
To design a secure system, the possible threats threatening the system are needed to be 
understood. Without this understanding a system that is more expensive than necessary 
and that has a large performance overhead may be produced [45]. 
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It is necessary to rate the security requirements CIAA of target application when using 
the proposed EDTEM in Chapter 5. Using internal guidelines based on documents such 
as [30], the following security objectives for the WebStoreApp application may be 
produced:  
• Confidentiality: High 
Application is ready for use to unknown public users, and sensitive financial data and 
client private information are handled by this application.  
• Integrity: Medium 
Loss of integrity will have an adverse effect on confidentiality. Poor inventory and 
shopping tracking may result in significant financial loss to the company and may result 
in customer dissatisfaction / loss of customers.  
• Availability: Low 
Information must be readily available with flexible tolerance for delay, or loss of 
availability will have an adverse effect. A major disruption of the application will cause 
a delay in shopping and have some financial consequences to the organisation. 
•  Accountability: Medium 
Operations to sensitive and internal data should be identified and that the trace to the 
author and the operation is kept.  
According to the EDTED described in the previous section, almost all of the likely 
threats are included in this type of web applications due to their complicated 
environment and target user. 
The threat list can be further screened out according to the security requirements of 
CIAA aspects. In terms of the EDTEM algorithm, threats with only Availability 
requirements can be rule out in that the given application has low requirements, while 
threats with Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I) and Accountability (Ac) are remained.  
Table 7-4 shows the threat list threatens the asset of WebStoreApp application. 
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Table 7-4 Threat List Threatens the Asset of WebStoreApp 
Asset Type Application 
Type 
CIAA 
Requirement 
Threat List with Threat ID 
Internal Data WA4 Confidentiality  
Integrity 
Accountability 
T12,T13,T14,T15,T16,T17,T18,T19, 
T20,T21,T22,T23,T24,T25,T26,T27, 
T29,T30,T31,T32,T33,T34,T35,T36, 
T37,T38,T39,T40,T41,T42,T43,T45 
Public  data WA4 Integrity  T3,T4,T10,T11,T12,T13,T14,T15,T20,
T21,T22,T24,T25,T26,T29,T31,T32,T
34,T35,T41,T42 
Sensitive data WA4 Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Accountability 
T12,T13,T14,T15,T16,T17,T18,T19, 
T20,T21,T22,T23,T24,T25,T26,T27, 
T29,T30,T31,T32,T33,T34,T35,T36, 
T37,T38,T39,T40,T41,T42,T43,T45 
Sensitive 
process 
WA4 Confidentiality 
Accountability 
T16,T17,T19,T20,T21,T22,T24, T25, 
T26,T27,T29,T30,T31,T32,T34, T35, 
T36,T37,T38,T39,T40,T41,T42, T45 
As described in Section 5.2.2, DREAD is used to quantify the security level for each 
threat identified from the proposed EDTEM approach according to the rating value in 
Table 5-8, the result for WebStoreApp is shown in Table 7-5. Moreover, each threat is 
classified based on the STRIDE [160] scheme described in Section 6.3.3 for later use. 
Table 7-5 Threat Risk Quantification 
AHN ID Threat Name Type D R E A D Total 
N
et
w
or
k 
1 Information Gathering I 0 5 5 0 5 3 
2 Sniffing I 5 5 5 0 5 4 
3 Spoofing S 5 5 0 5 5 4 
4 Session Hijacking S 5 5 5 5 5 5 
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5 Denial of Service D 5 5 5 10 5 6 
H
os
t 
6 Viruses, Trojan horses, and 
Worms 
STIE 10 10 10 10 10 10 
7 Footprinting S 5 5 5 5 0 4 
8 Password Cracking I 10 5 5 5 5 7 
9 Denial of Service D 5 5 5 10 5 6 
10 Arbitrary Code Execution TI 5 5 5 5 5 5 
11 Unauthorised Access TI 10 5 5 5 0 5 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
In
 p
ut
 V
al
id
at
io
n 12 Buffer Overflow T 10 5 5 5 5 5 
13 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) T 10 5 5 5 10 7 
14 SQL Injection T 10 5 5 5 10 7 
15 Canonicalisation T 10 5 0 0 10 5 
A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
16 Network Eavesdropping I 10 5 5 10 0 6 
17 Brute Force Attacks I 5 0 5 5 5 4 
18 Dictionary Attacks I 5 0 5 5 5 4 
19 Cookie Replay S 5 0 0 5 0 2 
20 Credential Theft S 10 0 5 5 5 5 
A
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
21 Elevation of Privilege E 10 10 0 5 0 5 
22 Disclosure of Confidential Data I 5 10 5 5 5 6 
23 Data Tampering T 10 5 5 5 5 6 
24 Luring Attacks E 10 5 0 5 5 5 
C
on
fig
ur
at
io
n 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
25 Unauthorised Access to 
Aministration Interface 
TI 0 5 5 10 0 4 
26 Unauthorised Access to 
Configuration Stores 
TI 0 5 5 10 0 4 
27 Retrieval of Clear Text 
Configuration Data 
I 0 5 5 10 0 4 
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28 Lack of Individual 
Accountability 
R 0 5 5 10 0 4 
29 Over-Privileged Process and 
Service Accounts 
E 0 5 5 10 0 4 
Se
ns
iti
ve
 D
at
a 30 Access sensitive data in storage I 10 5 0 10 5 6 
31 Network Eavesdropping I 5 5 5 5 5 5 
32 Data Tampering T 10 5 5 5 5 6 
Se
ss
io
n 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 33 Session Hijacking S 5 5 5 5 10 6 
34 Session Replay S 5 5 5 5 10 6 
35 Man in the Middle TI 5 5 5 5 5 5 
C
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
y 36 
Poor Key Generation or Key 
Management 
I 5 5 5 0 0 3 
37 Weak or Custom Encryption I 5 5 5 0 0 3 
38 Checksum Spoofing I 5 5 5 0 0 3 
Pa
ra
m
et
er
 
M
an
ip
ul
at
io
n 
39 Query String Manipulation I 5 5 5 5 5 5 
40 Form Field Manipulation I 5 5 5 5 5 5 
41 Cookie Manipulation TI 5 5 5 5 5 5 
42 HTTP Header Manipulation T 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Ex
ce
pt
io
n 43 Attacker Reveals 
Implementation Details 
I 5 5 5 5 5 5 
44 Denial of Service D 5 5 5 10 5 6 
A
ud
iti
ng
 a
nd
 lo
gg
in
g 45 
User Denies Performing an 
Operation 
R 5 10 5 5 5 6 
46 Attacker Exploits an 
Application Without Trace 
R 5 0 5 5 5 4 
47 
Attacker Covers His or Her 
Tracks 
R 5 0 5 5 5 4 
In many cases, it is impossible to mitigate every threat, even if it could be done. It 
would almost certainly take place at the cost of decreased usability. Due to the 
Chapter 7. Case Study 
207 
application budget and time, it is not necessary to mitigate every threat to the system. 
Therefore, some threats with more DREAD quantification value are chosen as the 
detailed security requirements to be alleviated. In this thesis, the threats with DREAD 
value lager than 5 are chosen for further processing. 
Table 7-6 Asset versus Threat List with DREAD Value >5 
Asset Type CIAA Requirement 
Threat List  
Threat AHN STRIDE 
Internal data 
Confidentiality  
Integrity 
Accountability 
T13 A Tampering 
T14 A Tampering 
T16 A Information Disclosure 
T22 A Information Disclosure 
T23 A Tampering 
T30 A Information Disclosure 
T32 A Tampering 
T45 A Repudiation 
Public  data Integrity  
T13 A Tampering 
T14 A Tampering 
T23 A Tampering 
Sensitive data 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Accountability 
T13 A Tampering 
T14 A Tampering 
T16 A Information Disclosure 
T22 A Information Disclosure 
T23 A Tampering 
T30 A Information Disclosure 
T32 A Tampering 
T33 A Spoofing 
T34 A Spoofing 
T45 A Repudiation 
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Sensitive process 
Confidentiality 
Accountability 
T16 A Information Disclosure 
T22 A Information Disclosure 
T30 A Information Disclosure 
T45 A Repudiation  
The total value after DREAD threat quantification is computed by averaging all of the 
potential threat, the final result is 7.08. 
7.4.3 Vulnerability Analysis 
As described in Section 5.2.3, the vulnerability scanning tool named N-Stalker is used 
to detect the potential vulnerabilities in WebStoreApp application. Figure 7-15 depicts 
the scan result of vulnerability detecting for WebStoreApp application. 
 
Figure 7-15 Scan Result of N-Stalker for WebStoreApp Application  
Figure 7-16 shows one of the identified vulnerability of WebStoreApp application 
named Insecure Communications which means applications frequently fail to encrypt 
network traffic when it is necessary to protect sensitive communications and which is a 
“2007 top 10 CVE (Common Vulnerability Exploit)”. The scan result is shown in Table 
7-7 and CVSS is used to quantify the result depicted in Figure 7-17 and Table 7-8. 
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Figure 7-16 Security Vulnerability Detected by Using N-Stalker 
Table 7-7 Vulnerabilities of WebStoreApp 
No. Scan Policy Vulnerability Name Occurrences Status Remark 
1 OWASP Web server will disclose 
platform details or versions 
information 
1 informational  
2 OWASP Insecure web authentication 
from data protection 
mechanism found (no SSL)  
45 informational OWASP Top 
10 version 
2007 
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3 OWASP Web form allows password 
caching in the client-side 
45 informational  
4 Full XSS 
Assessment 
Possible Cross-Site 
Scripting and/or HTML 
injection found   
12 Medium OWASP Top 
10 version 
2010 
 
Figure 7-17 CVSS Calculator in [116] 
Table 7-8 CVSS Scoring 
Vulner-
ability 
CVSS Base Score 
Access 
Vector 
Access 
Complexity 
Authenti-
cation 
Confidentiality 
Impact 
Integrity 
Impact 
Availability 
Impact 
Score 
V1 Network Low None Partial None None 5 
V2 Network Medium None  Partial Partial None 5.8 
V3 Network Medium None Partial None None 4.3 
V4 Network Medium None Partial None None 4.3 
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The total score for vulnerabilities combined with their occurrences is: 
5*1/103+5.8*45/103+4.3*45/103+4.3*12/103=4.96. 
According to Formula (5) proposed in Section 5.2, the security risk of WebStore 
application can be computed by referencing Table 7-3, Table 7-5, Table 7-6, and Table 
7-8. The value for asset is 6.19, 7.08 for threats and 4.96 for vulnerability. The final 
result is 6.14.  
7.4.4 Security Evaluation 
Section 5.3 described the security evaluation process with the consideration of security 
risk, security objectives and detected security mechanisms. Security risk is quantified by 
computing the threats in Table 5-7, Table 7-5 and Table 7-6 according to their DREAD 
value and CIAA requirements. Table 7-9 shows the evaluation result from which it can 
be concluded that the current security implementation in the WebStoreApp application 
is not enough to protect the target system to satisfy the user’s security requirements. 
Therefore, it is necessary to evolve the target system to satisfy the required security 
goals. 
Table 7-9 Security Evaluation for WebStoreApp Application 
 Security 
Objectives 
Security Risk  Detected Security 
Mechanisms 
Satisfied? 
Confidentiality High Medium Low No 
Integrity Medium High Low No 
Availability Low Low Low Yes 
Accountability Medium Low Low No 
7.5 Security Enhancement  
As described in Chapter 6, security pattern as an encapsulation of security expert 
knowledge is used to improve the security level in software evolution. A security 
ontology is developed to implement the mapping from the elicited security requirements 
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to the mitigation mechanisms--security patterns which are integrated into the system 
diagrams afterwards.  
7.5.1 Security Pattern Mapping 
Security patterns matched given query have been found by using the developed security 
ontology. An example of how the ontology works with the algorithms 2 in Section 6.5 
are given as follows. 
For a security requirements<Internal data, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Confidentiality, 
H>, which means Internal data facing Cross-site Scripting threats threatening the 
Confidentiality security feature with High level risk, a query is designed to generate the 
appropriate security pattern satisfying it. 
   DL Query: SecurityPattern and (hasDomain value WebAndJ2EE) and (hasLifeCycel 
value Design) and (hasSecurityConcerns value Confidentiality) and (has 
Architecture value Application) and (hasSecurityProblem and 
(SecurityProblem value CrossSiteScript) and (Threaten some 
InternalData)) 
   DL Result: Intercepting Validator 
            Secure Action Base (requires relation) 
The ontology shows the query result is Intercepting Validator pattern. Secure Action 
Base pattern is inferred and given as well via the require relationship between them. 
Table 7-10 shows the mapping result with the same method as illustrated above. 
Table 7-10 Mapping Result by Using the Proposed Security Ontology 
Security Requirements 
Security 
Pattern ID 
Asset Threat Priority 
Level Asset Type Security 
 
Threat  
  
AHN Security 
 
Internal data Confidentiality  
Integrity 
Accountability 
T13 A Confidentiality 
Integrity 
H P13, P22 
T14 A Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
H P13, P22 
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T16 A
 
Confidentiality M P25 
T22 A Confidentiality M P3, P22 
T23 A Integrity H P3, P22 
T35 N Confidentiality 
Integrity 
H P25 
T45 A Accountability M P22, P24 
Public  data Integrity  T13 A Confidentiality 
Integrity 
H P13, P22 
T14  AN Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
H P13, P22 
T23 A Integrity H P3 
Sensitive data Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Accountability 
T13 A Confidentiality 
Integrity 
H P13,P22 
T14   A Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
H P13,P22 
T16  AN Confidentiality M P25 
T22 A Confidentiality M P3, P22 
T32 A Integrity H P3, P22 
T33 A Confidentiality M P26, P30 
T34 A Confidentiality M P26, P30 
T35 N 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
H P25 
T45 A Accountability M P22, P24 
Sensitive 
process 
Confidentiality 
Accountability 
T16 A Confidentiality M P25 
T22 A Confidentiality M P3, P22 
T30 A Confidentiality M P3, P22 
T45 A Accountability M P1 
For ease of comparing the mapping result, a detailed mapping list is given in Table 
7-11. 
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Table 7-11 Detailed Mapping Result of Threat and Security Pattern 
Threat ID Threat Name Pattern ID Pattern Name 
  T13 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) P13, P22 Intercepting Validator 
Secure Base Action 
T14 SQL Injection P13, P22 Intercepting Validator 
Secure Base Action 
T16 Network Eavesdropping P25 Secure Pipe 
T22 Disclosure of Confidential Data P3, P22 Authentication Enforcer 
Secure Base Action 
T23 Data Tampering P3,P22 Authentication Enforcer 
Secure Base Action 
T33 Session Hijacking P26, P30 Secure Session        
Secure Facade 
T34 Session Replay P26, P30 Secure Session    Secure 
Facade 
T35 Man in the Middle P25 Secure Pipe 
T45 User Denies Performing an 
Operation 
P22, P24 Secure Logger    Secure 
Base Action   
P1,P26 Audit Interceptor Secure 
Facade 
7.5.2 Security Pattern Integration 
Selected security patterns have been integrated into the system’s high level architecture 
depicted as Figure 7-18. 
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Figure 7-18 System High Level Architecture Integrated with Security Pattern 
Security related components and methods are usually scattered across many or most of 
the system design artefacts which resulting in the reduced flexibility and reusability due 
to the inherent coupling between them. One of the efficient methods to solve this 
problem is to coordinate the security related components by providing a central access 
point for administrating security related functionalities. A Secure Base Action pattern is 
used as the single access point for this purpose. Figure 7-19 illustrates the Secure Base 
Action pattern as the access component to coordinate the security related components. 
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SecurePipe SecureBaseAction
AuthenticationEnforcer
SecureLogger
InterceptingValidator
uses logs
uses
validates 
parameter
 
Figure 7-19 Class Diagram of Secure Base Action Pattern [158] 
The Facade design of the original WebStoreApp can be upgraded into secure Facade by 
using Secure Service Facade as the access point in the business tier. Every access point 
has to authenticate and audit the operation with the help of combining Audit Interceptor 
and Secure Session patterns. 
In this section, some of the security patterns are selected as the example to illustrate 
how they can be applied in the system with sample code. 
7.5.2.1 Intercepting Validator Pattern 
Several well-known attacks in web application, such as SQL injection, XSS and buffer 
overflow, are carried out by exploiting the vulnerabilities of lack of input validation. 
Intercepting validator pattern [158] is one of the most important security patterns used 
in web-based application development since it serves as a filter to rule out all potential 
malicious code or malformed content from the input of users. These validations may 
include the validation on data type, data length, data formatting, data boundary and 
null-value handling. 
Best practice indicates that validation checks have to be performed on the server side 
whether checking in client side is done or not. The reason lies in that it is easy to spoof 
and bypass the client side validation by using some proxy tools. 
Suppose that the client needs to access the UserAccount resource, the system integrated 
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Intercepting Validator pattern is forced to validate the client’s input according to the 
validation criteria provided by the pattern.  Figure 7-20 and Figure 7-21 show the class 
diagram and sequence diagram when applying the Intercepting Validator pattern. The 
same can be applied to different resource access when there are input requests.   
UserAccountClient SecureBaseAction
InterceptingValidator Validator
invokes invokes
validates 
parameter
validates
creates
 
Figure 7-20 Class Diagram of Using Intercepting Validator Pattern to Validate the Request to 
UserAccount Class 
:Client SecureBaseAction InterceptingValidator ParaValidator SQLValidator :UserAccount
1:create
1:create
3:request
3.1:validate
3.1.1:validate
3.1.2:validate
3.2:invoke
 
 Figure 7-21 Sequence Diagram of Using Intercepting Validator Pattern to Validate the Request to 
UserAccount Class 
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Figure 7-22 Block Diagram of the Main Component of WebStoreApp 
A block diagram is shown in Figure 7-22 which describes the main component of the 
system where the Intercepting Validator patterns are used at the points where the user 
can input data, since these are the most crucial points in terms of security. List 7-1 
shows the sample code of Intercepting Validator implementation with Apache Strut. 
import org.apache.struts.action.Action;  
import org.apache.struts.action.ActionMapping;  
import org.apache.struts.action.ActionErrors;  
/** 
* This code is based on Apache Struts examples.  
* It requires a working knowledge of Struts, not explained here.  
*/  
public final class SecureBaseAction extends Action {  
 public ActionErrors validate(ActionMapping actionmapping, HttpServletRequest request) {  
//perform basic input validation Validator validator = InterceptingValidator.getValidator 
(actionmapping);  
ValidationErrors errors = validator.process(request);  
if(errors.hasErrors())  
return InterceptingValidator. transformToActionErrors(errors);  
         //For any additional externalised processing, use the  
//key 'additional_security_validator_identifier'  
//specified as 'parameter' attribute in action-mappings 
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         String externalisedProcessingKey = actionmapping.getParameter();  
ExternalisedValidator validatorEx = InterceptingValidator. getExternalisedValidator 
(externalisedProcessingKey);  
errors = validatorEx.process(request);  
if(errors.hasErrors())  
return InterceptingValidator.transformToActionErrors( errors);  
// Alternatively, 
       // use 'additional_security_validator_identifier' to 
       //specify a class that implements command pattern 
        //and invoke the 'process' method on the instantiation  
         try {  
           Class cls = InterceptingValidatorUtil.loadClass(externalisedProcessingKey);       
Method method = InterceptingValidatrUtil.  
  InterceptingValidator.invoke( cls, method, new Object[] {request}); } 
        catch(Exception ex) {  
 log("Invocation exception", ex);  
 return InterceptingValidator.transformToActionErrors(ex); } 
}  
} 
List 7-1 Sample Code of SecureBaseAction class using InterceptingValidator with Apache Struts [158] 
7.5.2.2 Secure Pipe 
Sniffing, replay attack, man in the middle and network eavesdropping are common 
attacks occurred during the web based transactions. Data exposed when transmitting 
over the untrusted network is subject to be disclosed, modified or duplicated.    
Secure Pipe pattern [158] plays a key role in protecting the confidentiality and integrity 
of data during the transmission against these attacks by establishing a secure 
communication between the client and the server.  Secure Pipe pattern is composed of 
two components, client-side component and server-side component, which work 
together to build a secure communication. Generally, the components can be SSL 
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(Secure Socket Layer) or TSL (Transport Layer Security) libraries that the web browser 
of client side and application of server side use for secure communication. 
Figure 7-23 and Figure 7-24 illustrate the structure of application scenario of Secure 
Pipe pattern while List 7-2 and List 7-3 show the sample code implementation using 
SSL in server side and client side respectively. 
Client ApplicationSecurePipesends request uses
creates
 
Figure 7-23 Class Diagram of Secure Pipe Pattern [158] 
3.2.1:process
3.1:process
2.1:negitiate
SecurePipe
:Client Application
1.login System
1.1:uses
2.create
3.:request
4.forward request
4.1.1:process
5:destroy
4:logout
4.1:logout
  
Figure 7-24 Sequence Diagram of Secure Pipe [158] 
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package com.csp.web.securepipe;  
import java.io.*;  
import java.net.*;  
import java.rmi.server.*;  
import java.security.KeyStore;  
import javax.net.*;  
import javax.net.ssl.*;  
import com.sun.net.ssl.*; 
import javax.security.cert.X509Certificate;  
 /**  
* This class creates RMI SSL connections.  
*/  
public class RMISSLServerSocketFactory  
implements RMIServerSocketFactory, Serialisable {  
SSLServerSocketFactory ssf = null;  
     /**  
     * Constructor.  
     */ 
     public RMISSLServerSocketFactory(char[] passphrase) {   
 // set up key manager to do server authentication  
 SSLContext ctx;  
 KeyManagerFactory kmf;  
 KeyStore ks;  
 try {  
  ctx = SSLContext.getInstance("SSL");  
  // Retrieve an instance of an X509 Key manager  
  kmf = KeyManagerFactory.getInstance("SunX509");  
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   //Get the keystore type.  
   String keystoreType = System.getProperty( "javax.net.ssl.KeyStoreType");  
   ks = KeyStore.getInstance(keystoreType);  
   String keystoreFile = System.getProperty( "javax.net.ssl.trustStore");  
   // Load the keystore.  
   ks.load(new FileInputStream(keystoreFile), passphrase); 
    kmf.init(ks, passphrase);  
   passphrase = null;  
    // Initialise the SSL context. ctx.init(kmf.getKeyManagers(), null, null); 
         // Set the Server Socket Factory for getting SSL connections.  
    ssf = ctx.getServerSocketFactory(); }  
     catch(Exception e) {  
    e.printStackTrace(); }  
     }   
    /**  
    * Creates an SSL Server socketnad returns it.  
    */ 
    public ServerSocket createServerSocket(int port)  
    throws IOException { 
          ServerSocket ss = ssf.createServerSocket(port);  
return ss; } 
 }  
List 7-2 Creating a Secure RMI Server Socket Factory Using SSL [158] 
Package com.csp.web.securepipe;  
import java.io.*;  
import java.net.*;  
import java.rmi.server.*; 
import javax.net.ssl.*; 
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public class RMISSLClientSocketFactory  
implements RMIClientSocketFactory, Serializable {  
public Socket createSocket(String host, int port) 
throws IOException { SSLSocketFactory factory =    
(SSLSocketFactory)SSLSocketFactory.getDefault(); 
 SSLSocket socket = (SSLSocket)factory.createSocket(host, port) return socket; }  
} 
List 7-3 Creating a Secure RMI Client Socket Factory Using SSL [158] 
7.5.2.3 Authentication Enforcer 
Poor authentication enables malicious users to access the system’s resources for which 
they are unauthorised to do. It is dangerous that a user’s credentials and related data to 
authenticate a web application are accessed by other users or co-existing applications. A 
web application must ensure that only valid users can access the restricted resources 
with proper authentication. 
Authentication Enforcer pattern provides a centralised authentication enforcement by 
performing user authentication and encapsulating the implementation detail of the 
authentication mechanisms to ease evolving authentication requirements and facilitate 
reuse.  
Figure 7-25 depicts the class diagram of Authentication Enforcer pattern. The 
responsibilities of each participant in Authentication Enforcer pattern are: 
• Client. A client uses the Authentication Enforcer to authenticate a user. 
• Authentication Enforcer. The Authentication Enforcer authenticates the user 
using the credentials passed in the Request Context. 
• Request Context. The Request Context contains the user's credentials 
extracted from the protocol-specific request mechanism. 
• Subject. The AuthenticationEnforcer creates a Subject instance that represents 
the authenticated user. 
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Client
Subject
AuthenticationEnforcer
RequestContext
uses
uses
uses
uses
creates
 
Figure 7-25 Class Diagram of Authentication Enforcer Pattern [158] 
 
Figure 7-26 Sequence Diagram of Authentication Enforcer Pattern [158] 
Figure 7-26 illustrates the sequence diagram in which the client is a Secure Base Action 
pattern that delegates to the Authentication Enforcer, which retrieves the appropriate 
user credentials from the UserStore. Upon successful authentication, the Authentication 
Enforcer creates a Subject instance for the requesting user and stores it in its cache. 
package com.csp.web;  
:Client AthenticationEnforcer
RequestContext
UserStore
1:create
2:authenticate
2.1:get data
2.2:retrieve
:Subject
2.3:create
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public class AuthenticationEnforcer {  
   public Subject login(RequestContext request)  
   throws InvalidLoginException {  
         // 1. Instantiate the LoginContext  
         // and load the LoginModule  
         try { 
             LoginContext ctx = new LoginContext("MyLoginModule",  
             new WebCallbackHandler(request)); }  
         catch(LoginException le) {  
    System.err.println("LoginContext not created. "+ le.getMessage()); }                                         
catch(SecurityException se) { 
             System.err.println("LoginContext not created. "+ se.getMessage()); }   
         // 2. Invoke the Login method  
           try { 
               ctx.login(); }  
           catch(LoginException le) { 
               System.out.println("Authentication failed"); } 
           System.out.println("Authentication succeeded");  
           // Get the Subject   
           Subject mySubject = ctx.getSubject(); 
           return mySubject;  
       }  
    } 
List 7-4 Sample Code of Authentication Enforcer Pattern Using JAAS Authentication Strategy [158] 
7.5.2.4 Final Integration Result 
Security patterns are illustrated in the previous sections. In this section, the result of 
integration of the selected security patterns into the system model is shown in Figure 
7-29. Figure 7-27 and Figure 7-28 specify the instantiation of security patterns in web 
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tier and business tier respectively. Based on the integration method proposed in Section 
6.5.2, the class sets are integrated according the considerations.  
 
Figure 7-27 Class Diagram I of Secure Pattern Instantiation  
Client SecureServiceFacade
AuditInterceptor
AuditLog
AuditEventCatalog
TransferObject SecureSessionObjectuses
audit
retrieve
record
secure transfer
 
Figure 7-28 Class Diagram II of Secure Pattern Instantiation  
Client SecureBaseAction
AuthenticationEnforcer
RequestContext
Subject
InterceptingValidator Validator
LogManager
Logger
LogFactory
uses
uses
SecureLogger
creates
uses
logs
validates 
parameter
uses
creates
uses
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Figure 7-29 Class Diagram of System Model Integrated Security Patterns 
From the final integration architecture, it can be concluded that security patterns can 
protect the system against the potential risks while increasing the system’s complexity 
and may be take the efficiency as the cost. Therefore, it is important to make a trade-off 
decision between them for the system developer. 
Security patterns have proven as the useful and efficient way to integrate security 
features into the system design. Even through there exist many versions of the 
application and across applications, these patterns will continue to grow and their 
implementation will be refined with the emerging of new security problems.  
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7.6 Discussion 
The goal of this study is to provide a suitable, effective and reusable approach to 
enhancing security levels by reengineering web software. The previous sections of this 
chapter demonstrate how the proposed SEMDA approach is applied to the legacy web 
application WebStoreApp. This section discusses the proposed approach based on the 
following criteria:  
• Effectiveness compared with other methods 
• Efficiency on the needed user efforts  
• Applicability for various context 
7.6.1 Effectiveness Comparison with Other Methods 
Security is a kind of quality which can only be defined in a relative way with respect to 
another system or by showing that a system satisfies some predefined security 
properties. The case study in this chapter demonstrates the latter by introducing security 
pattern to achieve the predefined security properties. The generated security enhanced 
system models indicates where the patterns should be integrated to protect which assets 
against which security problems. The experiment shows the proposed approach can lead 
to a security enhanced system on the model level.  
The security improvement in this research highly depends on the security ability 
provided by security patterns. The ability to provide security by security pattern has 
been well evaluated and proved in some researches such as [26, 49, 69-71, 77, 185]. 
Take the approach in [71] as example, two e-commerce applications are designed in 
which one is developed using security patterns and other is built with the same 
requirement and techniques but without using security pattern. Security evaluation has 
been made to compare the quality of these two systems with the same category STRIDE 
attacks. The experiment results show that the non-secure application has a high risk of 
being affected by the attacks, whereas the secure application has a significantly lower 
risk. Therefore, this thesis does not conduct the research on what degree the security 
level has been leveraged for the given legacy system as such evaluation has been made 
in the mentioned approaches.  
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As described in Chapter 2, there are several approaches concerning security 
enhancement for existing systems. None of them concerns the security improvement for 
legacy system from the reengineering perspective. They focus either on some specific 
developing stage, such as architecture, design and implementation, or on some specific 
security aspects, e.g. authentication or authorisation. Even though some of them [29, 97, 
153] provide systematic approach to evolve existing applications for security concerns 
both on requirement and architecture level, they assume the original design artefacts are 
at hand and address security problems directly upon them. However, it is not the case 
for most of the legacy systems. The proposed approach complements such information 
by providing a comprehensive solution involving a comprehension method to extract 
useful information especially security implementation information. Moreover, because 
of the encapsulation of security expertise solution in security pattern, the integration of 
security pattern into system design models makes more effective security guarantee.  
Models representing higher level of abstraction play an important role in the proposed 
approach. Security pattern itself is reusable elements in the software design. Both make 
it possible to produce reusable and evolvable applications.  
Although SEDMA approach involves several kinds of models and is based on model 
driven concepts, the “driven” is still in the preliminary stage. More general approach 
needs to be proposed to widen its range for utilising and the transformation rules are 
needed to facilitate the automation.  
7.6.2 Efficiency on the Needed User Efforts  
The proposed approach has been regarded as a semi-automatic process that involves a 
series of manual work and automatic transformation with toolset support. User efforts 
needed in the proposed approach is analysed from the activities involved in the whole 
evolution process. 
In the process of legacy system understanding, user efforts are analysed as follows: 
• Model extraction. This activity is achieved with the support of reverse 
engineering toolset. Appropriate tools can facilitate the UML model generation 
automatically. When it comes to object oriented applications, class diagram is 
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commonly supported in almost all of the reverse engineering tools. It is not he 
case for sequence diagram. Sequence diagram reverse engineered from source 
code using automatic tools can not represent the abstract object completely due 
to the specific implementation technique of programming language. For example, 
there may be intermediate result in the extracted diagram, while it should be 
hidden in the abstract level sequence diagram. Therefore, a manual revision to 
the extracted sequence diagram is required. 
• Model dependency analysis. Different dependency among classes are analysed 
and defined which lays the foundation of subsequent model slicing. This process 
needs manual analysis. However, the proposed CSDG construction algorithm is 
likely to be implemented as a tool to generate the CSDG automatically. 
• Model slicing. It is likely to realise the slicing automatically based on the 
proposed slicing algorithm with a given slicing criteria. 
• Legacy system partition. Partition algorithm makes it possible to decompose the 
system into several clusters automatically. 
• Security countermeasure detection. Identification of security implementation in 
the current design is a complicated process which involves a certain amount of 
manual intervention with the support of security expertise and experience.  
In the process of security requirement elicitation, user efforts analysed as follows: 
• Asset analysis. The proposed asset identification method is based on the 
semantic analysis of the system model with the security risk expertise and 
experience. Therefore, it needs manual intervention in this process. 
• Threat analysis. Threat identification and quantification methods proposed in 
this research has been designed and implemented as a tool. 
• Vulnerability analysis. This identification of vulnerability is implemented with 
an existing tool and quantified using CVSS.  
• Risk assessment. With the output of asset, threat and vulnerability analysis, risk 
level is generated with the proposed formula automatically. 
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• Security evaluation. Manual work is needed to perform the evaluation together 
with the security expertise to determine whether the provided security satisfies 
the required security level. 
• Security requirement elicitation. Security requirements can be produced 
automatically by formatting asset, threat, security features and risk level. 
In the process of security integration and forward engineering, user efforts analysed as 
follows: 
• Security pattern organisation. The proposed classification criteria make it 
possible to organise the security pattern automatically. 
• Security pattern selection. It can be implemented by pattern search engine 
with the help of provided security ontology. OWL API as a Java API can be 
used to facilitate the process. With the provided selecting algorithm, it is 
likely to automate this process. 
• Security pattern integration. Manual work is needed to match the pattern 
participants with the corresponding model elements. 
• Code generation. Forward engineering toolset can facilitate this process 
automatically. 
Security-driven software evolution is a complex and inherently knowledge intensive 
process which requires tons of domain knowledge involving software system 
knowledge, security engineering as well as expertise and experience from specialists. 
Even though some steps of the evolution process can be implemented to be automatic, 
manual intervention is still required to facilitate the understanding and analysis. The 
research in this direction is quite recent and far from producing a completely automatic 
transformation process. 
7.6.3 Applicability for Various Context 
The proposed security evolution approach is intended to be applied in web based 
applications coding by object oriented language. Even though several steps of the 
propose SEMDA approach have close relationships with object oriented techniques and 
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web applications, such as model extraction in Section 4.2 is automated by toolset which 
supports object oriented programming, security countermeasure detection in Section 4.6 
concludes typical security mechanisms used in web applications, the proposed threat 
identification method in Section 5.2 is based on the environments where the web 
applications are hosted, the design ideas or activities in SEMDA can be used as a 
guideline for software practitioners to solve similar problems in other types of legacy 
systems.  
7.7 Summary 
The purpose of the legacy WebStoreApp case study is to illustrate that the proposed 
approach makes it possible to improve the security level during the software evolution. 
The process is achieved via the following steps: 
• Understanding the legacy system through model extraction, model slicing and 
system partition techniques. 
• Eliciting the security requirements via assessing the risk of legacy system by the 
analysing assets, threats and vulnerabilities. 
• Improving the security level by integrating the appropriate security patterns into 
the legacy system. 
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Chapter 8                  
Conclusion and Future Work 
   Objectives 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 To summarise the whole thesis 
 To revisit original contributions 
 To evaluate the research with answers to the research questions 
 To review the success criteria 
 To illustrate the limitations of the work 
 To outline future work 
    _________________________________________________________________ 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the presented work and assessing to 
what extent the research aims and objectives set in Chapter 1 have been addressed. 
Firstly, a summary of the thesis is presented, then the significance of the contributions 
and the limitations issues are discussed, and finally directions for future work are 
suggested. 
8.1 Summary of Thesis 
The research on software security has become a hot topic in information domain.  
Many security methodologies and countermeasures have been developed and scattered 
all over the software development lifecycle to improve software security. However, 
most of the existing approaches to software security are limited to the integration of 
security features from the scratch of software development in the new designed software 
systems or maintenance of current used software by merely integrating some kind of 
security mechanisms. Systematic security improvement for legacy system is rarely 
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reported.  
This thesis aims to integrate software security research with software evolution which is 
an attempt to improve the security level in legacy system using model driven approach. 
The proposed reengineering approach, SEMDA, involves many issues related to 
software reverse engineering for security, security requirement elicitation and security 
enhancement.   
In this thesis, models representing the static and dynamic views are extracted from 
legacy code by toolset, which is the only possible system artefact. Once a series of 
models have been generated, they can serve as a foundation for the redevelopment of 
the legacy system to satisfy the new requirement. Security requirements can be elicited 
through analysing the risks to the legacy system and satisfied by integrating well-proven 
security pattern into system models. MDA forward engineering tools could facilitate the 
code generation from enhanced security models as well as provide round-trip 
reengineering for the legacy system. The case study confirms that the proposed SEMDA 
is a suitablel, effective and comprehensive approach.  
8.2 Significance of Contributions and Evaluation 
This thesis proposes solutions to integrate security engineering and software evolution, 
as observed in chapter 1. Specifically in Chapter 3, the thesis proposes a novel approach, 
SEMDA (Security-driven software Evolution using a Model Driven Approach). This 
section will revisit the original contributions described in Chapter 1: 
C1: In Chapter 3, a novel software reengineering framework is created to integrate 
software security and software evolution for web application. This proposed 
framework shown in Figure 3-1 consists of legacy system extraction for security, 
security requirement elicitation and security enhancement with ontology-based 
security patterns.  
C2: In Chapter 4, a method of legacy system understanding for security is proposed.  
A method of slicing models is presented on the basis of analysing different kinds of 
dependency relationships among classes and objects in UML diagrams. An 
intermediate representation diagram called CSDG is defined by combing the 
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advantages of class diagram and sequence diagram. The construction CSDG 
process is presented in List 4-1 and the model slicing algorithm based on the 
constructed CSDG is shown in List 4-2. An improved algorithm to decompose 
legacy system is developed based on the proposed CDSG and model slicing 
algorithm shown in List 4-3. A metric to measure the independence of a cluster is 
used and as a part of decomposition algorithm.  
C3: In Chapter 5, a method of security requirement elicitation for web application is 
proposed. A classification method for web applications is presented via taking 
consideration of the environment where the application is hosted to ease the threat 
identification for software developer. The process is described in Section 5.2.2.    
An environment driven security requirement elicitation method for web application 
is proposed, based on which an approach to risk assessment using security vector 
for web application is proposed and its tool is developed to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed approach. The elicitation process is proposed in 
Section 5.2. 
C4: In Chapter 6, a method of enhancing security level for web application is proposed. 
A multiple aspects method to organise security patterns is presented as security 
pattern is adopted as the security improvement methodology for security evolution. 
The detail of the method is described in 6.3.3.  A security ontology for 
inter-relating elicited security requirements and security pattern is defined and 
realised in OWL in Section 6.4. Validation has been made on the proposed security 
ontology with a series of competence questions. The developed ontologies are 
shown in Figure 6-6 and matching algorithm is presented in List 6-8.  
8.2.1 Research Questions Revisit 
The evaluation of this study starts from answering the proposed research questions 
presented in Chapter 1: 
How can security patterns be used to meet the security 
requirements elicited by risk analysis through model driven 
approach to evolve the security for web software 
applications? 
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The question has been answered in general by proposing an approach called SEMDA. A 
collection of research questions are defined to refine the whole question in detail. 
RQ1: Why is there a need for a security driven software evolution approach?  
Legacy systems are threatened by a lot of security problems due to their old 
design and lack of security consideration.  (Section 1.1) 
RQ2: How models are used to direct the whole process? 
Models and modelling techniques as the main artefacts and activities are used at 
every stages.  
• How may the models be extracted from source code in legacy systems? 
  Automatic tools are used to extract the initial diagrams, and then manual 
intervention is needed to correct and revise them into a form that can be used to 
the next stage. (Section 4.2.3) 
• What type of models is required to reengineer the legacy system?  
  Static diagram representing the system structure and dynamic diagram 
representing the system behaviour are chosen as the models in the proposed 
approach, which are class diagram and sequence diagram in UML. (Section 4.2.2) 
• How may the models be used to reengineer legacy system?  
System design models are extracted by reverse engineering techniques. Extracted 
models are used to construct intermediate graph CSDG (Section 4.3), which is 
used to facilitate the system understanding (Section 4.4). System domain models 
are achieved by analysing risks (Section 5.2). Security enhanced design models 
are finally generated by combining the system design model, security 
requirements domain model and security pattern model (Section 6.5).   
RQ3: How may security requirements be elicited from the legacy systems?  
Underlying requirements may be extracted by applying risk analysis for legacy 
system. (Section 6.4) 
• How may the risk be assessed for legacy system? 
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A security vector based method is proposed to assess the risk level for the legacy 
system taking asset, vulnerability and threat into consideration. (Section 5.1) 
• What kind of information is needed to represent the security requirement? 
After risk analysis, a list with columns of asset, threat and risk level is generated 
which is treated as the security requirement format in this thesis. (Section 5.4) 
RQ4: How may the elicited security requirements be satisfied by security patterns? 
Security patterns have been proven as a useful and effective way to improve 
security level in the system design. (Section 6.3) 
• How may the “right” security patterns be found for the elicited security 
requirement? 
Section 6.4 shows an ontology is developed to map the security pattern with the 
security requirements. 
• How may the security patterns be integrated into legacy system model? 
Section 6.5 describes the integration process of the selected security patterns 
diagrams with the system diagrams. 
RQ5: How can the proposed approach be validated? 
Chapter 7 shows how the SEMDA approach is applied in a typical case study. 
8.2.2 Success Criteria Revisit 
In Chapter 1, a set of criteria are proposed to judge the success of the proposed 
approach in this research. In this section, detailed analysis of the proposed approach is 
presented based on these criteria. 
• What type of legacy systems is the proposed approach applicable? 
As description in Section 7.6.3, the SEMDA approach is suitable for the web 
based legacy systems whose source codes are available. Case study shows that 
SEMDA approach can extract models from the source code, analyse and apply 
the proposed techniques to the models to achieve the final goal.  
• Are the extracted models consistent to the original design and easy to 
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understand?  
The answer is positive. Even though extracting models from source code may 
result in information lost, the remained is the structural information preserving 
the necessary structure and traceability which lay the foundation for the new 
design. The extracted models are easy to understand by using UML as well. The 
conducted case study shows the positive evidence to this conclusion. 
• Is the security requirement elicitation framework able to reflect system’s detailed 
level security requirement under the current environment? 
The answer is yes. Detailed security requirement is specified using 4-tuple 
<Asset, Threat, Security Attribute, Priority> which means that which asset is 
protected in the security requirement against the threatening from which threat(s) 
by violating which security attribute and what kind of risk level.  
• How can the proposed method be able to address the elicited security problems 
and provide implementation issues supporting for development? 
Security pattern has been proven to be a useful and efficient way to solve the 
occurred security problem. Ontology, as a tool of knowledge representation and 
inferring, provides security pattern semantic ability. Moreover, due to the OWL 
representation, the security patterns are available in a machine readable format 
and it is expected to be utilised in the system automatically. 
• Is the security enhanced models reliable to perform forward engineering? 
The answer is positive. Lots of forward engineering tools have been developed 
and introduced in Section 6.6. As long as the security patterns have been refined 
and documented with enough information, it is possible to generate the code 
from the security enhanced models automatically. The case study shows the 
instantiation of the security pattern. 
• Is the proposed approach feasible to realise? For example, it is possible to 
design and implement a real tool to demonstrate the approach. 
The answer is yes. During every phase of the proposed approach, various 
algorithms have been developed and specified. It is possible to integrate the 
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implementation of each algorithm and provide a unified interface for real 
practice.     
8.3 Limitations 
Besides the success criteria mentioned above, it is believed that the proposed approach 
had additional successes as well as some challenges. 
• Dynamic diagrams cannot always be extracted from source code completely. 
Some models cannot satisfactorily be extracted from source code. These models 
are highly dependent on user interaction to identify external actors and their 
roles or are behaviour models of highly reactive systems with many external 
events. A developer/user community must be available in order to identify these 
external actors and the roles that they play in regards to the system or these 
actors with their roles must be available in up-to-date documentation.  
• Security mechanisms may demand manual work and become time consuming 
    During the detection stage, a great number of security criteria will be discovered 
and determined.  Due to the complicated implementation of security, security 
expertise is needed. If mistakes exist in this process, it will affect the decision 
making. 
• The poor quality of the legacy system may affect the efficiency of the proposed 
approach.  
      In this research, the legacy system is analysed by using reverse engineering tools. 
If the legacy systems are designed by standard programming, such as comments, 
document and coding format, etc., the proposed approach will be more effective. 
Otherwise, human intervention is needed to improve the quality of model 
extraction.  
• The category of security pattern has not reached the greatest extent and needs to 
be enriched. 
Security pattern based design will be limited when there doesn’t exist the 
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applicable security patterns to a specific security problem. The application of 
classic security design principles is a good alternative in such circumstance. 
However, with the more and more security knowledge being encapsulated into 
security patterns, it is certainly that security problems can be solved easily with 
the help of security patterns. The pattern based approach used in this thesis 
benefit from the rich security patterns. More importantly than all of that, it 
provides the idea of security knowledge reuse. 
8.4 Future Work 
In terms of the discussion with respect to the research questions, the research hypothesis, 
the original contributions, the criteria of success, and limitations, it can be concluded 
that SEMDA approach is a novel and systematic methodology for reengineering 
software for security improvement. The case study in Chapter 7 demonstrates the 
overall security reengineering process. Nevertheless, the research work in this thesis has 
not reached its endpoint. A series of future work can be enhanced and extended based 
on the current study. 
• Based on the presented model slicing approach in Section 4.4, sequence 
diagram can be further refined to several execution scenarios which can be 
integrated into the construction of CSDG for illustrating the system precisely. 
• The proposed threat elicitation approach is based on the web application 
classification which can be extended to other type of applications, for 
example traditional desktop application, embedded application etc. 
• The proposed security ontology, designed focusing on the mapping of 
security requirements and security patterns in the current work, can be 
instantiated using OWL API (e.g. Jena, a java plugin to process OWL 
ontology) to implement the processing of OWL ontology with graphical 
interface.  
• Security pattern integration relies on the precise documentation of security 
pattern repository. There are 32 security patterns in the pattern repository in 
the current work which can be extend with more and precise security patterns 
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in the future study. 
• In order to better evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, various 
case studies should be carried out. Especially, development an integrated 
toolset to ease the use of the proposed method could be another research 
project in the future works. 
• Due to the crosscutting nature of AOP, it is a good choice to deal with 
security evolution only if security is treated as one of the system’s concerns. 
Modelling security concerns as security aspects makes it possible to separate 
the security concerns with other system concerns which will generate a 
reusable and evolvable secure system. Therefore, implement security with 
AOP could be a meaningful research topic in the further study. 
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Appendix A: Security Patterns Repository Organised 
by the Proposed Classification 
No. P1 
Name Audit Interceptor [158] 
Context Application, Design 
Problem Deviations must be identified from the audit reports and corrective actions have to be taken so that the 
deviations do not recur, either through code fixes or policy changes. How can you make an auditing 
framework to easily support additions or changes to the auditing events? 
Classification Key Core Security, Repudiation 
Solution Intercept business tier requests and responses. Create audit events based on the information in the request 
response pair using declarative mechanisms defined externally to the application. The declarative approach 
is crucial to maintainability of the application. This makes it easy to keep up with the changed corporate 
policies. 
Related Patterns  
No. P2 
Name Authenticator [151] 
Context Application, Design 
Problem A malicious attacker might try to impersonate a legitimate user to have access to the user's resources. This 
could be even more serious if the impersonated user has a high level of privilege. 
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Spoofing, Authentication 
Solution Create a single point of access to receive the interactions of a subject and apply a protocol to verify the 
identity of the subject. Create a proof of identity if subject is successfully authenticated.  
Related Patterns Single Access Point, Policy Enforcement Point 
No. P3 
Name Authentication Enforcer [158] 
Context Application, Design 
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Problem A malicious attacker might try to impersonate a legitimate user to have access to the user's resources. This 
could be even more serious if the impersonated user has a high level of privilege. How to prevent agents 
who are not allowed from entering the system? 
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Spoofing, Authentication, Web and J2EE 
Solution Create a single point of access to receive the interactions of a subject and apply a protocol to verify the 
identity of the subject. Create a proof of identity if subject is successfully authenticated. 
Related Patterns Single Access Point, Policy Enforcement Point 
No. P4 
Name Authorisation [151] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Authentication is the process to verify the digital identity of the sender. Authorisation is the process that 
performs access control by deciding whether a program or a person has the privilege to access some data, 
functionality or service. Controlling access to the system resources and especially data is a key requirement 
for an application security.  
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Information Disclosure, Access Control,  
Solution Indicate, in a suitable representation, who is authorised to access what and in what way. Specify policies to 
define all the needed access to resources.  
Related Patterns Role Based Access Control, Reference Monitor 
No. P5 
Name Authorisation Enforcer [158] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Authentication is the process to verify the digital identity of the sender. Authorisation is the process that 
performs access control by deciding whether a program or a person has the privilege to access some data, 
functionality or service. Controlling access to the system resources and especially data is a key requirement 
for an application security. How do we specify who is authorised to access specific resources in a system? 
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Information Disclosure, Access Control, Web and J2EE 
Solution Indicate, in a suitable representation, who is authorised to access what and in what way. Specify policies to 
define all the needed access to resources. 
Related Patterns Role Based Access Control, Reference Monitor 
No. P6 
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Name Checkpointed System [16] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem A component failure can result in loss or corruption of state information maintained by the failed 
component. Systems which rely on retained state for correct operation must be able to recover from loss or 
corruption of state information 
Classification Key Core Security, Tampering, Availability,  
Solution Create a set of states and make the system follow the state sequences in its life cycle. Store persistent state 
information all the time. Use a wide variety of configurations that provide the ability to restart the system 
from a known valid state (i.e. the checkpoint), either on the same platform or on different platforms.  
No. P7 
Name Comparator Checked Fault Tolerant System [16] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Failure in one component often starts the domino-effect and the failure is propagated to bring about the 
entire system failure.  
Classification Key Exterior Security, Tampering, Availability 
Solution Structure a system so that an independent failure of one component will be detected quickly and so that an 
independent single-component failure will not cause system failure. Use multiple components to perform the 
tasks and report the result only if the result is similar for both the components.  
Related Patterns Encrypted Storage 
No. P8 
Name Container Managed Security [158] 
Context Application, Design 
Problem Adding programmatic security solutions to an application involves extra work on development of security 
libraries and verification of the implementation. For many applications, the choice would be to use 
declarative security. How can security be added declaratively to an application? 
Classification Key Core Security, Information Disclosure, Authentication, Access Control 
Solution Use standard security features provided by application container. Define application level roles at 
development time. Perform a mapping of these application level logical roles to users in the deployment 
environment at deployment time or thereafter. 
Related Patterns Intercepting Web Agent 
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No. P9 
Name DoS Safety [67] 
Context Application, Design 
Problem Denial of Service is tackled by adopting several network-based strategies. However, system architecture 
should be resilient to such attacks as well. 
Classification Key Core Security, DoS, Availability,  
Solution Protect against Denial of Service attacks by setting resource limit. This can be done by per process resource 
management or by adopting operating system’s resource management features. 
Related Patterns Small Processes 
No. P10 
Name Encrypted Storage [91] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Firewalls provide protection of data stored in a server by limiting access to it. However, data can still be 
accessed by hackers. The extreme option to protect data in server is not to store any sensitive information at 
all in server. This is infeasible, because the server needs to keep state. Since firewalls do not provide 
security at data level, there is need of some additional security in this level.  
Classification Key Core Security, Information Disclosure, Confidentiality 
Solution Encrypt critical data before storing them in the server. Decrypt data in memory before they are used by the 
server. Use a single key for encrypting all the data and periodically alter it if possible. This involves 
decrypting all data stored with previous key and re-encrypting it with the new key. If this leads to an 
availability problem, use a large encryption key that is difficult to compromise.  
Related Patterns Encrypted Storage 
No. P11 
Name Error Detection and Correction [16] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Data residing on storage media or in transit across communication links is often susceptible to errors. This 
can occur because of bugs in the local system, or because of active attempts by adversaries to corrupt the 
data.  
Classification Key Core Security, Tampering, Integrity  
Solution Add redundancy to data to facilitate detection of and recovery from errors. This can be done by simple 
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parity checking or integrity checking based on some hash values 
Related Patterns Comparator Checked Fault Tolerant System. 
No. P12 
Name Full Access with Errors [151] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Some user interfaces offer different options based on the privilege level of the user. The designer of such a 
user interface faces the challenge that the revelation of the complete interface can cause a problem because 
the user may not have rights to invoke all functionality. Even the access rights might not be known in 
advance. This problem generalises to any interface you design whenever there are multiple modes of usage, 
such as different access rights.  
Classification Key Core Security, Information Disclosure, Access Control, Authentication 
Solution Design the application so users see everything that is available to them. When a user performs an operation, 
check if it is allowed. Generate error notifications if they try to access unauthorised operations.  
Related Patterns Limited Access, Policy Enforcement Point, Security Session 
No. P13 
Name Intercepting Validator [158] 
Context Data, Design 
Problem Several well-known attack strategies involve compromising a system by sending requests with invalid data 
or malicious code. This entails injection of malicious scripts, SQL statements, XML content and invalid 
data. These attacks can be avoided by validating data before use. Because of the constantly changing attack 
patterns, the data validation mechanism has to continuously change to prevent against new attacks. Another 
concern is the freshness of data. An application cannot blindly trust the freshness of data 
Classification Key Core Security, Spoofing, Filtering, Integrity, Web and J2EE 
Solution Verify the user input before they are used. Use a pluggable filters approach and apply the filters 
declaratively based on URL, allowing different requests to be mapped to different filter chains. Restrict filter 
tasks to pre-processing of requests and providing validation, i.e. a yes or no decision. Apply validation in the 
server side, because client side validation is insecure and open to spoofing. Renegotiate trust between users 
from time to time. Keep a record of the volatility of the data. 
Related Patterns Session 
No. P14 
Name Intercepting Web Agent [158] 
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Context Application, Design 
Problem Security is often postponed until after the functional pieces of the application have been designed. After an 
application is deployed, it is very difficult to implement the authentication, authorisation and auditing 
mechanism. 
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Information Disclosure, Access Control, Authentication 
Solution Provide authentication and authorisation outside the application. Use an intercepting agent installed on web 
server and provide authentication and authorisation of incoming requests by intercepting them and enforcing 
access control policy at the web server. Isolate application logic from security logic.  
Related Patterns Secure Service Proxy 
No. P15 
Name Limited Access [151] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Presenting the entire user interface has an important security problem associated with it. Some options may 
be private for some privileged user group and other users should not even see those options. Seeing the 
entire user interface is annoying for a user who has access to only a few operations when he finds by 
clicking options that he is not entitled to perform those operations.  
Classification Key Core Security, Information Disclosure, Access Control, Authentication 
Solution Only let the users see what they have access to. Only give them selections and menus to options that their 
current access-privileges permit. Dynamically adjust the view when the permissions of the user change 
Related Patterns Full Access with Errors, Policy Enforcement Point, Security Session, chroot Jail 
No. P16 
Name Multilevel Security[151] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem How do you control access in an environment with sensitive data so as to prevent leakage of information 
Classification Key Core Security, Access Control 
Solution Assign classification to users and data. Separate different institutional units into categories. Enforce 
confidentiality and integrity by adopting security models. For example, confidentiality can be enforced by 
the Bell La-Padula model and integrity can be enforced by Biba's model.  
Related Patterns Role Based Access Control. 
No. P17 
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Name Policy[16] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Systems often express their requirements as policies. However, the policy has to be enforced to check 
conformance. The policy enforcement functions have to be invoked in a correct sequence.  
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Access Control 
Solution Isolate the part that makes policy enforcement decision in a discrete component of the system. Ensure that 
policy enforcement activities are performed in proper sequence 
Related Patterns Role Based Access Control, Policy Enforcement Point 
No. P18 
Name Protected System [16] 
Context ALL, Architecture 
Problem Protecting systems against unauthorised access is the first line of defence. At the entry point, the requests 
have to evaluate and access permission is granted only if they conform to some policy.  
Classification Key Security Pattern Space, Access Control 
Solution Structure a system so that all access by clients to resources is mediated by a guard which enforces a security 
policy. The guard can be any type of firewall that acts as the policy enforcement point. Each resource or the 
overall system is protected by a guard that evaluates the incoming requests 
Related Patterns Single Access Point, Policy Enforcement Point, Policy. 
No. P19 
Name Reference Monitor [151] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Authorisation policies have to be enforced. How can the authorisation policies be enforced to prevent the 
users and processes from performing illegal actions ?  
Classification Key Core Security, Information Disclosure, Access Control 
Solution Define a process that intercepts all requests for resources and validates access on them.  
Related Patterns Policy Enforcement Point 
No. P20 
Name Replicated System [16] 
Appendix A: Security Patterns Repository Organised by the Proposed Classification 
267 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Transactional systems are often susceptible to outages of communication links, communication elements or 
other system elements. It is important to assure availability of transactional services in the midst of such 
failures.  
Classification Key Exterior Security, Tampering, Availability 
Solution Replicate services at multiple points in the network and during failure replace the failed service with an 
available service. Perform load-balancing based on some workload scheduling mechanism by a workload 
management proxy 
Related Patterns Standby 
No. P21 
Name Role Based Access Control [151] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Specifying Authorisation policies becomes difficult if a system has many users and resources. How do we 
reduce the number of individual rights when there are many subjects and objects involved 
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Information Disclosure, Access Control 
Solution Group subjects into roles based on similarities in duties performed. Assign rights of accessing objects to 
roles.  
Related Patterns Authorisation 
No. P22 
Name Secure Base Action [158] 
Context All, Design 
Problem Security-related data and methods are used across many or most of the Web tier components. Operations 
such as verifying authentication, checking authorisation, and storing and retrieving session information are 
prevalent throughout the servlets and JSPs. Due to the nature of security, these operations are often tied 
together through their implementation. When many normal application components are exposed to many of 
these security-related components, flexibility and reuse are reduced because of the inherent underlying 
coupling of security components. 
Classification Key Perimeter Security, pattern space, Authentication, Access Control, Web and J2EE 
Solution A Secure Base Action pattern can be used as a single point for security-related functionality within the Web 
tier. By having Web components such as Front Controllers and Application Controllers inherit from it, they 
gain access to all of the security operations that are necessary throughout the front end. Authentication, 
authorisation, validation, logging, and session management are areas that the Secure Base Action 
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encapsulates and provides centralised access to. 
Related Patterns Intercepting Validator, Secure Logger, Authorisation Enforcer, Authentication Enforcer 
No. P23 
Name Secure Communication [16] 
Context Network, Architecture 
Problem The communication channel is susceptible to various attacks and it is inherently unreliable. The 
communication between two protected systems or a subject and a protected system is jeopardised by the 
unreliability of the communication channel 
Classification Key Exterior Security, Information Disclosure, Confidentiality 
Solution Ensure that mutual security policy objectives are met when there is need for two parties to communicate in 
the presence of threats. Create secure channel for sensitive data that obscure the data in transit. Reduce the 
associated overhead on the system by using ordinary communication channels for non-sensitive data. 
Related Patterns Protected System, Security Association, Information Obscurity 
No. P24 
Name Secure Logger [158] 
Context Data, Design 
Problem Application Logs have to be created appropriately at multiple points during an application’s operational life 
cycle. Event logs and related data must be secured against alteration by an attacker. Log data should not be 
accessible to unauthorised personnel. 
Classification Key Exterior Security, Tampering, Accountability, Non-repudiation, Web and J2EE 
Solution Use a centrally controlled logging functionality that can be used in various places throughout the application 
request and response. Decouple the logging functionality and provide it as a component or service to be used 
throughout the application. Cryptographically secure the logged data and keep additional information to 
verify the integrity of logged data. Control access to the log so that unauthorised users cannot view content. 
Related Patterns Standby 
No. P25 
Name Secure Pipe [158] 
Context Network, Design 
Problem Web-based transactions are often exposed to eavesdropping, replay, and spoofing attacks. Anytime a request 
goes over an insecure network, the data can be intercepted or exposed by unauthorised users. Even within 
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the confines of a VPN, data is exposed at the endpoint, such as inside of an intranet. When exposed, it is 
subject to disclosure, modification, or duplication 
Classification Key Network layer, Exterior Security, Web and J2EE, Information Disclosure 
Solution A Secure Pipe provides a simple and standardised way to protect data sent across a network. It does not 
require application-layer logic and therefore reduces the complexity of implementation. In some instances, 
the task of securing the pipe can actually be moved out of the application and even off of the hardware 
platform altogether. 
Related Patterns Point-to-Point Channel 
No. P26 
Name Secure Service Facade [158] 
Context Application, Design 
Problem Many access points in the business tier mean that many points of failure that have to be secured. Every 
access point has to have authentication and authorisation and data validation and auditing mechanism. This 
becomes an even more difficult problem if security has to be retrofitted. How can we provide a secure 
interface for a fine-grained and loosely coupled security service? 
Classification Key Core Security, Web and J2EE 
Solution Integrate fine-grained, security unaware service implementation into a unified, security-enabled interface to 
clients. Use it as a gateway where client requests are securely validated and routed to the appropriate 
fine-grained service implementation. Maintain and mediate the security and workflow context between 
interactive client requests and fine-grained services that fulfil portions of client requests. 
Related Patterns Intercepting Web Agent, Secure Message Router 
No. P27 
Name Secure Service Proxy [158] 
Context All , Design 
Problem Adaptation of existing systems to newer security protocols is a standard practice in software maintenance. In 
case of SOA, you want to expose your existing system as services that interact with other services, but their 
security protocols do not match 
Classification Key Core Security, Authentication, Access Control, Web and J2EE 
Solution Provide security service as a wrapper. Intercept all the requests from clients, identify the requested service, 
enforce the security policy as required by the service, optionally transform the request for the inbound 
protocol to that expected by the service, and finally forward the request to the appropriate destination 
service. On the return path, transform the results according to outbound requirements. Externalise the 
addition of security logic to existing applications. 
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Related Patterns Intercepting Web Agent, Secure Message Router 
No. P28 
Name Security Association [16] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Secure Communication pattern adds overhead because it adds expensive security mechanisms. It is better if 
the security associated information is not added to the data content every time two parties communicate but 
only used when the connection is established. This requires storing security related information at each end 
of communications channel. 
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Information Disclosure, Authentication 
Solution Define a structure that provides each participant in a secure communication with the information it will use 
to protect messages to be transmitted to the other party, and with the information which it will use to 
understand and verify the protection applied to messages received from the other party.  
Related Patterns Secure Communication 
No. P29 
Name Security Context [16] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Within a single execution context, program or processes need to act on behalf of multiple subjects. When an 
execution context, program or process needs to act on behalf of a single subject on multiple occasions over a 
period of time, it needs to be able to have access to information about the subject whenever it needs to take 
an action.  
Classification Key Core Security, Elevation of Privilege, Confidentiality 
Solution Provide a container for security attributes and data relating to a particular execution context, process, 
operation or action.  
Related Patterns Security Association, Subject Descriptor 
No. P30 
Name Security Session [151] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem Many web based transactions require the user to browse through multiple web pages. Normally the user logs 
in at the start of transaction and then follows multiple web pages. Different components acting on behalf of a 
user might need to know, which user is activating them and what are the user’s permissions. Having every 
individual component or program within the system identifying, authenticating and authorising users is 
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annoying to both users and developers. In addition, system components might call each other or work 
together and thus need a way to share information regarding the user without compromising this ‘global’ 
data to other users 
Classification Key Core Security, Information Disclosure, Integrity 
Solution Create a session object, that holds all of the variables that need to be shared by many objects. Associate 
every action of the user with the session.  
Related Patterns Single Sign On, Policy Enforcement Point, Integration Reverse Proxy, Front Door. 
No. P31 
Name Single Access Point [151] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem A security model is difficult to validate when there are multiple ways for entering the application. How can 
we secure a system from outside intrusion?  
Classification Key Perimeter Security, Information Disclosure, Authentication 
Solution Set up only one way to get into the system and if necessary, create a mechanism to decide which 
sub-application to launch. Typically most applications use a log in screen to accomplish the single access 
point 
Related Patterns Policy Enforcement Point, Security Session 
No. P32 
Name Standby [16] 
Context Application, Architecture 
Problem A system component is exposed to failure. Failure of a single component might cause a system outage. How 
can an available system be designed where a system is tolerant of component failure?  
Classification Key Exterior Security, DoS, Availability 
Solution Structure a system with backup components so that the service provided by one component can be resumed 
by the backup component in case of system failure. In many systems, it is cost-effective to have a backup 
recovery mechanism 
Related Patterns Replicated System 
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Appendix B: OWL Representation of the Proposed 
Security Ontology 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
 
 
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [ 
    <!ENTITY owl "http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" > 
    <!ENTITY xsd "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
    <!ENTITY rdfs "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" > 
    <!ENTITY rdf "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" > 
    <!ENTITY Security "http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#" > 
    <!ENTITY untitled-ontology-12 "http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/2014/0/untitled-ontology-12#" > 
]> 
 
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
     xml:base="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl" 
     xmlns:Security="http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#" 
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
     xmlns:untitled-ontology-12="http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/2014/0/untitled-ontology-12#" 
     xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"> 
    <Ontology rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl"> 
        <rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="&xsd;string">An ontology that describes security requirements,security patterns and their 
relationships. Typical starting points for browsing should be the classes Asset, Threat, SecurityPattern.</rdfs:comment> 
        <Security:Creator rdf:datatype="&xsd;string">Hui Guan, guanh1999@126.com</Security:Creator> 
    </Ontology> 
     
    <!--  
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Annotation properties 
    // 
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     --> 
 
     
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Creator --> 
 
    <AnnotationProperty rdf:about="&Security;Creator"/> 
     
   <!--  
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Object Properties 
    // 
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     --> 
 
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#containsThreat --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;containsThreat"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Layer"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasApplicationContext --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasApplicationContext"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;FunctionalProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;AppicationContext"/> 
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        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasAsset --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasAsset"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasDomain --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasDomain"> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasLayer --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasLayer"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasLifecycle --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasLifecycle"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasProblem --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasProblem"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasSecurityAttribute --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasSecurityAttribute"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityAttribute"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasSecurityConcerns --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasSecurityConcerns"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasSolutionType --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasSolutionType"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;FunctionalProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecuritySolution"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasThreat --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasThreat"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&Security;hasProblem"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasThreatType --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasThreatType"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;FunctionalProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;ThreatType"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#isSolvedBy --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;isSolvedBy"> 
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        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
        <inverseOf rdf:resource="&Security;hasThreat"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#isSpecialisedBy --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;isSpecialisedBy"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#isThreatenedBy --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;isThreatenedBy"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityProblem"/> 
        <inverseOf rdf:resource="&Security;hasAsset"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#requires --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;requires"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#residesOn --> 
 
    <ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;residesOn"> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;Layer"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
        <inverseOf rdf:resource="&Security;containsThreat"/> 
    </ObjectProperty> 
     
 
    <!--  
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Data properties 
    // 
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     --> 
 
     
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#hasSeverityScale --> 
 
    <DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&Security;hasSeverityScale"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&owl;real"/> 
    </DatatypeProperty> 
     
 
    <!--  
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Classes 
    // 
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     --> 
 
     
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#AppicationContext --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;AppicationContext"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ClassificationKey"/> 
    </Class> 
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    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ApplicationLevel --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ApplicationLevel"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ApplicationSoftware --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ApplicationSoftware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Software"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ApplicationSpecific --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ApplicationSpecific"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Asset --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Asset"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#AuditingAndLogging --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;AuditingAndLogging"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Who did what and when? Auditing and logging refer to how your 
application records security-related events.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Authentication --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Authentication"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Who are you? Authentication is the process that an entity uses to 
identify another entity, typically through credentials such as a user name 
and password.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Authorisation --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Authorisation"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>What can you do? Authorisation is the process that an application uses 
to control access to resources and operations.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ClassificationKey --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ClassificationKey"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecuritySolution"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">some key words to help the seucity pattern classification</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Communication --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Communication"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Physical"/> 
    </Class> 
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    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ConfigurationManagement --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ConfigurationManagement"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Who does your application run as? Which databases does it connect to? 
How is your application administered? How are these settings secured? 
Configuration management refers to how your application handles these 
operational issues.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Cryptography --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Cryptography"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>How are you protecting secret information (confidentiality)? How are you 
tamperproofing your data or libraries (integrity)? How are you providing 
seeds for random values that must be cryptographically strong? 
Cryptography refers to how your application enforces confidentiality and 
integrity.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Data --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Data"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DistribitedSystems --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;DistribitedSystems"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Document --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Document"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DomainSpecific --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;DomainSpecific"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ClassificationKey"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#EmbeddedSystems --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;EmbeddedSystems"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ExceptionManagement --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ExceptionManagement"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>When a method call in your application fails, what does your application 
do? How much does it reveal about the failure condition? Do you return 
friendly error information to end users? Do you pass valuable exception 
information back to the caller? Does your application fail gracefully?</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ExternalPersonnel --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ExternalPersonnel"> 
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        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Personnel"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Hardware --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Hardware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Physical"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#HostLevel --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;HostLevel"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#InputValidation --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;InputValidation"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>How do you know that the input your application receives is valid and 
safe? Input validation refers to how your application filters, scrubs, or 
rejects input before additional processing.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#InternalData --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;InternalData"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Data"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#InternalPersonnel --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;InternalPersonnel"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Personnel"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Layer --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Layer"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityContext"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#LifeCycle --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;LifeCycle"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityContext"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Media --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Media"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Physical"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#NetworkLevel --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;NetworkLevel"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#OS --> 
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    <Class rdf:about="&Security;OS"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ParameterManipulation --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ParameterManipulation"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Form fields, query string arguments, and cookie values are frequently 
used as parameters for your application. Parameter manipulation refers 
to both how your application safeguards tampering of these values and 
how your application processes input parameters.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Personnel --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Personnel"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Physical --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Physical"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Priority --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Priority"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#PublicData --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;PublicData"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Data"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Reputation --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Reputation"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SCADA --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SCADA"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityAttribute --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityAttribute"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityConcern --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityConcern"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ClassificationKey"/> 
    </Class> 
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    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityContext --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityContext"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPatternElement"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityPattern --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityPattern"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&owl;Thing"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A Security Pattern is a description of one particular recurring security problem that arises 
in specific contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme for its solution.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityPatternElement --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityPatternElement"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityProblem --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityProblem"> 
        <equivalentClass rdf:resource="&Security;Threat"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPatternElement"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecurityRequirementElement --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SecuritySolution --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SecuritySolution"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPatternElement"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SensitiveData --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SensitiveData"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Data"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Sensitive_Data --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Sensitive_Data"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Sensitive data is information that must be protected either in memory, 
over the wire, or in persistent stores. Your application must have a 
process for handling sensitive data.</rdfs:comment> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Service --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Service"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SessionManagement --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SessionManagement"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationLevel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>A session refers to a series of related interactions between a user and 
your Web application. Session management refers to how your 
application handles and protects these interactions.</rdfs:comment> 
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    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Software --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Software"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SolutionType --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SolutionType"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecuritySolution"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SystemSoftware --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;SystemSoftware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;Software"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Threat --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;Threat"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ThreatType --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;ThreatType"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;ClassificationKey"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#UbiquitousComputing --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;UbiquitousComputing"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#WebAndJ2EE --> 
 
    <Class rdf:about="&Security;WebAndJ2EE"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </Class> 
     
 
    <!--  
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Individuals 
    // 
    /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     --> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#AccessControl --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;AccessControl"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#AccessSensitiveDataInStorage --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;AccessSensitiveDataInStorage"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Sensitive_Data"/> 
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    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Accountability --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Accountability"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Analysis --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Analysis"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;LifeCycle"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Application --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Application"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Layer"/> 
        <Security:containsThreat rdf:resource="&Security;DataTampering"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ArbitaryCodeExecution --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;ArbitaryCodeExecution"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;HostLevel"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#AttackerCovrsHisOrHerTracks --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;AttackerCovrsHisOrHerTracks"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;AuditingAndLogging"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#AttackerExploitsAnApplicationWithoutTrace --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;AttackerExploitsAnApplicationWithoutTrace"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;AuditingAndLogging"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#AttackerRevealsImplementationDetails --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;AttackerRevealsImplementationDetails"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ExceptionManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Authentication --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Authentication"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
        <Security:hasLayer rdf:resource="&Security;Application"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;DataTampering"/> 
        <Security:hasLifecycle rdf:resource="&Security;Design"/> 
        <Security:hasSecurityAttribute rdf:resource="&Security;Integrity"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Authenticator --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Authenticator"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Authorisation --> 
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    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Authorisation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Availability --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Availability"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#BruteForceAttack --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;BruteForceAttack"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authentication"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#BufferOverflow --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;BufferOverflow"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;InputValidation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Canonicalisation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Canonicalisation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;InputValidation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#CheckPointed_System --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;CheckPointed_System"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Check_Point --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Check_Point"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ChecksumSpoofing --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;ChecksumSpoofing"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Cryptography"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Client_Input_Filter --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Client_Input_Filter"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Comparator-checked_Fault_tolerant --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Comparator-checked_Fault_tolerant"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Confidentiality --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Confidentiality"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
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    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#CookieManipulation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;CookieManipulation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ParameterManipulation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#CookieReplay --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;CookieReplay"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authentication"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#CoreSecurity --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;CoreSecurity"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;AppicationContext"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#CredentialTheft --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;CredentialTheft"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authentication"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#CrossSiteScripting --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;CrossSiteScripting"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;InputValidation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DOS_safety --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DOS_safety"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DataTampering --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DataTampering"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authorisation"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Sensitive_Data"/> 
        <Security:residesOn rdf:resource="&Security;Application"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DenialOfService --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DenialOfService"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ExceptionManagement"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;HostLevel"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;NetworkLevel"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ThreatType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Design --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Design"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;LifeCycle"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Detection --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Detection"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SolutionType"/> 
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    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Deterrence --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Deterrence"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SolutionType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DictionaryAttack --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DictionaryAttack"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authentication"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DisclosureOfConfidentialData --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DisclosureOfConfidentialData"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authorisation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#DistributedSystems --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DistributedSystems"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ElevationOfPrivilege --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;ElevationOfPrivilege"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authorisation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Elevationofprivilege --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Elevationofprivilege"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ThreatType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#EmbeddedSystems --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;EmbeddedSystems"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Encrypted_storage --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Encrypted_storage"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Error_detection/_correction --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Error_detection/_correction"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ExteriorSecurity --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;ExteriorSecurity"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;AppicationContext"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
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    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Filtering --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Filtering"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Firewall --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Firewall"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationSpecific"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#FootPrinting --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;FootPrinting"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;HostLevel"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#FormFieldManipulation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;FormFieldManipulation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ParameterManipulation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Full_access_with_errors --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Full_access_with_errors"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#HTTPHeaderManipulation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;HTTPHeaderManipulation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ParameterManipulation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#High --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;High"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Priority"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Implementation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Implementation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;LifeCycle"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#InformationDisclosure --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;InformationDisclosure"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ThreatType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#InformationGathering --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;InformationGathering"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;NetworkLevel"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Integrity --> 
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    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Integrity"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Intercepting_validator --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Intercepting_validator"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Several well-known attack strategies involve compromising a system by sending requests 
with invalid data or malicious code. This entails injection of malicious scripts, SQL statements, XML content and invalid data. 
These attacks can be avoided by validating data before use. Because of the constantly changing attack patterns, the data validation 
mechanism has to continuously change to prevent against new attacks. Another concern is the freshness of data.Verify the user input 
before they are used.</rdfs:comment> 
        <Security:hasLayer rdf:resource="&Security;Application"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;BufferOverflow"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;Canonicalisation"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;CrossSiteScripting"/> 
        <Security:hasLifecycle rdf:resource="&Security;Design"/> 
        <Security:hasSecurityConcerns rdf:resource="&Security;Filtering"/> 
        <Security:hasSecurityConcerns rdf:resource="&Security;Integrity"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;SQLInjection"/> 
        <Security:hasDomain rdf:resource="&Security;WebAndJ2EE"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#J2EE --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;J2EE"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#LackOfIndividualAccountability --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;LackOfIndividualAccountability"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ConfigurationManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Limited_access --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Limited_access"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;AttackerRevealsImplementationDetails"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Low --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Low"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Priority"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#LuringAttacks --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;LuringAttacks"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authorisation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#ManInTheMiddle --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;ManInTheMiddle"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SessionManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Medium --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Medium"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Priority"/> 
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    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Mitigation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Mitigation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SolutionType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Multilevel_Security --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Multilevel_Security"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Network --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Network"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Layer"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#NetworkEavesdropping --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;NetworkEavesdropping"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authentication"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Sensitive_Data"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#NonRepudiation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;NonRepudiation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityConcern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#OS --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;OS"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#OverPrivilegeProcessAndServiceAccounts --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;OverPrivilegeProcessAndServiceAccounts"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ConfigurationManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#PasswordCracking --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;PasswordCracking"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;HostLevel"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#PerimeterSecurity --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;PerimeterSecurity"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;AppicationContext"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Policy --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Policy"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
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    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#PoorKeyGenerationOrKeyManagement --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;PoorKeyGenerationOrKeyManagement"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Cryptography"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Preventtion --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Preventtion"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SolutionType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Protected_system --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Protected_system"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#QueryStringManipulation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;QueryStringManipulation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ParameterManipulation"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#RBAC --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;RBAC"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Recovery --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Recovery"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SolutionType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Reference_monitor --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Reference_monitor"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Replicated_System --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Replicated_System"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Repudiation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Repudiation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ThreatType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#RetrievalOfClearTextConfigurationData --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;RetrievalOfClearTextConfigurationData"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ConfigurationManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Role_Based_Access_Control --> 
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    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Role_Based_Access_Control"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SCADA --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;SCADA"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SQLInjection --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;SQLInjection"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;InputValidation"/> 
        <Security:hasSeverityScale>7</Security:hasSeverityScale> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Secure_Communication --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Secure_Communication"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Secure_Logger --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Secure_Logger"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Secure_pipe --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Secure_pipe"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;BruteForceAttack"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;CookieReplay"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;CredentialTheft"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;DictionaryAttack"/> 
        <Security:hasThreat rdf:resource="&Security;NetworkEavesdropping"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Secure_proxy --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Secure_proxy"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Secure_service_proxy --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Secure_service_proxy"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Security_Association --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Security_Association"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Security_Session --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Security_Session"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
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    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Security_context --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Security_context"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Session --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Session"/> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SessionHijacking --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;SessionHijacking"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;NetworkLevel"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SessionManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#SessionReplay --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;SessionReplay"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SessionManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Single_Access_Point --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Single_Access_Point"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Sniffering --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Sniffering"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;NetworkLevel"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Spoofing --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Spoofing"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;NetworkLevel"/> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ThreatType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Standby --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Standby"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Symmetric_Encryption --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Symmetric_Encryption"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityPattern"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#System --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;System"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Layer"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#Tampering --> 
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    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;Tampering"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ThreatType"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#UbiquitousComputing --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;UbiquitousComputing"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#UnauthorisedAccess --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;UnauthorisedAccess"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;HostLevel"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#UnauthorisedAccessToAdministrationInterface --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;UnauthorisedAccessToAdministrationInterface"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ConfigurationManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#UnauthorisedAccessToConfigurationStores --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;UnauthorisedAccessToConfigurationStores"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ConfigurationManagement"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#UserDeniesPerformingAnOperation --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;UserDeniesPerformingAnOperation"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;AuditingAndLogging"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#VeryHigh --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;VeryHigh"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Priority"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#VeryLow --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;VeryLow"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Priority"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#VirusesTrojanHorsesAndWorms --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;VirusesTrojanHorsesAndWorms"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;HostLevel"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#VoIP --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;VoIP"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;ApplicationSpecific"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#WeakOrCustomEncryption --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;WeakOrCustomEncryption"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Cryptography"/> 
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    </NamedIndividual> 
     
 
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/guah1/ontologies/Security.owl#WebAndJ2EE --> 
 
    <NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;WebAndJ2EE"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;DomainSpecific"/> 
    </NamedIndividual> 
</rdf:RDF> 
 
 
<!-- Generated by the OWL API (version 3.4.2) http://owlapi.sourceforge.net --> 
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